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Abstract 
I have constructed a narrative that draws on a variety of traditions, 
disciplines and discourses. This narrative was located in the discursive territory 
made available to me by my reading of poststructuralist feminist theory. I 
adopted a conception of poststructuralist feminism as a transformational politics 
involving a struggle against domination and oppression, a struggle motivated by 
a desire to change ourselves as well as the structures in which we live, a 
struggle which results in the transformation of both ourselves and our world. 
I have used the production of the text as an opportunity to reflect on the 
constructed nature of my own subjectivity. These reflections informed 
consideration of the construction of subjectivity in relation to five themes: one, 
feminism, patriarchy and power; two, ideology, discourse and language; three, 
truth, knowledge and reality; four, society, agency and subjectivity; five, 
dualism, consciousness and transformation. These themes were organised 
around the idea of betrayal and explored/expressed through three different kinds 
of text: autobiography; literary fiction; and academic . theory. These were laid 
alongside each other and each intended to be an iteration of similar ideas 
expressed through the employment of different discursive styles. 
The text was seen as an attempt at critical deconstruction, as a collision 
between the wider social structures and the life stories. Through this collision, 
the intention was to provoke the reader to critically reflect on the life stories 
presented in this work and perhaps, like the author, interrogate the deceptive 
habituated familiarity of her/his own life stories. 
In searching for a non-dualistic formulation of the human subject I have 
attempted to locate a perspective that allowed conceptualisation of body, self, 
person, identity and subjectivity in terms of both structure and agency. Such a 
search involved an exploration of possible relationships between people, their 
historical, political and social circumstances and the choices that they make. In 
exploring possible relationships between people, history, circumstance and 
choice I acknowledged that social structures do not exist without human 
subjectivity, and that social structures define the boundaries within which 
human behaviour, feeling, thought and action are both made possible and given 
meaning. I thus sought to articulate the inter-relationship of the human subject 
as agent and the social structure in which their subjectivity is enabled, enacted 
or performed in ways that proscribe, or enable, change. 
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Locution: a statement of intention 	 1 
LOCUTION: a statement of intention 
Beginning 
This text is about many things and made of many parts. It is in some 
sense fragmented and in some sense connected. Both the fragmentation and 
the connection are intentional and I have struggled to articulate a dialectical 
relationship between them without imposing a linear logic or establishing 
fixed or final causal relationships. This text affects, or appropriates, three 
narrative styles; literary fiction, autobiography and academic theory. These 
are laid alongside each other and each is intended to be an iteration of similar 
ideas expressed through the employment of different discursive styles. In so 
doing I am exploring the ways in which narratives are differently produced, 
intentioned and situated, their meanings variously arrived at. Thus repetition 
across the various parts of this text is intentional. This repetition aims to 
foreground the ways in which similar ideas are differently produced through 
different discourses. It is also a stylistic device that simultaneously disrupts 
linearity and allows the writer to return to earlier ideas in order to elaborate 
their meanings. 
This text is an exploration of myself, its author. It employs theory as a 
means of reflecting on the autobiographical stories, and situates the 
autobiographical stories as a ground for theory. In producing this text I am 
exploring the discursive production of my sexed/gendered/sexualised 
subjectivity, a subjectivity made flesh through the fictive narratives which 
allow its performance to appear, and feel, natural. 
Betrayal 
This text is, above all else, the product of my struggle to place myself 
in the world differently. It is an act of survival, motivated by a wound, by an 
act of betrayal. The sensation of the experience that is here (re)told is that of 
pain. It is precisely because of that pain that this text exists, has been made 
possible. This text is inscribed, scribed, described, in, by and through that 
pain. 
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Indeed, it is my contention that we have all been wounded, all 
betrayed. I am thus attempting to explore the relationship between the 
personal and the social, to explore the ways in which social structures, 
institutions and practices construct a range of subject positions that are taken 
up as if one's own. This illusion of individuality, this sense that our 
experience is our own, masks the discursive limits within which that identity 
is inscribed by socially produced discourses and relations of power. It is my 
contention that as social subjects we are betrayed in, through and by the 
truths, realities, knowledges, languages, selves and others that proscribe the 
subject positions available to us and through which we are able to take up, 
consciously or otherwise, a position that is experienced as personal, individual 
and natural. I understand that we are betrayed by the ideologies and 
discourses which make these betrayals possible, invisible and treacherous. 
Betrayal, then, is a central theme around which the various subjects and 
fragments of this text coalesce. 
In attempting to unmask these betrayals I seek to disrupt the 
distinctions between the known and the not known; between the familiar and 
the strange; between fact and fiction; between the habitual and the possible. 
Subjectivity 
For Pile and Thrift the human subject cannot be counted as singular, 
but is rather understood as a 'mass of different and sometimes conflicting 
subject positions' (1995, p.1). These subject positions are historically and 
culturally variable and mobile, and having fluid and imprecise boundaries are 
difficult to define or contain. In exploring human subjectivity I do not seek to 
articulate a definitive, static conception of the subject. Rather, I attempt to 
negotiate a whole series of interconnected terms; body, self, identity, person 
and subject, and in so doing note that these terms are variously equivocal, 
ambiguous, evasive and contested. Further, it is anticipated that these terms 
will be subsumed within the embodied subject articulated by this text. 
Discussion of bodies, selves and identities has often been formulated 
in binary terms; body/soul, reason/nature, nature/nurture, structure/agency. 
The structure/agency dualism emphasises social rules, sanctions and 
prohibitions on one side and individual thought, feeling and action on the 
other (Pile & Thrift, 1995, p.2). The structure/agency dualism proposes, on 
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one side, that the choices people make are largely determined by the 
circumstances in which they find themselves. This implies a passive 
acceptance of the dominant ideologies and practices of the social structure, 
capitalism, patriarchy, socialism, communism, religious fundamentalism and 
so on. The structure/agency dualism proposes, on the other side, that people, 
though bound by certain constraints, largely determine their own 
circumstances. Yet, the extent to which people are free to choose what they 
do, without constraint on their actions, is uncertain. 
In searching for a non-dualistic formulation of the human subject I am 
attempting to locate a perspective that allows conceptualisation of body, self, 
person, identity and subjectivity in terms of both structure and agency. Like 
Pile and Thrift, I attempt to locate 
the possibility of a theory of social action which recognises both the 
determination of structure on the action of individuals and the 
determination of individuals to do things, sometimes differently. 
(1995, p.2) 
Such a search involves an exploration of possible relationships 
between people, their historical, political and social circumstances and the 
choices that they make. In exploring possible relationships between people, 
history, circumstance and choice I acknowledge that social structures do not 
exist without human subjectivity, and that social structures define the 
boundaries within which human behaviour, feeling, thought and action are 
both made possible and given meaning. I thus seek to articulate the inter-
relationship of the human subject as agent and the social structure in which 
their subjectivity is enabled and enacted or performed. For Thrift, 
human agency must be seen for what it is, a continuous flow of conduct 
through time and space constantly interpellating social structure. 
(1983, p.31) 
The acts, thoughts and feelings of an individual are thus located in 
time and space, in historical/political/social moments that produce, prioritise 
and privilege certain possibilities, certain choices, over others. It is thus 
possible to locate subjectivities, which incorporate bodies and selves, in 
relation to social institutions, structures and practices and the meanings they 
give to the lived experience of individual subjects and the relationship 
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between the meanings individuals ascribe to their lives and the choices they 
subsequently make. 
Attempts to locate theoretical territories beyond the structure/agency 
dualism have focussed on the role of language in the production of culturally 
intelligible meanings about a range of phenomena, including human 
subjectivity (Cameron, 1985; Davies, 1989, 1993, 1994; Pile Sz. Thrift, 1995; 
Spender, 1980; Weedon, 1987). These sets of linguistic practices are 
informed, and cohere around, structural constraints or ideologies and are 
manifest through discourses and discursive practices which define those 
practices, possibilities and choices that are culturally intelligible and 
permissible and those that are not. This turn to language has allowed an 
interrogation of everyday life 'as simultaneously real, imaginary and symbolic' 
(Pile & Thrift, 1995, p.4). 
Text 
This text aims, amongst other things, to consider the subject, and the 
lived experience of the subject, as constructed in this territory between the 
real, the imaginary and the symbolic. It aims also to interrogate commonly 
held, commonsense assumptions about the body, the self, the person, the 
identity and the individuality of the subject. This interrogation, this text, 
begins with the author. 
I have attempted to construct autobiographical narratives from 
memories, many of them derived from early childhood. In accepting that 
these memories are more half-remembered possibilities than factualities I 
confer upon them the status of fiction. They are fictive narratives brought into 
play through the discourses through which they, and their meanings are 
articulated. 
These fictive narratives are 'an enigmatic point of inactuality, a strange 
stasis, the stasis of an arrest' (Barthes, 1993, p.9). This arrest is a disruption of 
reality; a reality disrupted by the experience of pain; a painful disruption of 
the familiar; a fragmentation; a shattering of the self as previously known and 
understood; a shattering of the reality previously taken for granted. This text, 
like memory, has been worked and reworked and recognises that, 
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There is no pristine, pre-social nugget of memory that is just waiting to be 
uncovered and appreciated, that hasn't been worked over, again and 
again. What we are left with is a fictional reconstruction of life events 
that we lend significance to, in accordance with the way our present 
emotional investments in certain identities shift and change. 
(Jackson, 1990, p.73) 
This text is seen as an attempt at critical deconstruction, as a collision 
between the wider social structures and the life stories. Through this collision, 
the intention is to provoke the reader to critically reflect on the life stories 
presented in this work and perhaps, like the author, interrogate the deceptive 
habituated familiarity of her/his own life stories (Jackson, 1990, p.10). 
I attempt, in the fictive autobiographical narratives to identify where 
agency, as expressed through choice making, might mediate structure, or 
where structure might mediate agency. Some of these choices were at times 
clear to me and consciously made. Other choices were more obscure, beyond 
awareness, outside conscious thought/action. For this reason, and others 
which will become clear throughout the text, reflexive consciousness is 
central to my project. 
In interrogating identities I thus aim to construct them reflexively 
rather than simply recognise them, to acknowledge that they are made not 
given. In so doing I seek to articulate 
the possibilities of hybrid identities which are not essentialist but which 
can still empower people and communities by producing in them new 
capacities for action. 
(Pile & Thrift, 1995, p.10) 
The resultant text, in terms of both style and subject matter, has been 
greatly influenced by poststructuralist feminist theory and represents my 
attempt to articulate the profound experience of personal transformation that 
has been central to its production. Through the use of multiple narratives I 
have attempted to record what it is like to undergo transformation in terms of 
both self understanding and an understanding of the situation of this self 
within its historical, political and social contexts. I am compelled to write in 
order to make sense of my self, my life, and therefore my explanation of 
subjectivity does not attempt to identify absolute, pure or universal structures 
which exist in any a-historical, a-political or a-social realm of possibility. 
Rather I think, reflect, speculate and write as an embodied subject with a 
particular historical/political/social location. In exploring patriarchy, power, 
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reality, consciousness and what counts as knowledge, I consider some of the 
structural features of the altered way in which I have come to look at self and 
world as both product and content of an altered consciousness. 
This text, as a consciously constructed collection of fragments, 
contests the myth that there exists a unified, stable individual whose identity 
can be expressed in a single, authentic, internally coherent language. Rather, 
multiple voices are used to explore and articulate the conflicts and 
contradictions, the shifting perceptions and meanings, of both personal and 
social worlds. The text affects a variety of language styles and interactive, 
intertextual contexts to suggest a subjectivity similarly 'precarious, 
contradictory, and in process, constantly being reconstituted in discourse each 
time we think or speak' (Weedon, 1991, p.33). 
This text is neither a singularly focussed monograph nor a collection 
of disparate fragments. It has no single point or ambition. Rather, it is about 
the creation of 'shifting frameworks and models of understanding, about the 
opening up of thought to what is new, different and hitherto unthought' 
(Grosz, 1994, p.xiii). 
This process does not pretend to be arbitrary, neutral or value-free. 
Rather, it is a deliberate, if selective, reworking of a personal history made 
possible within particular discursive contexts. The knowledge I seek is not 
value free, does not exist beyond the contexts in which it is constructed, and 
admits multiple possible meanings. Further, these meanings themselves are 
neither value free, nor located beyond the contexts in which they are 
constructed. My struggle is against the boundaries within which subjectivity, 
knowledge and reality are inscribed and constructed. 
Theory 
The theoretical positions I explore and adopt are not assumed to be 
monolithic, or capable of authentic replication. Rather, I recognise that within 
each theory there exist multiple discourses, some of them compatible, some 
competing, some contradictory, some contesting each other. Like Lather, in 
Foregrounding the reductiveness of the interpretive act, I propose my 
readings across these complex, shifting and polyvalent fields as neither 
correct nor final. 
(1990, p.126) 
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I adopt a conception of poststructuralist feminism as a 
transformational politics involving a struggle against domination and 
oppression, a struggle motivated by a desire to change ourselves as well as the 
structures in which we live, a struggle which results in the transformation of 
both ourselves and our world. Poststructuralist feminism is here understood 
as a politics directed at changing existing structures and relations of power, 
especially existing power relations between women and men in society. 
Further, I adopt a general notion of feminism as a politics that seeks to 
identify, critique and eliminate the subordination, oppression, inequalities and 
injustices individuals suffer because of their sex, their gender, or their 
sexuality (Weedon, 1991). 
In reflecting on the relationship between the personal and the 
theoretical, the individual and the social, feminist theory provides a context 
for an interrogation of personal experience within a social context. Rather 
than being dismissed as subjective, biased, particular or exceptional, personal 
experience is understood as a means of 'opening up ways of locating ourselves 
within a shared experience of power and subordination' (Seidler, 1989, p.ix). 
Given this challenge to the social/personal, theory/experience, 
objective/subjective dualisms, feminist theory 'openly states that knowledge is 
necessarily limited, representing only some possibilities' (Grosz, 1988, p.51). 
Such a view acknowledges a perspectival, partial and invested position in the 
production of knowledges. In place of an absolute and universal patriarchal 
knowledge, feminist theory proposes knowledges that are limited, political 
and representative of some, but not all, interests. Thus, there emerge multiple 
feminisms, multiple theories and multiple knowledges, some of which may 
contradict or openly contest each other, some of which may, or may not, be 
represented in this text. 
Having come to observe, understand and experience myself as 
fragmented, changeable, illusory, contradictory and unstable, I seek to 
articulate this self, write and speak this self, through disclosures that do not 
suppose or impose a sense of authenticity, certainty and essential foundation 
where none is perceived to exist. Thus in conceiving of structures without 
fixed centres it becomes possible to perceive them as 'always open to 
interpretation without end, unconfined, unreduced, unfinalised, untotalised, 
not continuous, not linear, where truth is never arrived at, is always involved 
in a play of differences that keep deferring its arrival, its full presence' 
(Docker, 1994, p.133). Such deferral makes space within discourse, within 
self, within text, for complexity, contradiction, density, difficulty and mystery. 
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This space is created in the simple admission that not everything, least of all 
this self, can be explained. What I seek, in entering this space, are ways of 
understanding self, sex, gender, sexuality, knowledge, reality, truth, social 
relations and culture, that do not resort to linear, hierarchical, singular, or 
binary ways of thinking and being. What I seek is a position of critical 
distance from those taken-for-granted assumptions accorded the status of truth 
within culture. This critical distance creates a space in which critique and 
reconstruction of existing social structures and practices becomes possible. 
Purposes 
This text aims to contest the myth that there exists a unified identity, 
self, authentic core or essence at the heart of the individual, 'a kernel of I-ness 
just waiting to be uncovered' (Jackson, 1990, p.6). Thus my self-reflexive 
narratives do not suppose that it is possible to 'strip away the onion-skin layers 
of deception' (Jackson, 1990, p.6) so that the authentic self may be revealed. 
Rather, I proceed on the understanding that this text is produced by, and 
reproduces for the reader, 'fragmentary I's that are constantly shifting over 
time and in different contexts and interactions' (Jackson, 1990, p.6). These 
fragmentary I's constitute multiple identities which are formed within 
different discursive frameworks. These fragmentary I's and multiple 
identities contest essentialist views of the self and understand the construction 
of subjectivity to be contradictory and open to change. 
But fragmentariness can also dissolve into isolated, individual acts rather 
than build up collective strength. Perhaps we need a more dialectical 
view that tries to bring together an awareness of multiple identities with a 
recognition that some versions of the self seem to be more significant 
than others. Perhaps they seem more important because they offer a 
greater continuity and coherence to us at times of flux. This can mean 
inviting us to embrace the illusory safety of a temporary 'real me, while, 
at the same time, being in the midst of other transitional selves that are 
continuously coming into conflict with the 'real me' ? 
(Jackson, 1990, pp.6-7) 
I have used the production of this text as an opportunity to reflect on 
the constructed nature of my own subjectivity. These reflections inform 
consideration of the construction of subjectivity in relation to five themes, 
each of which provide a focus for the chapters which follow. These themes 
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are: one, feminism, patriarchy and power; two, ideology, discourse and 
language; three, truth, knowledge and reality; four, society, agency and 
subjectivity; five, dualism, consciousness and transformation. These themes 
are organised around the idea of betrayal and explored/expressed through 
three different kinds of text: autobiography; literary fiction; and academic 
theory. The autobiography is distinguished by the use of italics, the literary 
fiction is distinguished by the use of bolded text and the reflections on both 
these and the academic theory are distinguished by the use of normal text. In 
what follows I juxtapose these three narratives in an attempt to further explore 
the complexity of the subjects and themes announced in this statement of 
intention. 
LOCATION: a statement of position 
What follows are story fragments, representing each of the fictions, 
autobiographical, literary and academic, to be found in this text. Selections 
from Jeanette Winterson's text, Sexing the Cherry (1990) are referred to as 
'Her Story'. The autobiographical fictions are referred to as 'My Story' 
Reflections on the academic texts and theories of others are referred to as 'Our 
Story'. The juxtaposition of these fictions is intended to signal, echo or 
illuminate the themes, reflections and preoccupations explored throughout this 
text. 
My purposes in this are multiple, differently intentioned at different 
moments; firstly to both reveal and conceal myself, my thoughts, to wedge 
them between someone else's narratives; secondly to demonstrate 
intertextuality; thirdly to signal many of the preoccupations that appear 
throughout my text; and fourthly, to interrogate everyday life as 
simultaneously real, imaginary and symbolic. 
The following extract from Sexing the Cherry (1990) has been selected 
and positioned here to draw attention to the way in which those 
unremembered and hence invisible episodes from childhood gradually 
appeared before me and, in revealing themselves, disrupted the familiar life 
with which I had become habituated. 
10 
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HER STORY 
Every journey conceals another journey within its lines: the path not 
taken and the forgotten angle. These are the journeys I wish to record. 
Not the ones made, but the ones I might have made, or perhaps did make 
in some other place or time. 
For the Greeks, the hidden life demanded invisible ink. They wrote an 
ordinary letter and in between the lines set out another letter, written in 
milk. The document looked innocent until one who knew better sprinkled 
coal dust over it. What the letter had been no longer mattered, what 
mattered was the life flaring up undetected ... till now. 
I discovered my own life was written invisibly, was squashed between the 
facts, was flying without me like the Twelve Dancing Princesses who shot 
from their window every night and returned home every morning with 
torn dresses and worn-out slippers and remembered nothing. 
I resolved to set a watch on myself like a jealous father trying to catch 
myself disappearing through a door just noticed in the wall ... I was 
giving myself the slip and walking through this world like a shadow. The 
longer I eluded myself the more obsessed I became with the thought of 
discovery. Occasionally, in company, someone would snap their fingers 
in front of my face and ask, "Where are you?" For a long time I had no 
idea, but gradually I began to find evidence of the other life and gradually 
it appeared before me ... 
Winterson, 1990, pp.9-10 
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This fragment of Winterson's text conveys a sense of the multiple, 
simultaneous journeys that I have undertaken and of the unexpected eruption 
of that which was previously invisible. My text recounts many journeys, 
some consciously begun, some not. Each point of departure, each turn, each 
moment of arrival has revealed paths previously invisible, some taken, some 
not. 
What follows is an attempt to rearticulate, elaborate and demonstrate 
some of the preoccupations and ideas signalled in my earlier statement of 
intention. These multivoiced textual fragments have been dated and arranged 
in a way that attempts to foreground the constructed nature of the text and 
demonstrate that it is neither seamless nor homogenous. Rather it has been 
conceived piecemeal over time and fashioned into a text by way of connecting 
themes and ideas. In so doing I attempt also to cut, perforate and juxtapose 
polyvocal narratives which work alongside each other, creating a text in which 
it becomes possible to read between the lines set out in another story, to 
discover the invisibly written life squashed between the facts. 
I attempt here also to signal the ways in which a specific incident, an 
experience of sexual abuse at the age of seven, has impacted on the production 
of this text. This incident has been understood, interpreted and reworked as a 
betrayal of trust at the hand of the father and has emerged as critical to the 
conceptualisation of betrayal as the central idea around which the themes and 
reflections of this text coalesce. 
Betrayal is here understood as involving something totally unexpected; 
something unforeseen; the involuntary or treacherous revelation of something 
previously hidden; a disruption which re/locates the subject differently in 
relation to a previous state of acceptance, comfort, safety or trust. Betrayal 
then, marks the end of a state of primal, unconscious trust. This state of trust 
is critical to the acceptance and maintenance of particular beliefs, 
understandings and practices to which we have become habituated. The 
disruption or loss of this trust marks a crisis; a dissatisfaction; a refutal or 
refusal of the familiar; and is in this sense critical to my understanding of my 
own experience and of the possibility of both personal and social 
transformation. 
The theme of betrayal is, in this work, expressed in the belief that 
things are always much more than they seem. Trust and betrayal are 
understood to be concomitant. The more intimately, thoroughly and invisibly 
we are embedded in something, the greater the drama of betrayal. Acts or 
experiences of betrayal mark the cessation of, or expulsion from, a state of 
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innocent trust, of unconscious, unquestioned acceptance. Separated from an 
object, situation or experience of familiar intimacy we are made vulnerable to 
the unknown, the unfamiliar. Betrayal then, is a wounding, a painful 
disruption of the familiar which allows for the gaining of complexity, the 
gaining of another view from which new possibilities may emerge. What 
interests me then, about betrayal, is not the eruption of fear, doubt, paranoia or 
cynicism, but the disruption of the familiar and the possibility of insight and 
transformation that this disruption brings. Betrayal brings too, the challenge 
of reflection, of an altered way of seeing and knowing, of an altered 
consciousness. This alteration, in turn, brings the possibility of resistance, 
subversion, transgression and transformation. 
Betrayal is also understood to be about relations of power and the 
ideologies, discourses and discursive practices which simultaneously structure 
them and render them invisible. Betrayal is also understood and explored at 
the literal/personal level at the hand of my father and at the 
symbolic/structural/political level at the hand of patriarchy and patriarchal 
ideologies. Betrayal is thus understood as simultaneously personal and 
political, individual and social. 
A certain pleasure is derived from a way of imagining oneself as 
individual, of inventing a final rarest fiction: the fictive identity. This 
fiction is no longer the illusion of a unity: On the contrary, it is the 
theatre of society in which we stage our plural; our pleasure is individual 
- but not personal. 
(Barthes, 1994, p.62) 
My stories, like myself, are discursive constructions. These 
constructed stories are not so much chronicles of actual experiences, but 
reconstructed memories that resemble the original experiences perhaps only in 
certain ways. Further, these memories are reconstructed and retold at some 
significant distance from the original experiences, and as such are reproduced 
or produced in a narrative more impressionistic, even fictionalised, than a 
simple and certain recount of events might allow. As author of these 
autobiographical stories I am engaged in the creation of myself, my world, my 
reality. 
Through this process, personal history becomes philosophy, and though 
built on fact, memory becomes fantasy, important fantasy, and ultimately 
the mythology by which we make our choices and live our lives. 
(Moore, 1994, p.36) 
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MY STORY 
Instead of following the path of a formal ontology (of a logic), I stopped, 
keeping with me, like a treasure, my desire or my grief ... not as a 
question (a theme) but as a wound: I see, I feel, hence I notice, I observe, 
and I think. 
(Barthes, 1993, p.21) 
JANUARY 1996 
I balk, demur, desist. This act of writing, this written, this writer, is 
tense, apprehensive, resistant, unsure of where to begin. I want to start 
everywhere, on all sides, but must locate a moment from which to sketch my 
narrative. I want also to acknowledge both the constructed nature of this 
narrative as well as the conditions under which it has been constructed. This 
text has been made, planned, revised and is not a seamless fabric of 
recollections and reflections. 
AUGUST 1995 
I have attempted to fashion connections across a number of ideas, 
discourses and disciplines. A singular purpose - an historical, political and 
social reflection on patriarchy - gave way to multiple and more complex 
purposes, manifest in a preoccupation with perceived relationships between: 
the social construction of subjectivity and human agency; the discursive limits 
of language and the construction of subjectivity and reality; hierarchical 
oppositional binarisms and the allocation of privilege, authority and power; • 
and pedagogical theory and practice and the construction of knowledge and 
truth. 
Reflection on these relationships gave way to an elaboration of 
multiple, and more complex, interrelationships. Further, what began as a 
narrowly focussed academic text gave way to something more personal. This 
shift profoundly altered the style, content and structure of the text, and 
necessitated the construction of multiple, and more complex, texts. 
My purposes, my texts, attempt to disrupt the taken for granted 
fact/fiction, rational/emotional, body/mind, self/other, male/female binarisms 
that freeze the field of possibility into a series of either/or choices. 
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I look to poststructuralist feminist theory and the possibilities of 
emancipatory/liberatory pedagogy for the reinvention/reconstruction of both 
subjectivity and reality, of both the subject and the real. 
FEBRUARY 1996 
I have attempted to create a polyvocal text which articulates narratives 
of possibility which disrupt dominant, taken-for-granted stories of a natural, 
inevitable and immutable gender order/reality. These stories/narratives are 
acknowledged as subject to truth/knowledge regimes, but not always 
subjected to them. They are, rather, juxtaposed against them to acknowledge 
their provisional status. 
Finally I am motivated by the possibility that people can transcend 
their difficulties, their sadness and their pain. And that is where my narrative 
begins. With pain. 
OCTOBER 1995 
I am outraged that this thing from the past sits like a rock in my belly. 
Though wishing it gone, I hold it. Cling. Grip. My body tensed in its 
protection. It is a weight; a stone rolled across the entrance of a dark 
cavernous moment. That moment has passed, is past, but alive in me still. A 
dead weight. Immovable. Painful. Immobilising. I lie here, immobilised, 
vacillating between frustration, anger and exhaustion. I don't need to hold 
this moment, this souvenir. I cannot deny its presence nor expect its memory 
to evaporate. Vanish. Rather, I can acknowledge this hard and bitter stone 
and release it from the place in which it has become lodged. Ease out. Move. 
Discard. Expel. This is possible, yet may cause as much pain in the passing 
as in the holding. It is Father; it is Brother; it is Lover. This patriarchal 
trinity have struck and played my weakness, making sad music. 
I offer up my stone, my sadness, my weakness, my bitterness. I seek 
release from the part of me that inhibits the free play of possibility in my life. 
I claim, reclaim, the freedoms that have been taken from me, that I have 
surrendered. This freedom is simultaneously exciting and terrifying. 
Liberation plays against the fear of disintegration. 
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FEBRUARY 1996 
The progress of this dissertation was disrupted by an eruption of my 
personal/emotional/psychological life, and I wanted to incorporate these 
eruptions into my text. It seemed to me then, as now, that the ideas I had been 
exploring in my reading and writing had unsettled me in a way I had neither 
anticipated nor fully understood. My academic work engaged me in critical 
reflection on issues and questions that I came to see as inextricably bound up 
in events that had shaped me since childhood. In recording these events, or 
some of them at least, I became persuaded by the proposition that reality is as 
much plastic as it is concrete. 
There is no such thing as objective reality. We each select our 
experiences through the filters of our genes, values and belief systems. 
Beginning with the world of our parents and then that of our surrounding 
society and institutions, we learn to see the world in a limited way that 
influences what we remember or forget, emphasise or downplay. 
(Suzuki, 1987, Preface) 
This text is similarly constructed, though more intentional. It is 
motivated by a desire to make connections between my academic research and 
my experience. Here, theory juxtaposes experience. Here, theory is better 
understood through reflection on experience and experience better understood 
through reflection on theory. In so doing I have constructed, reconstructed 
and retold stories about myself, stories informed by experiences, events and 
memories which feel important to me and which may provide insight into 
some of the ideas and opinions I now hold, as well as those ideas with which I 
currently struggle. In recounting these stories I struggle with chronology. My 
stories, unlike familiar linear narratives, do not begin at the beginning and end 
at the end. Memory-like, they do not conform to any ordered chronological 
sequence. Rather, they are erratic and, like this text, move backwards and 
forwards in time, subject to the vagaries of memory and the purposes of their 
author. 
When Ettie tells this story, although I have no reason not to believe it is 
true, it's sometimes hard to distinguish from the fairy tales she uses to 
illustrate her life. When I imagine the world in which she lived as a girl 
all that time ago, I do so through the lens of history. But Ettie does not 
see the past through a plate-glass window separating then from now. 
She sees the past more as a dream, and in that dream all of us are 
linked. For there are passages that everyone of us must traverse on our 
entry into life. It is the journey of the soul that marks us, Ettie says. 
Or not. And for that journey the past has as much meaning as the 
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present, and legend is as potent as the truest stories ... My friend Louise 
says it was Ettie who taught her that the past need not always be 
appeased; from her she learned to embrace it as a dream, allowing the 
narratives and rich images of memory into the clatter and uncertainty 
of the present. 
(Modjeska, 1995, pp.4,7) 
JANUARY 1992 
Sleep is a problem; a confusing problem. I drift into sleep without trouble, but 
then I wake up. Sort of Whilst I believe that my body is asleep my mind is 
somehow awake. Body asleep, mind awake. If this is not confusing enough I 
am confounded by the realisation that my mind is not awake to anything in 
particular- indeed anything at all. Except the sensation of being awake. 
Awake but not conscious. I don't think, dream, see or hear anything. 
Nothing. All I know is that my mind is not asleep in a sleeping body. At first 
this contradiction unsettles me, but as the month wears on I become 
surprisingly used to it. It becomes familiar, almost commonplace. Ordinary. 
Each morning I rise and my now awake body performs its daily rituals - 
exercise, eat, shower, dress. Yet I am an automaton, for my mind is still in its 
somewhere else place. I sense the space left empty by its absence. I learn not 
to panic, to wait the customary hour for mind to re-enter body, to reunite. I 
live like this now. Quietly. I do not tell anyone. It is secret, a hidden thing. 
FEBRUARY 1992 
A friend is critically ill and I fly to be with her. I tell her of my altered sleep. 
She has temporarily lost her sight and I am her eyes, just as she is my ear. I 
guide her, distract her. I take her to visit her friend the chiropractor. He has 
a new surgery nearby, a surgery he shares with a psychotherapist. It is 
Saturday. The surgery is closed and this chiropractor is painting his 
consulting room. Just as we are about to leave the psychotherapist calls in to 
check the progress of the painting. We are introduced and my friend suggests 
that I speak to him about my sleep. He proposes a consultation there and 
then, and I agree. 
hypnosis n (pl.- oses) (artificial production of) state like deep sleep in which 
the subject is responsive 
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So, here I am. Both asleep and awake. Again. Yet this time my mind is also 
conscious. Working. Listening. Thinking. Imaging. Responding to 
questions. I am wandering through my childhood. Unhappily. I find little 
comfort. I remember mostly fear, hurt, anxiety, insecurity. Remember? 
Perhaps it is more accurate to say that I experience the sensation of these 
things, for they are more feeling than facts of memory. More artefact than 
fact. I become increasingly panicked, fearful, rigid. I hear my quavering 
suppressed voice answer questions, eventually lapsing into silence. I am 
asked again to describe what is happening, who is there with me in this 
fractured moment that grips my mind. But I cannot say. I am mute. Not 
through ignorance, or doubt. But from terror. All I can say is that I am on 
the floor and that there is a shape over me. A big black shape like a blanket, 
at first standing, hovering, perpendicular, then suddenly over me. Terrified, 
unable to proceed, I am brought from this artificial sleep into waking 
consciousness. I rise from the couch/bed on which I have been lying and 
move to the armchair where I replace and retie my shoes. I am asked again, 
in this waking state, if! can reveal more about the black shape. I want to say 
'It is my father'. But I resist. Suppress the urge and almost immediately 
forget that I had wanted to say it. Asked again, sometime later, the words 
spill out, and as given breath are given life. My life. I am not asleep, 
artificially or otherwise. I am awake, but everything is a dizzying black. I am 
in a wheeling vortex. I am not in this room. I am not an adult. I am in the 
loungeroom of my childhood home. I am a child. I do not see this as if 
looking back. I am there. This is now. I feel it. I know it. Yet I cannot see 
where I am or what is happening. Everything is black. But I feel it. I feel my 
father's strength, dominance, power. I feel him enter me. I feel the pain. I 
scream. I relive, reexperience a moment from long ago. It is happening now. 
JANUARY 1966 
I remember. It is morning, I am at home. I believe alone. I am in the 
loungeroom, singing something from 'The Sound of Music' in my tuneful boy 
soprano. I am absorbed, pleased with the sound of myself, lost in a reverie of 
song. The door opens and my father comes in. Jam surprised (why isn't he at 
work?) and embarrassed (caught in a private moment). He's been sleeping off 
last night's drink (I recognise the signs). He wears only his underwear, white 
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Y-fronts and singlet. He tells me I sing like a girl. That's all I remember until 
1967. I lose a year of my life. I lose a part of myself 
FEBRUARY 1992 
My sense of myself the self I thought I was and knew, has been shattered, 
fragmented. I am crushed by this revelation. Lost. I am frightened, 
exhausted and confused. My mind is crowded by questions which have no 
answers and answers which have no questions. Did this really happen? Why 
would I make it up? Is it true? How can I prove it? How can I have 
forgotten? Why have I remembered? What else have I forgotten, 
misremembered, believed to be true? What and where are the boundaries of 
consciousness? What is real? How can my body remind me of things my 
mind has forgotten? How can my body know things I don't? How can I 
assume to know anything? 
I become obsessed with proof Truth. I search for clues. I recall that 
January when I was seven. I hatch that memory to this experience. 'The 
Sound of Music'? Surely I was too young to have seen it, too young to 
remember the songs. I go to a bookshop and look for a guide to the movies. 
Skimming to 'S' I find what I am looking for. I discover that I could have seen 
the film, could have known the songs. But what does this prove? All too little 
I'm afraid. I oscillate 1;.tween certainty and disbelief and still do. How can I 
know? How can I be certain? How can I determine the truth? I can't. 
FEBRUARY 1996 
You cannot sit down to write about yourself without rhetorical questions 
of the most tedious kind demanding attention. Our old friend, the Truth, is 
first. The truth ... how much of it to tell, how little? It seems it is agreed 
this is the first problem of the self-chronicler and obloquy lies in wait 
either way. Telling the truth about yourself is one thing, if you can, but 
what about the other people. 
(Lessing, 1995, p.11) 
Herein lies my greatest anxiety. In determining the truth of this matter I am 
not happy to say simply, this is true, or this is true for me. For my truth 
profoundly implicates another. My accused. I don't have the stomach for 
accusations of such tenuous uncertainty. Indeed, at times I censor my text so 
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as not to implicate particular others. My difficulty in locating truth is thus 
compounded by the responsibility that such truth seeking brings. 
There are,' however, things of which I can be more certain, memories, though 
difficult to locate in time, which feel more reliable. 
I remember the mixture of fear and deference that characterised my 
relationship with my father. I saw and knew him as wild, angry, violent, 
abusive, unpredictable and out of control. He was big, loud and without 
gentleness. I, by comparison, was small, fragile, uncertain, sickly, tentative. I 
disliked the way he treated my mother, who bore the brunt of his intemperate 
behaviour believing that in so doing she was protecting us, preserving our 
childhood. Early on I made a decision. A commitment. Whatever my father 
was, I was not. Whatever he did, I would do the opposite. I thus inscribed 
myself as weak, powerless, passive, quiet, sensitive, caring. I looked around 
and noted what people did, how they behaved. Seeing similarities between my 
father and his friends I quickly generalised his behaviour to include all men. I 
became less able to distinguish between those who were like my father and 
those who were not. For now I had generalised responses of fear, 
powerlessness, silence and mistrust to all men. This has dogged much of my 
adult life and is something with which I still occasionally struggle. 
Since I had come to ascribe hegemony to all men I defined myself as not male 
in order to sustain a sense of difference, of otherness. Whilst I identified and 
felt comfortable with women I knew, as much as I believed I was not male, 
that I was not female. The only male identity I felt able to adopt was that of 
boy. Even in my twenties, with the young children I was teaching, I playfully, 
though seriously, denied that I was a man, insisting instead that I was a boy. 
Denying my maleness/masculinity engendered a sense of difference. Always 
at school I was marked as such. Girlie. Sissy. Pool I was secretly happy 
with this. To be thus marked confirmed my status as not male, as not 
inscribed by the things that masculinity implied, and which I so hated. So, 
disliking men (and not being one of them anyway) I eschewed their company. 
Yet, as an eleven year old, I became enthralled by men's bodies. Desiring, I 
eroticised male bodies whilst dismissing the men who inhabited them. After 
some years I learned that this attraction had a name, 'homosexual', yet had no 
concept of homosexuality, of the sexual as lived experience. That came later, 
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and once again I resisted categorisation. Having been neither interested in 
nor aroused by women's bodies, I believed that I was not heterosexual. Yet I 
could not identify with the men I knew to be homosexual. I therefore inscribed 
myself as not heterosexual/not homosexual, and resolved the impasse by 
remaining nonsexual for many years. All this time the contradiction of my 
simultaneous attraction to and dislike of men was a source of irony, though 
somehow not of confusion. It was a contradiction I could live with. 
I have come to understand that the family I have grown up in was predicated 
on fear and power. I have come to understand that the world I have grown up 
in, was, and still is, predicated on the systemic and systematic allocation of 
power to men, and to some men more than others. I seek to understand this 
allocation of power, and propose a world predicated on love instead of fear, a 
mutual, reciprocal, sustaining love that empowers, emboldens and 
emancipates. 
To this end I have sought a theoretical framework that enables me to engage 
in self reflexive speculation on the formation of my attitudes, beliefs and 
knowledges about myself and my world. In locating a framework I also 
require one that allows me uncertainty and contradiction, that allows me to 
make provisional, partial statements that express my meanings as fully as I 
am able without closing those meanings to further interrogation and revision. 
I desire a framework that encourages thinking liberated from binary logic, 
where I can simultaneously know and not know, understand and not 
understand, that constantly opens and expands my field of inquiry. What I 
seek is no closed, finite set of meanings but rather, a web of possibilities from 
which the choosing subject makes decisions and takes action, in so doing 
manifesting some possibilities and not others. Thus, reflections on feminism, 
poststructuralism, discourse theory and subjectivity inform my stories and my 
search for theory that may illuminate their possible meanings. It is 
anticipated that my search will lead me beyond the limits of the discourses 
currently available to me and into the realm of the as yet unsaid, the not yet 
conceived, the not yet possible. I desire, then, alternative discourses that are 
not predicated on binary logic and power, nor motivated by fear. I am here 
struggling to articulate a discourse of love, one that is praxis oriented and not 
disembodied or abstracted. This struggle begins, has begun, with my stories, 
with me. 
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NOVEMBER 1995 
Quite early on I had discovered the overlooked space 
open to those of us with a silent life ... I had the trick of 
survival, of being able to hide in silent places. 
(Ondaatje, 1992, pp.200-201) 
I seek now to reveal, expose, release myself from that hidden place, break 
silence, find voice and tell what I have seen, heard and become during that 
time of hiding. 
Now revealed, I begin again, disrupting my familiar, uncertain of who I am, 
where I am going or what I might find. Yet, being, going and finding anyway, 
always in search of those things 'beyond the horizons of all the narratives 
of our lives' (Olcri, 1991, p.229). 
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OUR STORY 
What follows is simultaneously a theoretical reflection on my stories, 
on myself as their author and on the means of their production. It is also a 
reflection on myself as the author of this text and on the terms of its 
production. I am thus attempting to locate myself at the centre of my many 
narratives. 
Location 
As much as I am located in a succession of historical, political and 
social moments I am located too in this text. As fictive autobiography and an 
exploration of a discursively produced subjectivity, there is a moment in 
which I am this text, and this text is me. We are both, my text and I, 
discursively produced. 
A person is a text of sorts, as are his or her stories, theories, ideas, 
memories, wishes, intentions - anything that a person expresses. Like 
any rich text, a person has many, many layers of meaning, most of them 
unknown, even to himself. 
(Moore, 1994, p.245) 
Thus I am, and this is, a self/text, told and retold from different 
moments and from different perspectives. 
Perspectives 
My text is self consciously constructed from a position of white, 
middle class, non-hegemonic, non-heterosexual male masculinity (Connell, 
1991). In contesting patriarchy I seek out a 'nonphallocentric patterning of 
reality' (Jaggar & Bordo, 1990, p.6) as well as those discourses that make such 
apprehension imaginable, capable of articulation and possible. In so doing, I 
preference those discourses that allow me, as subject and author, to 
conceptualise the knowing subject as embodied, interested, emotional and 
rational, and as having been constituted by particular historical, political and 
social contexts. Thus in locating myself in the text I seek to both 
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contextualise self and knowledge as historical, political and social and 
foreground the ways in which my thoughts, values and acts take their 
meanings from the contexts in which I write, and am written. 
In adopting a historical perspective, I explore how the subject is 
simultaneously shaped by the past and engaged in the project of continually 
reworking the past which has shaped them. Thus I have attempted to 
problematise the relationship between past and present and suggest that past 
events are not immutably set for all time. 'Has been' does not mean 'always 
will be'. Rather, the significance of past events, both personal and cultural, is 
understood to be subject to selective perception, editing and reformulation in 
terms of the present day conceptions of reality, truth and knowledge held by 
the subject. 
In adopting a political perspective I explore how the subject is both 
discursively constructed and a political site of struggle. Thus, subjectivity is 
understood as a political arena worth struggling over. Subjectivity, as a 
politics of identity, recognises that subjects are a product of their relationship 
to, and place within, a diverse range of social practices and power relations 
within a variety of institutions. Thus, subjectivity is not simply an expression 
of an innate self but a political construction which can be known through an 
interrogation of the social and psychological forces that have shaped the 
making of that identity named 'self. 
In adopting a social perspective I explore how the subject is inscribed 
mentally, emotionally and bodily as a sexed, gendered and sexualised subject. 
I explore, too, the social conditions, practices and institutions that make this 
subjectification both possible and desirable. The subject's personal history of 
social practices and relationships is physically embodied in the habitual ways 
in which that body is held and moved, and the purposes for which that body is 
used. That body is inscribed in, by and through both its location within 
society and the power that accrues from that location. The subject's location 
within hierarchical structures of class, race, age and gender result in the 
formation of particular sorts of bodies, both personal and social. These bodies 
are thus understood as having meaning and identity through the social 
categories and discourses through which they are inscribed. The body, as a 
site for the enfleshment of social categories and meanings, is understood as 
natural (or normal) within discourses (and discursive practices) informed by 
binary logic and the dualistic either/or choices they propose: man/woman, 
male/female, masculine/feminine, heterosexual/ homosexual. An interrogation 
of the interpretive frame-works, forces, practices and relationships through 
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which the subject is socially constructed thus dislodges any conceptualisation 
of the subject as a-historical, a-political or a-social. I thus conceive the 
subject to be an historical, political and social artefact, and acknowledge that 
our sense of ourselves as subjects has become so naturalised that the 
conditions of our own construction have become invisible. 
Discourses 
I seek out those discourses that understand the subject to be an active 
participant in the construction of a reality which is constituted through the 
discourses and practices of the culture in which they find themselves. I seek 
out too, those discourses that understand that truth, reality, knowledge and 
common sense are constructed from both individual and collective points of 
view. 
This text, like its author, is a construction, the result of a process that is 
both motivated and intentional. Thus, this text is not a reflection of a natural 
world nor a spontaneous expression of its author's subjectivity. We are, my 
text and I, artifice and illusion, fabrication and invention. 
Text means Tissue; but whereas hitherto we have always taken this tissue 
as a product, a ready-made veil, behind which lies, more or less hidden, 
meaning (truth), we are now emphasising, in the tissue, the generative 
idea that the text is made, is worked out in a perpetual interweaving; lost 
in this tissue - this texture - the subject unmakes himself, like a spider 
dissolving in the constructive secretions of its web. 
(Barthes, 1994, p.64) 
Davies (1994) suggests that there is no self independent of the 
positions through which we each fabricate ourselves, and through which we 
are each fabricated. Here, the concept of position is understood to be more 
fluid than the concept of role, and recognises 'the constitutive force of 
discourse to make/fabricate the stories or narratives through which meaningful 
lives are made' (Davies, 1994, p.23). This text, my stories, the multiple 
narratives through which I fabricate myself and my reality are thus attempts to 
render my experience meaningful. This text, this fabrication, this self is 
constructed in the web of my lived experience and the discursive contexts in 
which I speak, read and write and through which I, and my meanings, am 
constructed as spoken, written and read. 
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This web of lived experience and discursive contexts emphasises the 
'multi-sided constructedness of ourselves and our worlds' (Lather, 1991, 
p.21). In creating this text I acknowledge that my simultaneous self-making 
and world-making is multi-sited. I thus seek structures, discourses, 
knowledges and theories that admit multiplicity. Yet this multiplicity is not 
random, unmotivated or neutral. Rather, it is situated within the context of 
active choice making and struggles for meaning. Further, it is situated within 
discourses which make the apprehension and articulation of those choices and 
struggles conceptually possible and capable of conscious, embodied action. 
Lather describes this combination of theory and action in terms of praxis, 'the 
self-creative theory through which we make the world' (1991, p.11). For 
Lather 'the requirements of praxis are theory both relevant to the world and 
nurtured by actions in it' (1991, pp.11-12). This text then is my praxis, my 
embodied subjectivity explored through theory which, in turn, informs 
imagination, knowledge, desire and action. This text, is my attempt to 
'produce an awareness of the complexity, historical contingency and fragility 
of the practices that we invent to discover the truth about ourselves' (Lather, 
1991, p.7). In producing this text I seek always to emphasise contingency and 
fragility and thus seek out those discourses, ideas, visions, structures, and 
locutions that enable this contingent, fragile, subject to speak. 
I seek to make connections across these discourses which illuminate 
the meanings and knowledges I am attempting to construct. In acknowledging 
the constructed nature of text, meaning and knowledge, I am opening them to 
the critical reflection of both author and reader. I am also making them 
available to the process and conditions of its construction out of the available 
discourses (Belsey, 1991, p.104). 
In constructing a text that seeks out connections across multiple 
discourses and struggles against universalising, homogenising coherence, the 
resulting text is not restricted to a 'single, harmonious and authoritative 
reading' (Belsey, 1991, p.104). 
Instead it becomes plural, open to re-reading, no longer an object for 
passive consumption but an object of work by the reader to produce 
meaning. 
Belsey, 1991, p.104) 
It is my intention to create a self-reflective text that in turn invites self-
reflexivity; a text which engages the thinker/reader/writer/talker in a process 
of continual contestation, or continual disruption of the familiar, the taken-for- 
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granted, the commonsensical. Through this polyvocal text I seek to draw on, 
rearticulate and amplify voices from other texts and, in so doing, produce an 
evocative text of fragmented, multiple narratives where meanings proliferate, 
diverge and coalesce. In aiming for something polyvocal and intertextual I 
include quotations from other voices, 'that as many speaking subjects we may 
articulate more fully the complexity, nuance and knowing of our embodied 
selves' (Flax, 1992, p.204). 
Voice 
Hence I construct a multiply voiced, or polyvocal text, where some of 
the voices are more identifiably mine than others', some more others' than 
mine, and some, a hybrid of many articulated in the illusion of one. 
Throughout my text quotations from other sources, the words of other authors, 
are taken out of the contexts in which I found them and reproduced / relocated 
in my own text. This reproduction of text, as subject to my purposes, may or 
may not reflect the intended purposes and meanings of their originator. In so 
doing I have made selections and omissions, left gaps, created inconsistencies, 
foregrounded that which is chosen and made invisible that which is excluded. 
I have also attempted to foreground the reflexive, derivative, intertextual, 
referential, contextual and constructed nature of knowledge, of language and 
of text. Thus, as speaker/writer I appropriate the voices of others, identifying 
their origin but mouthing them as my own for my own purposes, to express 
my own meanings. This is a conceit of ventriloquism: I create an illusion of 
the author as speaking subject and the text, the spoken, as the dummy. 
The third person, impersonal, universal, objective and authoritative 
voice of academic discourse has historically had more power than the 
personal, subjective particular voice. Here I attempt to move between them 
and in so doing 'interrupt academic norms by writing inside another logic, a 
logic that displaces linearity, clear authorial voice and closure' (Lather, 1991, 
p.8). Further, in moving between them I seek to dislodge the 
impersonal/personal, objective/subjective dualisms and the hierarchical 
relationship between them where the first term of the dyad is privileged over 
the second. Any use of either the personal or impersonal voice is not done 
with any claim to truth, universality or objectivity. Both voices are limited by 
my experience and knowledge of the world and this text is bound by those 
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limitations. I, my reality, and this text are all three perspectival, partial, 
contradictory, paradoxical and located within the discourses and discursive 
practices within which each is constructed. This location, or position 
weighs heavily in what knowledge comes to count as legitimate in 
historically specific times and places. The world is spoken from many 
sites which are differentially positioned regarding access to power and 
resources. 
(Lather, 1991, p.116) 
In contesting the objectivity of phallocentric patriarchal scholarship I 
seek to construct 'an engaged personal voice, saturated with feeling, values 
and political protest, a voice which emerges in feminist biography in which 
subject engages with subject' (Dimen, 1990, p.35). I thus seek a voice, and a 
style of writing, that is passionate, reflective, personal, political and scholarly. 
This voice is personal in that it articulates experiences, memories, 
dreams, feelings, motivations, desires, and relationships. It also articulates a 
struggle for meanings and a desire to explore the ways in which these 
meanings are constructed so that some are made more possible, or desirable, 
than others. 
This voice is political in that it articulates some ways in which the 
subject might act alone or with others to both imagine and create a world that 
is more just, more empowering and more liberating than the one in which we 
now find ourselves. I use stories about myself to introduce the ideas with 
which I am preoccupied and which constitute the basis of my academic 
research. Here, the personal and the political are no longer conceived or 
understood as binary opposites. Rather, the personal becomes political: the 
personal is political. The emphasis here is on the potential for changing both 
ourselves and the society beyond us; for changing both the individual and the 
social body, for linking personal change with political action. 
In producing this text I have 'mined my own fears and anxieties' and 
'drawn upon my own consciousness' as a resource for theory (Bartky, 1990, 
p.9). Yet, this 'politics of autobiography' does not 'replace the received 
patriarchal voice' (Dimen, 1990, p.35): rather, it is used to juxtapose it. In 
this text, both voices are used to 'generate a sense of opposition, difference, 
creative tension' (Dimen, 1990, p.35) just as they are used also to demonstrate 
continuity, similarity and connection. This combination of voices aims also to 
suggest the intersubjectivity, intertextuality, interrelatedness and indivisibility 
of author/reader/text and knowledge/knower/known. In so doing it also aims 
to identify and contest the boundaries that limit apprehension of the 
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possibilities for speaking, knowing and being beyond those currently available 
or imaginable. This is a process whereby 'tacit (subjective) and propositional 
(objective) knowledge are interwoven and mutually informing' (Lather, 1991, 
p.66). Thus, in reflecting on the construction of my own subjectivity, I hope 
to illuminate the constitutive effects of the discursive practices through which 
we are all constituted as subjects - and through which the world we inhabit is 
perceived, understood and made real. 
Poststructuralism 
Poststructuralist discourses interrogate the constructed, arbitrary nature 
of that in culture which is taken to be 'true', 'real' or 'natural' (Davies, 1989, 
1993, 1994; Lather, 1991; Weedon, 1987). Such concepts are understood as 
• being founded in first principles or causes upon which hierarchies of meaning 
are then constructed. These first principles are commonly expressed in binary 
oppositions, and poststructuralist theory provides discourses through which 
these oppositions may be deconstructed, contested and transformed, where 
either/or choices are opened up to multiple possibilities. The subject, as 
spoken and written into existence through systems of binary thought can 
equally be spoken and written into new existences 'that partially write over 
and rub out the old limited and limiting thought systems' (Davies, 1993, 
pp.176-'7). Taken for granted realities, knowledges and subjectivities may 
thus be erased by the imaginative reconstruction of alternative realities, 
knowledges and subjectivities. These alternatives propose and explore the 
possibilities of non-hierarchical, non-oppositional, non-dualistic ways of 
thinking and being. In exploring the imagined and fictive boundaries of my 
own subjectivity I aim to contest and transcend these boundaries and imagine 
ways of thinking and being beyond those in which I have been inscribed and 
through which I describe myself. 
Drawing on poststructuralist theory I proceed on the basis that culture, 
social relations, knowledge, truth, reality and subjectivity are 'neither fixed or 
finite' (Lather, 1991, p.xxi) but rather 'dynamic, expansive and intrinsically 
shaped by power and the struggle against it' (Lather, 1991, p.xxi). Here, 
unities give way to multiplicities, clarities give way to ambiguities, univocal 
simplicities give way to polyvocal complexities, and certainties give way to 
possibilities. These dissolutions result in 'the splintering, disintegrating and 
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fragmenting effects of the partiality and plurality of contesting voices' (Lather, 
1991, p.xvi). 
Parallel fictions 
I seek to construct a text which is similarly splintered, fragmented and 
multi-voiced and through which I may explore the intersection of individual 
consciousness and social context. This text juxtaposes autobiography, literary 
fiction and academic research, each of which articulate similar 
preoccupations, each of which is amplified by different discourses and 
narrative styles. What I seek is 'a way of cutting, of perforating discourse 
without rendering it meaningless' (Barthes, 1994, p.8) so that 'narrativity is 
dismantled yet the story is still readable' (Barthes, 1994, p.9) its telling made 
possible by 'the inhabitation of languages working side by side' (Barthes, 
1994, p.4). 
In juxtaposing autobiography, literary fiction, academic research and 
the various discourses and narrative styles through which they are given 
meaning and voice, I aim to disrupt those dualisms to which all discourses are 
held captive: impersonal/personal, objective/subjective, collective/individual, 
self/other, universal/particular, true/false, fact/ fiction. 
All three narratives in my text are equally 'made-up': autobiographical 
fiction, literary fiction, academic fiction. All three narratives in my text are 
equally factual, their meanings derived from a repertoire of substantive 
experiences and phenomena. Thus, I conceive both autobiography and 
academic research as 'factitious', no more true or real than that form of 
discourse that would ordinarily be identified as fiction, nor less true or real 
than that form of discourse ordinarily identified as fact. This notion of 
'facticity' collapses the dichotomous oppositional distinction between fact and 
fiction and foregrounds the nature of discourse as constructed through, and 
situated in, language, metaphor and narrative. 
In foregrounding the blurred, ambiguous, constructed and 
interpretative boundaries between fact and fiction I argue that knowledge, 
truth, objectivity, reason, subjectivity and reality are powerful fictions, 
fictions which are themselves the effects of power. These discursive 
constructions inform our efforts to understand ourselves, our lived experiences 
and our worlds. I am attempting, in this non-linear, fragmented, polyvocal 
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text, to capture some sense of the interpretative complexity of our lives. In 
disrupting the distinction between fact and fiction I suggest that all forms of 
discourse are 
imaginative reconstructions of our world, in so far as that world is 
mediated through our own and other's interpretative work. 
(Mulkay, 1985, p.11) 
I thus contest the objective/subjective, fact/fiction, true/false binarisms 
which have become mapped onto each other as objective/fact/true and 
subjective/fiction/false. Thus, in claiming all narratives in this text to be 
fiction I do not assume all to be untrue. Further, in dissolving any opposition 
between fiction and theory it becomes possible to map each term onto the 
other, creating a fictional theory or theoretical fiction. This text aims, more in 
the manner of fiction or poetry, to demonstrate or enact its effects 'through the 
use of ... repetition, polyvocality, allusion, ambiguity and contradiction' 
(Oppel, 1993, p.92). This text is thus cumulative, repetitive, personal, 
perspectival, partial and contextual. 
The parallel fictions I propose form a polyvocal narrative which 
simultaneously connect my personal history with my academic research. 
Memories of childhood sexual abuse recovered during the writing of this 
dissertation have informed, motivated, and made more complex (and painful) 
my reflections on the ways in which social categories, relations of power and 
life history have inscribed this body and this mind in terms of sex, gender and 
sexuality. This text is an interrogation of body, mind and emotion as 
inscribed in, and by, my inner histories and experiences. From it comes a 
critical reflection upon the nature of sexed/gendered/ sexualised subjectivities 
and the multiple and complex implications for the construction of individual 
and social identities. 
Purposes 
My reflections on personal experience and academic theory reveal my 
preoccupations and dilemmas with contemporary discourses and debates 
about subjectivity, agency, sex, gender and sexuality. I seek to disrupt the 
hegemony of those received, taken-for-granted common sense descriptions 
and meanings within which these discourses are located. In disrupting the 
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hegemony of the familiar I attempt to deconstruct and reconstruct some of the 
current discursive limits within which subjectivity, knowledge and reality are 
constructed, and in so doing, seek discursive possibilities for both personal 
and social transformation. 
In my reading, my talking, my listening, my writing, I share with 
others an ambition to explore: the discursive nature of subjectivity, 
knowledge, reality and truth and the extent to which these are mediated by 
relations of power; the subject positions made available within culture on the 
basis of the categories sex, gender and sexuality: the relationship between 
socially constructed/constrained subjectivities, consciousness, agency and 
embodied subjectivity; possibilities for both personal and social 
transformation; the possibility of a social world predicated on reciprocity and 
mutuality, not hierarchy and exclusion. These explorations, and the text 
through which they have been made possible and given voice, have been 
informed by discourses of feminism, poststructuralism and postmodernism. I 
have sought out theory which 
strives for uncertainty through questioning assumptions rather than 
seeking closure; which tolerates ambiguity, fluidity and contradiction; 
and which is built on imagining: imagining that things could be different, 
other, better than they are. 
(Vance, 1992, p.144) 
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CHAPTER ONE: feminism, patriarchy and power 
HER STORY 
The fog came towards me and the sky that had been clear was covered up 
... I began to walk with my hands stretched out in front of me, as do those 
troubled in sleep, and in this way for the first time, I traced the 
lineaments of my own face opposite me ... I was invisible then ... I know 
that these are figments of my mind and nowhere I have been. But does it 
matter if the place cannot be mapped as long as I can still describe it? ... 
There is a black tower where wild beasts live. The tower has no windows 
and no doors. No one may enter or leave. At the top of the tower is a 
cage whose bars are made of bone. From this cage a trapped spirit peeps 
at the sun. The tower is my body, the cage is my skull, the spirit singing 
to comfort me is me. But I am not comforted, I am alone ... 
Did my childhood happen? I must believe that it did, but I don't have 
any proof ... I will have to assume I had a childhood, but I cannot assume 
to have had the one I remember ... Everyone remembers things which 
never happened. And it is common knowledge that people often forget 
things which did. Either we are all fantasists and liars or the past has 
nothing definite in it. I have heard people say we are shaped by our 
childhood. But which one? ... 
When I was little my mother took me to see a great wonder. It was about 
1633, I think, and never before had there been a banana in England. I 
saw it held high above a man's head. It was yellow and speckled brown, 
and as I looked at it I saw the tree and the beach and the white waves 
below birds with wide wings. Then I forgot it completely. But in my 
games with ships and plants I was trying to return to that memory, to 
release whatever it had begun in me. 
When Tradescant asked me to go with him as an explorer I thought I 
might ... bring back something that mattered, and in the process find 
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something I had lost. The sense of loss was hard to talk about. What 
could I have lost when I had nothing to begin with? I had myself to begin 
with, and that is what I lost. Lost it ... in the gap between my ideal of 
myself and my pounding heart. 
Winterson, 1989, pp.14-15, 59, 92, 100-101 
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These fragments of text, these symbols, this fog, this tower, this 
wondrous banana represent features of the story I want to tell. They inform 
the articulation of the narrative of my fictionalised self, life and experience. 
Enveloped in a fog of sleep, of not being fully awake, of confusion and 
obscurity, I have struggled to more carefully delineate, face and recognise that 
shadowy dimension of self that lay hidden. I have struggled to simultaneously 
recognise both my childhood and adulthood, to liberate myself from the 
confining tower, this cage of bones that is my body, in which I have held 
myself captive. In so doing I have revisited an overlooked past, a childhood 
that may or may not have happened in the way I have remembered, or indeed 
forgotten it. Unreliable memory, ambiguous, partial, fictional, formed around 
a seminal event, lost to consciousness but ever present in that shadowy 
dimension I began to explore, looking for something I had lost, trying to 
release whatever it had begun in me. This is my story. 
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MY STORY 
I am a small, weak thing. My boundaries are fragile. A tiny insect on my 
body, even the anticipation of it, is an excruciating violation. I am vulnerable. 
Danger is everywhere. The world hurts. My father hurts. Bodies and minds. 
He is cruel. Unpredictable. Dangerous. I am small, weak, fragile, 
acquiescent. Powerless. He is a man. Strong. He is the magnetic centre of 
my universe. The point on which each thing hangs and turns. He brings no 
joy. No happiness. No comfort. No safety. I hide, cower, hang back. Slide 
away. Become invisible. Silent. Compliant. Safe. Or not. Not. He is a 
man. Men are like this. I am not a man. A boy but not male. I am passive, 
sweet and deferential. I bend and slide. It makes me invisible. Or so I think. 
I think now, in this fragmented, fragmenting moment that I am broken. A bit 
of me. Locked now in a dark place. Buried. Hidden. Lost. Abandoned and 
alone. I am pulled out of the landscape and into a mist that envelops me. Out 
of the physical, the material, the body, and into a realm beyond. A realm 
obscured by mist. Only hazy outlines, shadowy shapes suggest the presence of 
something more tangible. Thus am I. Mist. All is confused, vague, hidden. 
There is no looking back or beyond. All is concealed. My mind is foggy. I 
drift, doze, sleep-dream of nothing in particular. Or nothing that memory 
ushers back to consciousness. For now, I fossilise around this place of 
closure, protecting some lost possibility, swaddling my loss, my pain, my 
wound, my grief my humiliation, my fear, in a numbing forgeffulness. But I 
remember the man. The danger. The fear. All men are like this. Men are. 
All men. But I am not a man. No. I am a big boy who is not male. I am a big 
boy who is not male and I am on a couch. A psychiatrist's couch. I am 
distressed. Disoriented. Disrupted. My mind is disordered. A face looms. 
His face. My father's. Laughing. Mocking my weakness. I am pathetic. 
Powerless, as always. His gloating face another victory, another defeat. 
Mine. I am a big boy who is not male. I am on a chair this time. In a 
classroom. Reading, talking, thinking. Safe with women. Who have never 
hurt me. A light. A key. A door. A path. A way. A place of entry to that 
hidden shadowy place. A clearing fog. I struggle to go beyond the power of 
the father to keep me blind. I see it now. The betrayal. The wounding. The 
abuse of power. The complicity. I smell the musty possibility locked away so 
long ago. It is pungent and alive in me still. I move toward it. Tentatively. 
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But I am moving. The fog out there, like the fog in here, will, I know, begin 
sometime to clear and in clearing reveal a new landscape, a new series of 
possibilities. 
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In reflecting on my story I want to conceptualise betrayal as something 
simultaneously personal and social, where the personal is made possible by 
the social and the social made possible by the personal. My father's violence, 
his abuse of power and trust, meant that my home and family, as a place of 
safety and love, was made vulnerable to his power and the means through 
which it was expressed. We children were taught, and expected, to defer to 
the father's authority and this deference was betrayed by exploitation and 
abuse of the power that this authority conferred upon him. Eschewing 
violence, and limited by a two-fold choice of ally or victim, I took up the 
latter position. This position confirmed the power of the father, and his allies, 
and the powerlessness of those who, like myself, were his victim. I 
understand now that each of these positions, ally and victim, necessitated 
compliance and complicity. I understand too, that these positions replicated 
relations of dominance and subordinance, conferring greater power and 
privilege to the ally than to the victim, to the dominant rather than to the 
subordinate. 
I recognise that my familial relations replicate the structures, institutions 
and practices that locate power in the hands of those chosen to be powerful. I 
emphasise the extent to which power is conferred, as I see on one hand no 
natural/inevitable reasons for power to be allocated to any particular 
individual or group, nor any natural/inevitable reasons for the obvious 
disparity of power among different individuals or social groups. Rather, I see 
that the construction and allocation of power is fully historical, political and 
social, and argue that in this particular historical/ political/social moment men 
as a group have greater access to power than any other group. I see that the 
hierarchical structures through which power is conferred and maintained 
privilege men, some men more than others, and that this privilege is made 
invisible by propositions of superior strength, greater capacity for rational 
thought and other assumptions of the naturalness and fitness of men to rule, 
provide and protect the weak and dependent. In this way the inequities and 
disempowering consequences, both individual and social, of such actions 
come to be recast as protection and as a reflection of a natural order, of human 
nature. 
I suggest that the institutions, structures and practices we are taught to 
perceive as natural and in our best interest, reproduce those relations of power 
which maintain the right of men to dominate all social institutions, politics, 
law, economics, medicine, religion and the armed forces among them. I see 
also that compliance and complicity with, and deference to and maintenance 
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of, these institutions amounts to a betrayal of the possibility of a more 
equitable society. This is also a betrayal of self and other within the context 
of the structures of power that are believed to provide for and protect us. I 
argue that patriarchal institutions, structures and practices amount to a 
betrayal of power and of the possibility of empowerment. 
What follows represents an attempt to come to some understanding of 
power, patriarchy and social relations. This understanding is informed by the 
discourse of critique made available to me by poststructuralist feminist theory. 
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OUR STORY 
Purpose 
In this chapter I locate myself in relation to theories of feminism, 
patriarchy and power. In so doing I attempt to clear a space from which to 
articulate my own meanings within sometimes contradictory and competing 
discourses. This space provides me with a discursive opportunity to write my 
way to some understanding of my experience of sexual abuse as 
fundamentally about betrayal and powerlessness. This experience became, 
imperceptibly, generalised rather than particular to a given moment, a given 
man, a given context. Thus I am preoccupied with how a fragmented and 
fragmenting moment became an interpretive framework for all subsequent 
moments. I am preoccupied too, with understanding why I might have 
continued to defer to the rule of the father and the father's rules, and with how 
I might begin to disrupt or subvert them. It is these reflections and 
preoccupations, as well as the complex relationship between the theories and 
the position I take up in relation to them, which provide a theoretical context 
within which the rest of the text is written and may be read. 
I recognise the processes through which both author and text are 
constructed to be historically, politically and socially contingent. Like the text 
I am constructed in a context and it is my location in this context that I intend 
to explore. 
The politics of location requires each individual to define the historical, 
cultural, psychic and imaginative boundaries which provide the ground 
for political definition and self definition, of the subject's body and the 
social body, and to become critically aware of the relation between 
experience, identity and political perspective. 
(Cornwall & Lindisfarne, 1994, p.44) 
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Patriarchy 
I locate both author and text within the concept of patriarchy and this 
location informs my exploration of the relationship between gender and power 
(Connell, 1991). The concept of patriarchy is used to map a matrix of 
intersecting institutions, discourses, structures and practices which create, 
maintain, legitimise and naturalise male hegemony, privilege and power in all 
aspects of culture and social life. Patriarchal authority is located in 
hierarchical, dualistic structures which result in the suppression, oppression 
and marginalisation of difference, of different discourses, knowledges and 
visions of reality in a variety of complex ways. These patriarchal structures 
are not ahistorical, apolitical and asocial. Rather, they are understood to be 
historically, politically and socially produced and seen to take different forms, 
and develop different supporting ideologies, institutions and practices, in 
different historical periods, across culture and in varying political contexts 
(Connell, 1991; Davies, 1991; French, 1992; Weedon, 1991). 
Thus, I understand the historical, political and social moment in which 
I think and write to be located in an oppressive patriarchal regime. This 
regime is based on hierarchy, opposition and exclusion and is maintained by 
the differential social privilege and power accorded to a particular form of 
masculine identity, an identity which excludes all women and some men 
(Connell, 1991, 1995). Given this paradigm of power, social relationships, 
and relationships between women and men in particular, are here understood 
as problematic and in need of interrogation and reconceptualisation. I am thus 
motivated by a politics where the personal and theoretical, individual and 
social are brought together in critical reflection on the nature and sources of 
powerlessness and the systemic and systematic institutions and practices 
through which such powerlessness is created, maintained and alternatively 
rendered invisible, meaningless, acceptable or just. Such a politics is 
motivated toward empowering both individual and collective action to change 
the conditions under which lives are lived. I am committed to the struggle for 
social change where the territory between the already and the not yet may be 
theorised, articulated and negotiated. 
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Feminist theory and patriarchy 
Within feminism there are many ways of understanding the meanings 
and implications of patriarchy. Different feminist discourses offer different 
meanings and emphasise a range of sites in which definitions and meanings 
are constructed. These include sex, gender, sexuality, culture, race, class, 
biology, politics, psychology, psychoanalysis and economics. I locate my 
discussion of patriarchy within the theoretical context of poststructuralist 
feminism as made available to me by Weedon. (1991) Weedon acknowledges 
that every form of feminist theory or politics implies a particular way of 
understanding patriarchy and that these different ways of perceiving and 
resisting patriarchy result in different forms of feminist politics, each of which 
have different implications for cultural action. Based on Kristeva (1981) she 
identifies three forms of feminism; liberal feminism, radical feminism and 
socialist feminism (Weedon, 1991, p.4). 
Liberal feminism aims for full equality of opportunity in all spheres of 
life without radically changing the present social and political system. 
Radical feminism envisions a new social order in which women are not 
subordinate to men. This necessitates separation from men and patriarchal 
social structures. Socialist feminism recognises that gender is not ahistorical 
but rather socially produced, and reproduced, in different epochs. In this 
view, oppression on the basis of sex, gender, sexuality, race, class and other 
divisive discursive categories, is integral to patriarchy and can only be 
transcended by 'a full transformation of the social system' (Weedon, 1991, 
p.4). Within these various definitions and theories patriarchy is understood as 
the institutionalised dominance of men over women. 
Whilst I acknowledge that definitions of patriarchy may be variously 
produced and understood, I support the view which emphasises that it is 
neither unassailable nor biologically inevitable (Roberts, 1992, p.14). I locate 
this text within a theoretical framework made available to me through feminist 
critique and inquiry, especially as understood through the work of Davies 
(1989, 1993, 1994), Lather (1991) and Weedon (1991). They articulate a 
range of possible strategic interventions through which patriarchal identities, 
knowledges, realities, structures, practices and social relations may be 
contested. I recognise that these structures and practices are mediated by 
power and that the distribution of this power is mediated by variables such as 
sex, gender, sexuality, race, class, socioeconomic status and age. Thus, given 
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that not all men are equally powerful, nor all women similarly powerless, 
variable and competing masculinities and femininities are produced. Drawing 
on the work of Davies (1989, 1993, 1994), Lather (1991) and Weedon (1991) 
I understand socialist feminism to be synonymous with poststructuralist 
feminism. Poststructuralist feminism is here understood as a politics of 
change which enables analysis, critique and reconstruction of patriarchal 
structures and practices in ways that potentially transform and transcend the 
paradigm of power within which current relations between women and men, 
and variably inscribed social subjects, are situated. 
In recognising various and variable feminisms I do not conceive of 
feminism as a monolithic structure. Rather, I acknowledge different 
feminisms, differently positioned in relation to theories of sociopolitical 
relations between women and men, each with different assumptions, goals and 
recommendations for action. Like Lather (1991), I see feminism as a 
liberatory politics which is praxis oriented and emphasises theory based 
action. Praxis is the 'self creative activity through which we make the world' 
motivated by theory 'both relevant to the world and nurtured by actions in it' 
(Lather, 1991, p.11). Praxis is theory in action. 
Feminism has only working definitions since it is a dynamic, constantly 
changing ideology with many aspects including the personal, the political 
and the philosophical. It can never simply be a belief system. Without 
action, feminism is merely empty rhetoric which cancels itself out. 
(Roberts, 1992, p.13) 
Poststructuralist feminism provides a theoretical framework which 
enables me to both reflect on the ways in which patriarchy is constructed and 
search for perspectives which make sense of the obvious disparity in power 
between women and men, the often violent consequences of that power for 
women and some men, and the extent to which both women and men are 
complicit in its maintenance. I will expressly avoid detailed reference to 
either individual or systematic global acts that subjugate women and children 
through the denial of rights and freedoms, or through material deprivation and 
violence in its many forms. These are taken as axiomatic and have been 
thoroughly documented by Faludi (1992), French (1992) and Wolf (1991). 
Rather, I will focus on the mechanisms by which patriarchy, as a system of 
maintaining differential status and power between women and men, is 
structured and perpetuated, for 'only when we know how we have been shaped 
by the structures of power in which we live can we become shapers' 
(Starhawk, 1990, p.8). 
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Patriarchy is understood as more than simply the oppression of women 
by men. Rather, it is a 'hegemonic, hierarchical system of exclusions of 
feminist, non-white, non-heterosexual and non-middle-class interests' 
(Weedon, 1991, p.140). Men caught up in the dynamics of patriarchy seek 
not only to dominate women, but other men as well (Moore & Gillette, 1990; 
Connell, 1991, 1995). 
Whilst patriarchal relations are structural, existing in social institutions 
and practices, they are also manifest in the everyday behaviours, relations, 
beliefs and practices of individual women and men. The relationship between 
the individual and the social incorporates the relationship between experience 
and social power. Analysis of patriarchal social structures and the positions 
women and men occupy within them foregrounds the forms of social 
organisation and the social meanings and values which hold them in place and 
through which they may be contested. Such analysis also foregrounds and 
theorises 'individual consciousness...(and)...the relation between language, 
subjectivity, social organisation and power' (Weedon, 1991, p.12). Thus, like 
Weedon, I seek out those discourses within feminism that articulate a theory 
of 'subjectivity, of conscious and unconscious thoughts and emotions, which 
can account for the relationship between the individual and the social' 
(Weedon, 1991, p.3). 
Structuralist and liberal humanist positions inadequately theorise and 
articulate the complexity of the relationship between subjectivity and power. 
Within this tradition, the dialectical relationship between 'what people were 
struggling to become within themselves and the prevailing relationship of 
power and subordination' is obscured (Seidler, 1989, p.x). There is not, 
according to this view, any tension between human agency and social 
structures, nor any sense that social structures are themselves outcomes of 
social relationships. 
Structuralism assumes that a structure has a centre, a fundamental 
ground, from which everything about that structure emanates, is understood 
and is capable of explanation. That centre is also the origin from which all 
aspects of the structure are presumed to inevitably unfold. The assumption of 
a stable fundamental centre implies a state of immobility, finality, and of 
fixed, absolute truth. Structuralist and liberal humanist conceptions of identity 
thus propose a self that is fixed, coherent, innate and genetically determined; 
an authentic essential self (Cameron, 1990; Davies, 1991, 1993, 1994; Tarnas, 
1991; Weedon, 1991). 
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Structuralist and liberal humanist positions assume a fixity where I 
argue none necessarily exists, and assume an incapacity for change where I 
argue change is possible. Thus, given my interest in personal and social 
transformation, structuralist and liberal humanist positions are dismissed in 
favour of poststructuralist feminism. 
Feminism as a politics of change 
Poststructuralist feminist critique contests the pre-given, taken for 
granted meanings upon which social relations and practices are constructed. 
Meanings are understood as political and located within social networks and 
relations of power and knowledge. Such a politics is directed at changing 
existing social relations and transforming patriarchal power relations. It is 
only when established meanings, values and power relations are no longer 
taken for granted that it is possible to demonstrate where they come from, 
whose interests they serve, how they maintain ascendancy and where they are 
vulnerable to disruption and transformation. 
The poststructuralist concept of subjectivity offers greater potential for 
provoking and enabling inner and outer change than the liberal humanist 
concept of an innate, essential and fixed self (Weedon, 1991, pp.12-13). From 
a poststructuralist perspective, patriarchy, which implies a fundamental 
organising of power on the basis of biological sex, is not natural and 
inevitable, but socially produced (Weedon, 1991, p.127). If patriarchy is a 
social construction then patriarchal subjects are similarly socially produced. 
The concept of subjectivity, of a socially constructed identity 
negotiated by the subject within the boundaries of social institutions, practices 
and possibilities, makes visible the process of subjectification. It is through 
socially produced discourses that these practices are made available and 
subject positions taken up. Thus, 'conflict, contestation and contradiction are 
a part of a subject's relation to a discourse and the relations between different 
discourses are also open to these kind of struggles as well' (Jackson, 1990, 
p.269). 
Personal and social transformation is enabled through the development 
of a critical perspective through which individuals can begin to see how social 
practices are organised to support certain interests. This understanding forms 
the basis for active political intervention directed toward social change. 
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Transformation is thus a fusion of the personal and the social, a fusion of 
theory and practice. A subject constantly in the process of construction and 
capable of change is thus open to the possibility of transformation and 
reconstruction. Personal and social change arise from critical reflection and 
action, from both questioning and contesting assumptions about how we 
develop as social subjects. This involves critical deconstruction of how we 
are historically and socially formed as subjects in a patriarchal society and has 
implications for how conventional social relations and identities may be 
reconstructed. Our sense of identity is thus understood as having been 
historically produced in a series of social practices within different discursive 
frameworks. These frameworks offer a set of discursively produced subject 
positions which may be taken up, resisted or rejected by particular subjects. 
Further, these discursive frameworks may be opened up to encompass a wider 
range of possible subject positions. Given the relationship between 
patriarchy, power, gender, subjectivity and social organisation, critique of 
patriarchy also involves critique of these manifestations and material effects 
of patriarchal ideology and practice. The critique of patriarchy, power, gender 
and subjectivity begins in this chapter and is taken up and extended later in the 
text. 
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Sex and gender 
In recognising the relationship between theories of patriarchy and 
power, I focus on relationships between women and men as enactments of 
patriarchal power. I recognise that theories of patriarchy intersect with 
theories of sex and gender and that the concept of gender includes some direct 
relationship to the issue of power (Eisenstein, 1991; Connell, 1991, 1995; 
Weedon, 1991). Given this view, theories of gender are understood as 
fundamentally about relations of domination and subordination and the ways 
in which these relations are constructed and perpetuated. Indeed, Fromm 
(1990) observes that the exercise of power over those who are weaker is 
central to the maintenance of patriarchy. 
Segal (1990) argues that patriarchal structures 'create masculinity as 
enactments of power over women, men and things' (Segal, 1990, p.120) and 
that the maintenance of men's power over women cannot be reduced to a 
single or primary, cause. Rather, power, as a structure, involves all the 
institutions of authority, control and coercion. 
Connell (1991) suggests that questions about why this relationship 
exists might be better replaced by questions about how. By avoiding 
questions about 'ultimate origins, root causes or final analyses' (Connell 1991, 
p.63) Connell suggests that debate might be more fruitfully focussed on the 
ways in which gender relations are organised and maintained. If, as Connell 
argues, the structure is not pre-given, but historically composed, 'then it is 
possible to find different ways of structuring gender' (Connell, 1991, p.63). 
Eisenstein (1990) acknowledges that the subordination of women 
under patriarchy is a complex matter. It is, she maintains, obscured by the 
fact that the means by which men assert their dominance are not necessarily 
visible. Rather, dominance is maintained by the 'continual reproduction of an 
ideology that reinforces a separation between male and female roles' 
(Eisenstein, 1990, p.4-). The reproduction of these roles, and hence of gender 
relations, involves an interplay between personal lives and social structures. 
Gilbert and Taylor (1991) acknowledge that every day social practices 
constitute social structure. Further, this structure is historically constructed on 
the basis of power relations between women and men. 
Where the gender order is subject to patriarchal ideology it is 
characterised by emphasised femininity and hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 
1991). Connell observes that hegemonic masculinity is constructed on the 
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basis of the dominance of men over women, as well as other forms of 
subordinated masculinity (1991, p.187). It is heterosexual and tends to be 
characterised by power, authority and aggression (Connell, 1991, p.187). 
Emphasised femininity is the form of femininity preferred as complement to 
hegemonic masculinity. It is characterised by compliance with subordination 
and accommodation to the interests and desires of men. It emphasises 
sociability, sexual passivity and acceptance of motherhood and domesticity 
(Gilbert & Taylor, 1991, p.10). I recognise these versions of masculinity and 
femininity in my own family, in the actions, thoughts, beliefs and attitudes 
within which family members and familial relations were inscribed. Thus 
inscribed, and with no alternative versions available to me, I aligned myself 
with the position ascribed to emphasised femininity: passivity, compliance 
and subordinance. This was an early disruption of the assumed mimetic 
relationship between sex and gender. 
Whilst a number of versions of femininity and masculinity are 
constructed in everyday social practices, emphasised femininity and 
hegemonic masculinity are represented, at the symbolic level, as the cultural 
ideals. Yet, these ideological representations of femininity and masculinity do 
not necessarily correspond to actual, lived femininities and masculinities. As 
Connell recognises, these ideological representations tend to be 'stylised and 
impoverished ... Their interrelation ... centred on a single structural fact, the 
global dominance of men over women' (1991, p.183). The subordination of 
women is therefore essential to patriarchal structures, and to masculinity itself. 
Stoltenberg (1990) asserts that the cultural norm of human identity is, 
by definition, male identity and that under patriarchy, the cultural norm of 
male identity 'consists in power, prestige, privilege, and prerogative as over 
and against the gender class women. That's what masculinity is' (Stoltenberg, 
1990, p.74). Men are thus the arbiters of identity for both females and males. 
Whilst men in general are advantaged through the subordination of 
women, I suggest that relations between men and women do not involve 
'confrontation between homogeneous blocs' (Brod, 1987, p.90). Rather, the 
categories female and male are fragmented by the creation of a range of 
subordinated femininities and masculinities. These fissures or divisions are 
created on the basis of sexuality, class, race, religion, power, status and any 
other criterion which differentiates individuals from the positions prescribed 
by emphasised femininity and hegemonic masculinity. Hegemonic 
masculinity is, however, the descriptor of all humanity, and the basis upon 
which all subject positions are formulated. It also legitimises and reproduces 
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the social relationships that generate their dominance. Yet, like Brod (1987) I 
recognise that this culturally exalted form of masculinity may only correspond 
to the actual characters of small numbers of men (Brod, 1987, p.92). It is 
clear, says Connell (1991) that most men do not fit the image of 'tough, 
dominant and combative masculinity that the ideologists of patriarchy sell' 
(Connell, 1991, p.109). I argue, like Connell, that normative definitions of 
masculinity are problematic in that not many men actually meet the normative 
standard (Connell, 1991) 
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Indeed the number of men rigorously practicing the hegemonic pattern in 
its entirety may be quite small, yet the majority of men gain from its 
hegemony, since they benefit from the patriarchal dividend, the advantage 
men in general gain from the overall subordination of women. 
(Connell, 1995, p.79) 
This contradiction between the cultural ideal and the lived reality 
necessitates the construction of a hierarchy among men. Connell notes that 
this hierarchy has three basic elements: hegemonic masculinity; conservative 
masculinities, 'complicit in the collective project but not its shock troops' 
(1991, p.110); and subordinated masculinities. Within this hierarchy all forms 
of masculinity are constructed with reference to the hegemonic model. I 
suggest, too, that all forms of femininity are constructed with reference to this 
model, and reflect the inherent subordination of women to men upon which it 
is based. Therefore the organisation of a hegemonic form based on 
dominance of the other sex is absent from the social construction of 
femininity. As Connell notes, constructions of femininity which emphasise 
compliance, nurturance and empathy are hardly in a position to establish 
hegemony over other kinds of femininity in the way that hegemonic 
masculinity is able to do over other masculinities (Connell, 1991). I suggest 
also that central to the maintenance of emphasised femininity and hegemonic 
masculinity is the silencing of alternative subject positions (Connell, 1991, 
p.188). Subject positions which disrupt the assumed mimetic relationship 
between sex and gender tend to be marginalised and subjected to discourses of 
abnormality, deviance, immorality, insanity and illegality, each sustained 
through those religious, medical and legal institutions, structures and practices 
which make such articulations possible, plausible and acceptable. Alternative 
subject positions, those positions which lie beyond the boundaries of 
hegemonic masculinity and emphasised femininity, are thus defined as 
socially undesirable and met with punitive consequences. As a child I learned 
that my lack of an appropriate masculinity, and later my homosexuality, made 
me vulnerable and, to the extent that my subject position was invisible and 
silent, simply left out, not represented in my social context, I learned that 
invisibility and silence were the safest positions for me to take up. 
At the same time as hegemonic masculinity has subordinated women, 
by defining and controlling the historical and social constructions of 
femininity, it has also in my view marginalised and subordinated other men 
(Brod, 1987, p.91). The general connection between power, authority and 
men is complicated and partly contradicted by the fact that some groups of 
men are denied access to this power and authority. 
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The construction of hierarchies of authority is, I propose, essential to 
both patriarchal structures and masculinity. Despite the fact that the 
hegemonic model does not necessarily represent all men, nor accord them all 
its privileges and powers, large numbers of men are complicit in sustaining it. 
Hegemonic masculinity sustains the power of the powerful and provides a 
model to which large numbers of men ascribe, and are therefore motivated to 
support. This complicity is due largely to the fact that most men benefit from 
the subordination of women, and implies 'the maintenance of practices that 
institutionalise men's dominance over women' (Connell, 1991, p.185). 
The oppression of women could not succeed without the co-operation 
of individual men (French, 1991). Further, these individual acts could not 
succeed without the support and co-operation of the patriarchal systems and 
structures which institutionalise the oppression of women. 'Men gain a 
dividend from patriarchy in terms of honour, prestige and the right to 
command. They also gain a material dividend' (Connell, 1995, p.82). That 
large numbers of men derive some benefit from the hegemonic project but do 
not necessarily see themselves as embodying hegemonic masculinity is made 
possible through complicity with the hegemonic project (Connell, 1995, p.82). 
I recognise that hegemonic masculinity is central to the 
institutionalised domination of women. 'It would hardly be an exaggeration to 
say that hegemonic masculinity is hegemonic so far as it embodies a 
successful strategy in relation to women' (Brod, 1987, p.92). The concept of 
hegemony refers to 'the cultural dynamic by which a group claims and 
sustains a leading position in social life' (Connell, 1995, p.77) and is likely to 
be established only if there is some correspondence between the cultural ideal 
and institutional power, collective if not individual. 
At any time, one form of masculinity rather than others is exalted. 
Hegemonic masculinity can be defined as the configuration of gender 
practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of 
the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) 
the dominant position of men and the subordination of women. 
(Connell, 1995, p.77) 
The domination of women, by men, and their exclusion from most of 
the areas of power open to men is fundamental to patriarchal institutions. 
Central to the idea of maleness 'seems to be the idea of power as male power, 
with females having power only in the domestic realm or as helpers of men in 
the male sphere' (Davies, 1991, p.138). 
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The social institutions we enter as individuals, families, schools, 
church, work and so on, pre-exist us and 'we learn their modes of operation 
and the values they seek to maintain as true, natural and good' (Weedon, 1991, 
p.3). It is this belief in truth, naturalness and goodness which I believe must 
be contested if the hegemony of patriarchy is to be disrupted. 
Power 
An understanding of patriarchy as a structural mode of organisation, 
which places women and men 'in different positions in social, economic and 
interpersonal relations' (Groz, 1990, p.149) is the starting point for a 
disruptive analysis of gender relations. It is also, I believe, necessary to 
examine theories of power in order to do this. 
There exist many theories of dominance, oppression and power. 
Miller defines power as the ability to simultaneously advantage oneself and 
control, limit 'and where possible destroy' the power of others (Miller, 1991, 
p.116). This process involves an examination of how power is exercised, for 
oneself and over others. Such an examination implies that those with power 
can organise those who are less powerful according to their own needs. 
Drawing on Connell's theory of power as 'a balance of advantage or an 
inequality of resources in a workplace, a household, or a larger institution' 
(Connell, 1991, p.107). I recapitulate the feminist argument that women are 
oppressed because men have power over them. Consequently women's 
oppression can only be changed by contesting and breaking this power. What 
is foregrounded here is the relationship between gender and power, and how 
relations of power function as a social structure. As elaborated in what 
follows, I begin to interrogate how this structure imposes constraints on social 
practice and how social power is a function of the ability of one group to 
impose definitions, set terms, formulate ideals and define morality in ways 
that advantage them and disadvantage others. In my attempt to explore my 
own experience of powerlessness, I recognise 'how much men's control over 
women resembles one group's control over other powerless populations' 
(Fromm, 1990, p.187). I also recognise how the exercise of power is 
legitimated by the authority of those who exercise it and the extent to which 
patriarchal power structures imply a necessary connection of authority with 
masculinity. It is important, I think, to explore how such power structures are 
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naturalised and rendered invisible, so much so that we are unaware of the 
relations of domination in which we are embedded. Indeed, 'Our conditioning 
to obey authority is the foundation of the culture of domination. It is 
embedded in us so deeply that we are rarely aware of it' (Starhawk, 1990, 
p.11). 
My conditioning to defer to the authority of my father, and to other 
men in socially designated positions of power, was successful to the extent 
that it required no act of coercion. The fear of possible negative, even violent, 
consequences was sufficient to secure my deference. I was complicit, and 
deferred automatically, unquestioningly and unfailingly. This seemed 
appropriate behaviour, part of those everyday practices which maintained 
social order. I deferred to my father, the school principal, the doctor and so 
on, continuing to do so as an adult, mistaking deferral for respect. I recognise 
that such unconscious collusion sustains those relations of power which 
connect masculinity with authority. 
In recognising the tension between the social and the individual I make 
a distinction between the power which men as a sex maintain collectively in 
society at large and the 'struggles of individual men to live up to this ideal of 
themselves' (Seidler, 1989, p.147). Drawing on the work of Seidler (1984) I 
suggest that men learn to assume positions of authority and exercise power 
through dominance and coercion. What is at issue here is the suggestion that 
men learn to assume superiority and to believe that if they don't have control 
'they are not being masculine' (Seidler, 1991, p.35). My desire to write my 
way to some understanding of my own powerlessness makes it clear that 
whilst men oppress women, men too may be oppressed. Subordinate 
masculinities are oppressed as are those men who fail to live up to the images 
and expectations prescribed by the hegemonic model. French (1992) 
acknowledges that men everywhere are oppressed by racial, religious, 
economic and political factors. My oppression as a homosexual male is thus 
understood in terms of the social/political meanings attached to my often 
feminised non-hegemonic subject position. 
I acknowledge that the power relations in which institutionalised 
power structures are embedded do not deny that both individual men and 
women may be agents of oppression (Weedon, 1991). Where sex and gender 
intersect with sexuality, class, race, wealth and political affiliation, power 
relations become more complex. Given these variables men can be seen to 
oppress both women and other men, and women can be seen to oppress some 
men and other women. However, Weedon (1991) recognises that these 
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individual variations of power, ascribed on bases other than gender, in no way 
contradict the global dominance and power that men may be observed to 
exercise over women. 
It is this observation of Weedon's that I put at the centre of my attempt 
to articulate, 'a theory which explains how and why people oppress each other' 
(Weedon, 1991, p.3). Such theory will need to explore both the conscious and 
unconscious thoughts and emotions that shape subjectivity and account for the 
relationship between the individual and the social. The challenge for me then, 
is to explore what it is that links particular, individual, acts of oppression to 
the more general, systematic and systemic forms. This necessitates 
investigation of the mechanisms by which dominance and oppression are 
constructed and perpetuated and ultimately the actions by which they may be 
transformed. Such transformation is not possible 'without challenging the 
relationship of power and subordination in the different contexts in which 
gender relations are constituted' (Seidler, 1991, p.42). The retelling of my 
experience of sexual abuse is not simply an act of self-disclosure. Rather, I 
am simultaneously struggling to understand the various contexts that make 
such abuse possible and imagine different contexts in which relationships 
based on power, dominance and subordinance may be transformed and, 
indeed, cease to exist. 
Power is a much more complex concept than a simple matter of 'haves' 
and 'have-nots' (Davis, 1987). In my view such a conception can only lead to 
an over-estimation of the power of the powerful and may obscure their 
weaknesses as well as the many ways in which the less powerful are able to 
exercise control over their own lives, 'even in situations where stable, 
institutionalised power relations are in operation' (Davis, 1987, p.13). Though 
the exercise of power involves differential access to resources, rights and 
skills, power relations 'are always reciprocal, involving some degree of 
autonomy and dependence in each direction' (Segal, 1990, p.61). Whilst 
individual or particular transactions of power may be easily observed, they 
often obscure the existence of a less visible power structure in the form of 'a 
set of social relations with some scope and permanence' (Formaini, 1987, 
p.107). 
Power and personal relationships 
Chapter 1: feminism, patriarchy and power 	 55 
To grapple with the relationship between structure and individual 
actions an analysis of the relationship of the dominant to the subordinated is 
necessary. Dominant groups inevitably have the greatest influence in 
determining, and creating, culture. The dominant group holds all of the open 
power and authority and determines the ways in which this power may be 
exercised. The philosophy, morality, social theory, language, knowledge and 
other cultural artefacts created by the dominant group legitimise unequal 
social relationships and incorporate them into the ideologies and practices that 
produce and reproduce culture. In this way the dominant group becomes the 
model for 'normal' human behaviour and relationships. In adhering to the 
dominant pattern it is then considered normal to subordinate those who have 
been defined as other and inferior. 'Even though most of us do not like to 
think of ourselves as either believing, or engaging in such domination, it is in 
fact, difficult for a member of a dominant group to do otherwise' (Miller, 
1991, p.8). For, after all, participation in the pattern of dominance is 
considered to be normal. 
As Miller (1991) recognises, the dominant group prefers to avoid or 
deny , the existence of inequality. It achieves this by explaining its relationship 
to the subordinate group in terms of a belief that they share the same interests, 
and even to some extent, a common experience. In maintaining this belief the 
dominant group suppresses any challenge to its hegemony and believes itself 
justified in doing so: it is, after all, acting for and protecting the rights of all. 
In so far as the dominant group is seduced by its own hegemony and 
convinced that its dominance is right, good and natural, any challenge is 
perceived as threat and met with hostility. The subordinate group, motivated 
by basic survival, therefore avoids direct, honest responses and open, self-
initiated action. Such action frequently results in economic hardship, coercive 
force, social ostracism and diagnosis of a personality disorder. It is therefore, 
'not surprising ... that a subordinate group resorts to disguised and indirect 
ways of acting and reacting' (Miller, 1991, p.10). Such behaviours maintain, 
rather than change, the system that oppresses them. Positions of complicity 
can be maintained even when they are no longer needed. In my own case, the 
powerlessness that I learned as a child positioned me to defer to the power of 
men, not because of their individual actions but because of the position I took 
up as an adult in relation to male hegemony. In exploring this question of 
complicity I am attempting a self-reflexive critique of the ways in which I 
have assumed since childhood, a subject position within which I have 
inscribed myself as other, as weak, powerless, passive, inferior and 
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subordinate. In recognising the childhood origin of this position I am 
confronted, as an adult, with the shocking realisation that this position is 
habitual, unnecessary, and indeed unhelpful to my functioning as an adult. 
Recognition of complicity is thus confronting and painful, yet, I am firmly 
convinced, critical to both personal and social transformation. Such 
recognition brings with it a sense of responsibility which is fundamental to a 
belief in the possibility of change and of the will to action. 
While I recognise that patriarchy is a political system in which men 
determine, by way of ritual, religion, tradition, law, language, custom, 
education, economics and force, the part women play in society, a part in 
which 'the female is everywhere subsumed under the male' (Rich, 1976, p.58), 
I acknowledge the force of Coward's suggestion that power is not simply a 
fact of men's greater access to, and dominance of, the social institutions which 
structure authority and relations of power. Power is 'also lived out in 
emotional relationships' (Coward, 1984, p.141). 
It is important not to oversimplify relationships between men and 
women in terms of women as victims of men. Given Dinnerstein's (1987) 
assertion that relationships between women and men are not 'a conspiracy 
imposed by bad, physically strong and mobile, men on good physically weak 
and burdened, women' (Dinnerstein, 1987, p.176), then women cannot simply 
be seen as the historical victims of intrinsically violent men. Rather, the 
relationship between the sexes is maintained through an unconscious collusion 
between women and men. Traditional gender roles embody a female-male 
symbiosis, a symbiosis based on 'the most cherished of ideas, that of physical 
and emotional love between men and women' (Eisenstein, 1990, p.14). 
Important in maintaining this collusion is the recognition that sexual 
love is a crucial part of the ideological structure that 'perpetuates male power 
over women with their full participation' (Eisenstein, 1990, p.14). For 
Dinnerstein (1987) the act of falling in love is no metaphor; each time a 
woman falls in love with a man she literally falls into, and repeats, the social 
patterns that reinforce both the individual and collective subordination of 
women. This situation is paradoxical, for whilst the family is a place of 
subordination, even violence, for many women, as it was for me, it is also a 
place of comfort and love. What is required then, is a theory which 
adequately describes the complex contexts in which choices are made. 'We 
have to be careful that our theories can illuminate these contradictory feelings 
and experiences rather than force us to make false choices' (Seidler, 1991, 
p.34). 
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In rethinking what I might mean by collusion, I draw on Friere's 
(1990) pedagogy of oppression. He theorises social relations in terms of the 
reproduction of the range of actions through which the oppressed are 
employed to accept and perpetuate their own oppression. Both oppressor and 
oppressed are therefore complicit in maintaining the system of oppression. I 
see this as consistent with Lerner's thesis that patriarchy is 'a historic creation 
formed by men and women' (Lerner, 1986, p.212). Whilst patriarchy is 
characterised by men's sexual dominance over women, and the exploitation of 
some men by other men, it can only function with the co-operation of women. 
This co-operation is secured by various means, including: gender 
indoctrination; educational deprivation; physical force or threat of force; 
restraints, sanctions and coercion; discrimination in access to economic 
resources and political power; and by awarding class privileges to women 
who conform to patriarchal expectations and roles (Lerner, 1986) 
Women have for millennia participated in the process of their own 
subordination because they have been psychologically shaped so as to 
internalise the idea of their own inferiority. 
(Lerner, 1986, p.218) 
As Coward (1992) observes, female passivity, the desire to be desired, 
and the tendency to hand control over to men, are taught and learned at an 
early age. This early learning shapes expectations about sexual roles and 
behaviour, the effectiveness of which is evidenced by the fact that despite 
contemporary changes in the family, girls and boys 'are not free to break with 
deep feminine and masculine identifications' (Coward, 1992, p.177). 
It follows then that children are reared to become adults who are 
'emotionally predisposed to consent, at whatever cost, to the prevailing male-
female arrangements' (Dinnerstein, 1987, p.35), arrangements where public 
power is allocated exclusively to the male sphere. This allocation of power to 
men is not necessarily achieved by means of force, but rather, by engineering 
the consent of women. Consent is achieved by conditioning women to accept 
that their subordinate status is a natural outcome of their gender. These roles 
are thoroughly internalised by women and men and are therefore a powerful 
mechanism by which they are both kept subject to the rules of patriarchy. 
Yet it is important, I think, to recognise that the consent of women and 
men to the rules of patriarchy is not easily withdrawn. Law, custom, 
economic pressure, religion, education and social practice all impede such 
action. Just as Connell (1985) has identified the ways in which all men are 
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implicated in the maintenance of patriarchy and the subordination of women, 
Dinnerstein (1987) recognises the ways in which all women are implicated in 
their own oppression. She is aware that the implications of her argument may 
be controversial, even unpalatable. Yet, I argue, unless women can 
acknowledge the part they play in the maintenance of oppressive 
relationships, they will be less able to make choices which lead to changes in 
the range of subject positions available to them. 
I acknowledge, like Dinnerstein (1987) and Coward (1992), that 
discussions of complicity and collusion are potentially problematic, especially 
within a feminist discourse which focuses on male power. Placement of 
power as the central issue in the construction of gender relations recognises 
the unequal power relations between women and men. Axiomatic to this view 
is the fact that it is men who hold, or have access to, economic, social and 
political power. Such argument assumes that women's co-operation is a 
function of coercion rather than collusion. Yet, women are not 'innocent 
victims of men's lust for power' (Coward, 1992, p.13). They have had, 
Coward asserts, both opportunity and sufficient power to demand significant 
changes. 'That they have not done so is insufficiently explained in terms of 
women's passivity and ignorance' (Coward, 1992, p.13). 
The passivity of women, as expressed most fully by emphasised 
femininity, is deeply implicated in the subjectivity of both women and men, 
and is manifest in their relationships (Coward, 1992). This internal account of 
oppression, passivity, and complicity, combined with social factors, 
powerfully militates against change. Coward observes that despite any 
perceived gains in women's struggles against oppression they have still had an 
'unspoken agenda' (1992, p.7) that makes change difficult. This agenda has 
been to assure men that they are not required to change, that it is women who 
will accept responsibility for, and do the work necessary to achieve, the 
desired change. As a result, despite the work of feminism, there has been no 
change to male hegemony and any contestation has been met with hostility 
and resistance (Coward, 1992; Faludi, 1992; French, 1992). It seems to me 
that the experience and status of women in patriarchy will not change until 
men themselves change. 'Indeed, any real improvement in the quality of life 
for men and women will involve radical changes in men' (Coward, 1992, p.7). 
Yet, whilst feminists have engaged in analysis of patriarchal institutions and 
the gendered subject positions produced both within them and through 
relations of power, Weedon observes that men have 
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hardly begun to look at the social construction of masculinity and the 
ways in which patriarchal power is exercised through subject positions 
open only, or most often to them. 
(1991, p.173) 
In restating what collusion and complicity might mean I suggest that 
both women and men have avoided confrontation with the system of values 
that privilege certain men (Coward, 1992). Instead, women have acquiesced, 
conformed, adapted 'Rather than change they seem at best, to have learned 
how to adjust to intolerable situations' (Faludi, 1992, p.385). I suggest that 
women are reluctant to confront men, fearing that asking them to change will 
involve the loss of their love and support (Coward, 1992; Faludi, 1992). This 
does not deny that women may fear a range of reprisals, including physical 
violence. As a consequence the gender stereotypes and the traditional 
expectations of the family, and women's role within it, remain largely 
unchanged. 'Indeed neither seem to have lost any of their appeal as the prime 
attraction and responsibility' (Coward, 1992, p.8). Women, embedded in the 
romantic discourse of home and family, continue to seek love from men, who, 
embedded in a discourse of dominance and denial, are unable to give it. 
Whilst men have been complicit in keeping traditional forms of hegemonic 
masculinity alive, women have been similarly engaged and complicit, in 
keeping alive the traditional forms of femininity, 'willingly or at least without 
too much complaint' (Coward, 1992, p.9). 
Coward argues that the belief in women as historical victims of 
powerful patriarchs makes 'a travesty of ordinary people's experience of the 
mutual interdependence of men and women' (Coward, 1992, p.137). She does 
not deny, however, that for women this relationship often results in 
exploitation, abuse or oppression (Coward, 1992, p.197). The belief in 
individual responsibility and choice functions to sustain oppression and 
women's embeddedness in patriarchy should not be read as contentment with 
contemporary gender relations. 
Contesting patriarchy 
It is my argument that any challenge to patriarchy must challenge the 
'hegemonic, hierarchical, dualistic system of definitions' (Weedon, 1991, 
p.139) upon which it is constructed. I recognise that the imbalance of power 
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in patriarchal relations between men and women is 'constituted through any 
discourse which holds the dualism intact' (Segal, 1990, p.138). Such a 
reading of the centrality of discourses and discursive practices to the structure 
and maintenance of patriarchy suggests that any challenge to the hegemonic 
definitions upon which it is constructed will make possible the creation of 
alternative sets of meanings and values, as well as alternative conceptions of 
what constitutes humanity, society and culture. 
I recognise that any quest for equality between men and women 
undertaken within the existing patriarchal order may leave the patriarchal 
duality of female and male intact, as well as the many dualisms that derive 
from it (Gilbert & Taylor, 1991). Indeed, these dualities are often invoked, 
and inverted, in the quest for liberty. Demands for the equal access of women 
to those aspects of the dualistic equation traditionally reserved for men does 
little more than maintain compliance with the patriarchal order of discourse. 
It reconstructs the binary thinking that creates a binary world. What we need 
instead are other discourses 'that are not predicated upon these dualities' 
(Gilbert & Taylor, 1991, p.26). It is only once society is 'freed from the 
tyrannous law of masculinity, ways of relating will come into being other than 
those currently prescribed' (Sellers, 1991, p.17). 
To contest patriarchy it is necessary to dislodge the relationship 
between power and social relations. Power needs to be rethought or 
reconceptualised in ways that make change possible. It is this issue of power 
that I put at the centre of my attempt to imagine and articulate a 
conceptualisation of relationships which are no longer predicated on 
oppression, dominance or subordinance. I am struggling, through this text, to 
imagine and articulate a position that empowers me to create and sustain 
relationships from which enactments of patriarchal power are absent. 
Power is located in patriarchal structures which 'create masculinity as 
enactments of power-over women, men and things' (Segal, 1990, p.129). It is 
thus necessary to consider the problem of male power as a political reality, 
and avoid placing the burden of change on women rather than on men 
themselves. This implies that feminist action must not simply focus on 
women as the locus of change but on men as well. This will involve shared, 
unified, organised and co-operative action. The problem is not one of gender 
difference, but of gender hierarchy, a hierarchy founded on male supremacy 
and female subjugation. Gender, then, is not fundamentally about difference, 
but about power (Eisenstein, 1991). 
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In order to dislodge current notions of power I suggest, like Friere, 
(1990) that transformation of an oppressive reality requires a theory of 
transforming action. Feminism, defined by Weedon as 'an analysis of a 
system of oppression and ... a blue print for fundamental social change' 
(Weedon, 1991, p.98) offers such a theory. Transforming action involves, 'the 
ideological effort that goes into negating, defusing and challenging the 
historically dominant meaning of gender in particular periods' (Barrett, 1981, 
p.111). The many different and contradictory feminist positions locate points 
of resistance which fracture and weaken patriarchal structures. Weakened, 
they may be contested and changed. Like Lerner (1990) I recognise that 
stepping outside patriarchal thinking necessitates scepticism of 'every known 
system of thought; being critical of all assumptions, ordering values and 
definitions' (Lerner, 1990, p.228). 
In contesting and unmasking patriarchal ideologies I want to think 
about ways of disrupting dominant understandings of gender and current 
constructions of gender relations. In exploring these issues I am attempting to 
identify some of the processes by which the reproduction of gender ideology 
and the maintenance of male hegemony is achieved. Barrett (1981) suggests 
that the processes of stereotyping, compensation and collusion describe the 
ways in which ideology functions to construct and manipulate reality. In 
recapitulating each of these processes I intend to make visible how patriarchal 
ideology holds current relations of gender in place. 
Firstly, I contend that all patriarchal institutions are structured on the 
basis of stereotypical thinking about gender (Barrett, 1981). Stereotypes 
generate preconceived ideas about individuals, groups or objects, and may 
ascribe a differential value to them. Patriarchal structures generate stereotypic 
thinking about gendered subjectivities. Biology is appropriated as ideology 
and traits assigned to men are prized, privileged and ascribed highest value. 
Traits assigned to women, though determined by their reproductive biology 
and hence crucial to the perpetuation of the species, are none the less more 
likely to position them as marginal to historical, social and political reality. 
Secondly, I suggest that women are compensated for their lack of 
power. Compensation refers to the process by which women are offered 
palliative rewards for the systematic denial of rights and opportunities they 
experience and are expected to accept without criticism. Physical protection, 
limited power in the home and family, economic dependence in the guise of 
freedom from work, and higher moral value as the 'gentle sex', are among the 
compensations offered for being woman and subordinate. These 
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compensations for oppression function primarily to silence and disempower 
women. Silenced and disempowered they are less able, and less likely, to 
challenge the oppressor. 
Thirdly, I recognise that attempts to manipulate women's consent to 
their subordination involves collusion, in the form of willing consent to and 
the internalisation of, oppression. As already discussed, women, embedded in 
patriarchal structures and stereotypes, and compensated for their 
subordination within them, are manipulated to collude in the maintenance of 
their own state of oppression (Barrett, 1981; Coward, 1992). 
While it is important to identify how patriarchal structures are held in 
place, it is also important to analyse different kinds of power if the 
relationship of power and gender is to be deconstructed and contested. 
Starhawk (1990) identifies three forms of power; power-over, power-with and 
power-from-within. In reflecting on these I am attempting to conceptualise 
possibilities for alternative, non-patriarchal social relations, relations that are 
not predicated on power. 
Power-over is linked to domination and control and is the prevailing 
form of power in patriarchal societies and institutions. Relationships between 
human and non-human life are described by rules, laws or abstract 
generalisations. Power-over therefore has a clear material base which may be 
sustained by punitive physical, economic or social sanctions. Power-over 
enables one group to make decisions that effect other groups. This, coupled 
with the use of force, enables one group to control another. We are, in 
patriarchal systems, embedded in relations of power-over and indoctrinated 
into them as children. Inevitably power-over shapes every institution of 
society, including family, work, law, church and school (Starhawk, 1990). 
Power-with, the form of power at the heart of Friere's (1990) concept 
of liberating dialogical action, is social power, where power and influence are 
held among equals. Indeed it can only exist among those who are equal and 
who recognise that they are so. Power-with is based on co-operation not 
competition, and conceives the world as a pattern of relationships which are 
constantly changing. This pattern can therefore be shaped, moulded and 
shifted. Power-with bridges the value systems of power-over and power-
from-within. 
Power-from-within refers to the agency of the subject to negotiate, and 
renegotiate, their subject position. It implies self-reflexivity and conscious 
intentional action motivated toward the unmasking of the ideological features 
that shape those knowledges, beliefs and practices that shape social reality, 
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relationship and possibility. Barrett (1981) contends that all patriarchal 
institutions are structured on the basis of such ideologies. 
In addition, Porter (1991) distinguishes between power-over and 
personal power on the basis of the motives and outcomes of each. Power-over 
derives from a desire to control knowledge, resources, property, possessions, 
ideas, behaviour and people. In contrast, personal power challenges 
traditional notions and sources of power and 'prompts a general re-evaluation 
of personal capacities for creating and choosing alternatives that neither 
oppress others, nor are oppressive in themselves' (Porter, 1991, p.181). To 
evoke these capacities, this power- from-within, I argue that we must envision 
the conditions and actions that will enable their expression. We are 
challenged, therefore, to imagine and create the conditions that will foster 
empowerment. 
Empowerment 
My focus here is on the centrality of empowerment to my struggle to 
articulate a politics of change. Discourses of transformation, or liberation, are 
here located as part of those practices which 'empower those involved to 
change as well as understand the world' (Lather, 1991, p.3). Like Lather I am 
opposed to the use of the term 'empowerment' to signify 'self assertion, 
upward mobility and the psychological experience of feeling powerful' (1991, 
p.3). Such a definition does little to dislodge the hegemony and hierarchical 
order of patriarchal discourse. 
Here empowerment is understood in terms of social or collective 
identity rather than simply the development of a sense of identity as an 
individual (Taylor, 1989). Within the context of a counter-hegemonic project 
I take empowerment to involve 'analysing ideas about the causes of 
powerlessness, recognising systemic oppressive forces, and acting both 
individually and collectively to change the conditions of our lives' (Lather, 
1991, p.3). Such a reading of empowerment signals the interrelatedness of the 
social and the personal and understands that empowerment is something 
undertaken for oneself, alone or in collaboration, and is not something done 
'to' or 'for' others. 
This idea of empowerment is, I believe, central to the contestation of 
patriarchy. Thus, empowerment implies self determination and requires an 
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'unlearning of powerlessness' (Porter, 1991, p.182). Those who become 
empowered are more able to challenge those who continue to exercise power 
over others. Further, I argue that empowerment enables action which is 
motivated by refusal to co-operate with the humiliating hierarchical structures 
of dominance and submission, and, in so doing 'create new structures that do 
not depend on hierarchy for cohesion' (Starhawk, 1990, p.10 ). 
It must be recognised that a politics of empowerment is a struggle to 
change the nature of the power in which our society is rooted (Christ, 1991). I 
suggest that the struggle is to transform hierarchal power into relational 
power, a power which comes from understanding the connection of one's own 
power to that of others. Empowerment, as the source of possible 
personal/social/political change, involves a struggle to make connections 
which affirm and are affirmed by those actions which transform our sense of 
self, our sense of others, our sense of community and ultimately our sense of, 
and belief in, what is real. 
I argue that changes in awareness or consciousness of our subject 
positions empower us to change our thoughts, beliefs and actions. Our 
thoughts, beliefs and actions shape reality and collective reality is shaped by 
collective action. Collective action is enabled by power shared between 
equals and becoming equal depends upon liberation from an oppressive 
reality, that of patriarchy. 
Without consciously understanding history, without confronting the 
existing political and social power structures, there can be no significant 
change; nothing short of the total transformation of society will suffice. If, as 
Lerner (1990) asserts, patriarchy is a historic creation formed by men and 
women, then it can be transformed by them also,. together, and not as 
oppositional forces in a dualistic, alienated and separated world. 
The ability to imagine from a position outside the present system is the 
most potent option in coping with the impending termination of the male 
dominant world order, as well as for envisioning the forms of a new 
phase of human history which must follow. 
(Lawlor, 1991 p.30) 
The central assumption underpinning this work is that we have become 
habituated to particular forms of social relations which are both structural and 
lived out in individual subjectivities. Habituated we are unable to see what 
has, anyway, become invisible - that the possibilities and meanings of social 
relations are structured around discourses of gender and power. 
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This habituation is made possible, and invisible, by those discourses 
and discursive practices which bring ideology into material reality and are 
solidified in language. Poststructuralist feminist analysis of the sort I am 
undertaking here demands radical reflection on our interpretive frames 
(Lather, 1991). This raises questions about the relationship between social 
structure and reality as produced and reproduced through the relationship 
between ideology, discourse and language as sites of contest and change. In 
the following chapter it is this relationship between ideology, discourse and 
language that I intend to explore. 
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CHAPTER TWO: ideology, discourse and language 
HER STORY 
We can't talk about all that the universe contains because to do so would 
be to render it finite and we know in some way, that we cannot prove, 
that it is infinite. So what the universe doesn't contain is as significant to 
us as what it does. There will be a moment (though of course it won't be 
a moment) when we will know (though knowing will no longer be 
separate from being) that we are a part of all we have met and that all we 
have met was already a part of us. 
Until now religion has described it better than science, but now physics 
and metaphysics appear to be saying the same thing. The world is flat 
and round, is it not? We have dreams of moving back and forward in 
time, though to use the words back and forward is to make a nonsense of 
the dream, for it implies that time is linear, and if that were so there 
could be no movement, only a forward progression. But we do not move 
through time, time moves through us ... Language always betrays us, tells 
the truth when we want to lie and dissolves into formlessness when we 
would most like to be precise. And so, we cannot move back and forth in 
time, but we can experience it in a different way. If all time is eternally 
present, there is no reason why we should not step out of one present into 
another. The inward life tells us that we are multiple not single and that 
our one existence is really countless existences holding hands like those 
cut-out paper dolls, but unlike dolls never coming to an end. When we 
say, 'I have been here before', perhaps we mean 'I am here now', but in 
another life, another time, doing something else. 
Winterson, 1990, p.90 
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This excerpt from Sexing the Cherry signals the contradictory 
feelings produced by my desire to know and explain what may not yet, and 
may never, be known or explained, may perhaps never be knowable or 
explicable. This is not to say that nothing may ever be known or explained, 
but I understand that there are, currently at least, limits and that these limits 
are discursive. I recognise that I am only able to generate meanings from the 
range of discursively produced meanings available to me, from the language 
through which I speak/write myself and make sense of the complexity of my 
lived experience. I struggle, in the telling of myself, to avoid imputing a fake 
linearity and clear causal relations to the memories, dreams and experience 
that comprise my narrative. I am beginning to see how everything is 
relational and contextual, that I am a self-in-relation to other structures, 
discourses, meanings and selves, that I am a part of all that I have met and that 
all I have met is already a part of me. In understanding this I am seeking out a 
language of possibility, a language that allows contradictions, speaks of 
multiplicity and allows me to experience my past differently, redefine my 
present and imagine a possible future. 
Chaster 2: ideolo  discourse and Ian ua e 	 hR 
MY STORY 
Peter, 
sook, sissy, girlie, poof poofter, 
fag, faggot, camp, fairy, queen, nancy-boy, 
pansy, queer, gay, 
homo, sod, deviant, sick. 
Words hurt. 	Words. 	Abstractions. 	Symbols. 	Annunciations. 
Pronouncements. Words are powerful. Of course its all in the delivery. I was 
delivered into, and up to, a world of words. A collection of abstractions, 
symbols and meanings. Boy. Male. Masculine. Normal. Natural. 
Heterosexual. Yet I failed. Am a failure. An aberration. Of nature. Of 
culture. My boyness, my maleness, were not precursors of my masculinity, my 
naturalness, my normality or my heterosexuality. Instructed in the language 
of the Fathers I learned that I was effeminate. Feminised. Unnatural. Bad. 
Deviant. Wrong. Criminal. Sinner. Powerless. Other, weak, passive. 
Feminised and powerless. I took up these labels and attached them to myself 
with a careful, steady hand, lining up the edges, making sure the corners 
stuck. I was, after all, a good boy. Compliant, obedient, agreeable co-
operative. I did as I was bid. I did not question the accuracy of these labels, 
the arbitrariness of their meanings. I did not need to. They were inked with 
truth. And I took them to be so. True. They were reflections of a real world, 
a natural order. My world was ordered. Explicable. Once. Its order was 
disturbed by an intrusion of memory. An intrusion I struggle to make sense of 
but don't have the words for. The words I have are inadequate, partial and 
barely enough to sketch a rudimentary outline of this intrusion that has so 
disrupted me, body and mind. There are gaps, omissions. Still. And I don't 
have the language to fill them. All I know is that time does not stand still. We 
move through it and it through us. Slowly, slowly, I begin to question my 
inscription. To see its meanings as illusory. Illusions solidified as reality. A 
fossilisation of possibility. A point of reference. A formulation of the status 
quo. A means of establishing order and control. Words are not neutral or 
harmless. No. They manipulate reality. They are values solidified, relations 
of power given material force. They tell me who I am, who I can be, and who 
I cannot. What is possible and what is not. But words are lies, and lies are 
words. These lying words are nothing more than configurations of scratchy 
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graphemes and empty phonemes. A slack-hinged door squeaking in a hollow 
wind. As for me? I am searching, like some obsessive lexicographer, for new 
words, new definitions, new meanings and a voice with which to articulate 
them and the stories of possibility they foretell. 
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I have come to understand that, growing up I was taught, and learned, 
to make sense of the world and order it according to pre-given categories and 
meanings. These categories and meanings were conveyed to me through 
language, a language purporting to describe what already existed and merely 
awaited description. I have come to understand that people, objects, events 
and experiences become knowable, and known, by their names. This process 
of naming ascribes particular, fixed, meanings to particular, assumedly fixed, 
people, objects, events and experiences. This creates an illusion of solidity 
where none necessarily exists; but the illusion persists. 
I accepted the names I was given and the terms by which my world 
was ordered; father, son, home, safe. My sense of self, my possibility and my 
familial and social status were constructed within the terrain of intelligible 
sets of meanings which conferred, and confirmed, powerlessness both in terms 
of my physical body and in terms of my ability to act as an agent of change. 
Trapped within a language of opposites I negotiated a self that eschewed all 
that masculinity implied, strength, power, control and violence, and inscribed 
myself in opposite terms, weakness, powerlessness, submission and passivity. 
This felt right and informed my construction of reality. Yet, ironically, this 
construction foreclosed the range of possibility I was able to perceive or 
pursue. Thus the place I took up in the world was simultaneously enabled and 
limited by the names and meanings available to me. 
Yet these names and meanings betrayed me, my possibilities, as did 
those whose actions were justified by the names and meanings available to 
them. I was made vulnerable when I could have been safe, powerless when I 
could have been empowered and victim or dupe when I could have been more 
free. In struggling now to interrogate and reconceptualise the terms of my 
inscription I am also interrogating the construction and closure of possibility 
within the social domain of ideology, discourse and language. I understand 
that my own inscription is only possible within this domain, and that what is 
possible within this domain is circumscribed by relations of power. 
Thus, my sense of betrayal by ideology, discourse and language is 
simultaneously personal and social. My male body has been conferred with 
sets of hegemonic meanings that I have not always taken up. This has been 
interpreted as failure, as manifestation of an otherness that marks me as 
different, deviant, and vulnerable to those institutions of power which 
privilege certain configurations of values, morals, codes and laws. I 
conceptualise this as betrayal by a language that constructs the self as 
autonomous, natural and individual, not socially produced, regulated, 
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rewarded and punished. Where this language of conformity pathologises 
those individual experiences or actions which fall outside the range of 
culturally endorsed meanings and practices, then the possibilities for change 
are foreclosed. In this way change is conceptualised in terms of individual 
adaption rather than in terms of social or political transformation, and this 
amounts to a betrayal of possibility. As with all betrayals this means that the 
power of the powerful remains intact. 
I am attempting, in the discussion that follows, to foreground the 
relations of power through which ideologies, discourses and languages are 
socially produced and reproduced and through which subjectivities are 
constructed. In so doing I am attempting to clear a space in which to 
articulate a language of possibility. 
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OUR STORY 
Purpose 
I have a name, and am variously named by others who assume that the 
names I am known by have a meaning which fixes my identity, makes me 
knowable. In struggling to understand the possibilities for reinscribing myself 
I recognise that I am struggling also to understand how I have come to be 
named and how that process of naming may be transfigured. Thus I am 
struggling, in this chapter, to come to some understanding of the discursive 
production of myself as speaking/writing subject. This struggle is undertaken 
in the territory made available to me by poststructuralist feminist theory. 
What I am attempting here is the mapping of relations between ideology, 
discourse and language and connecting these to some understanding of how 
the real, the symbolic and the imaginary might function in relation to 
subjectivity, structure and agency. This mapping informs the framework 
within which the subjects of this text, including myself, are interrogated. 
Ideology is understood as referring to sets of meanings, beliefs and 
values; discourses and discursive practices are understood as the medium 
through which ideology is brought into material effect; and language is 
understood as the medium through which these meanings are solidified and 
circulated (Barrett, 1991; Belsey, 1991; Davies, 1993; Fairclough, 1993; 
Weedon, 1991). 
What is at issue is the production and reproduction of sets of meanings 
which congeal into categories and come to be seen as fixed, static, absolute, 
true, natural and real. These meanings inform those discourses which circulate 
in particular historical/political/social contexts and attain hegemony over 
meaning making in the form of common sense, universal truths or self evident 
facts. From a poststructuralist feminist perspective, what I am attempting is 
a way of conceptualising the relationship between language, social 
institutions and individual consciousness which focuses on how power is 
exercised and on the possibilities of change. 
(Weedon, 1991, p.19) 
Like Weedon (1991) I argue that social meanings are produced within 
social institutions and practices and that individual subjects are 
simultaneously shaped by these institutions and able to act as agents of 
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change. This change may either serve hegemonic interests or challenge 
existing power relations. As Connell (1995) suggests, hegemony does not 
mean total control; 'it is not automatic, and may be disrupted - or even disrupt 
itself (Connell, 1995, p.37). In considering some of the ways in which 
individual subjects come to understand the material conditions of their lived 
experience, of their everyday lives, everyday spaces are identified as sites of 
struggle where they can either be reproduced or transformed. 
In producing this self-reflexive text I am engaged in the project of 
searching for different possibilities for making sense of lived experience, for 
ways of being and knowing that 'do justice to the complexity, tenuity, and 
indeterminacy of most of human experience' (Lather, 1991, p.52). I am 
attempting also to make connections between lived experience and the 
intersubjective construction of meaning. 
By acting as my own informant, I can hope to achieve two things. First, 
to theorise about the self from a firm grounding in the subjective: to map 
the contemporary subject from an initial knowledge of myself. Second, 
to lay the foundation for an intuitive interpretation of the selves of others. 
If I am conscious of the way I live through discourses, stereotyped and 
other, how I switch, combine and juxtapose interpretations, identities and 
selves in securing a home for myself in the contemporary world, then I 
can construe how others might be doing likewise. 
(Rapport, 1995, p.269) 
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In producing this self-reflexive text I am also struggling to understand 
myself as 'historically contingent, as formed within discourses and power 
relations' (Lather, 1991, p.10). I am struggling to articulate a subject that is 
formed within multiple structures and discourses, within many sites and 
institutions; a subject that is open, multiple and fractured, understood to be 
part of the social relations of language despite any illusion of finality, closure, 
independence, autonomy, individuality or universality (Lather, 1991; Pile & 
Thrift, 1995). 
As speaking/writing subject I understand that I am only able to speak 
or write from within the discourses available to me. I refer to these 
discourses, whether spoken or written, as texts. Thus discourses allow for the 
textual staging of meaning and knowledge, and I am produced in the social 
texts that I take up as my own and reproduce in the process of configuring or 
fabricating a fictive, imaginary, but always embodied self. In this sense I am 
a derivative text, borrowed from other voices and „texts, and in 
speaking/writing I want to use these many voices and other texts to 
foreground the intertextual, intersubjective discursive construction of meaning 
and subjectivity. 
Within postmodern textual practice, 'the fiction of the creating subject 
gives way to frank quotation, excerption, accumulation and repetition of 
already existing images'. (Hutcheon, 1988a, p.11) ... This de-centering of 
the author via intertextuality is a demonstration of how the author is 
inevitably inscribed in discourses created by others, preceded and 
surrounded by other texts, some of which are evoked, some not. 
(Lather, 1991, p.9) 
What I seek in this exploration of ideology, discourse and language is 
to expose that which appears as natural to be an effect. Thus, what might be 
taken as natural is understood as the material effect or embodiment of 
meanings that are more to do with relations of power than true expressions or 
representations of the real. Given this understanding I argue that subjects are 
produced within discursive practices and am critical of universalist models of 
development which generate meanings about 'the person', 'female', 
'femininity', 'male', or 'masculinity' outside 'specific historically and culturally 
located practices in which subject positions are produced through the 
interchange of signs' (Walkerdine, 1995, p.312). Thus I am preoccupied with 
the relationship of the subject, in terms of how subjectivity is lived, to both the 
historical and the material, and with how a non-unitary subjectivity might be 
held together in the illusion of a singular embodied subject. 
Chapter 2: ideology, discourse and language 	 75 
I argue that we make sense of the world through the stories that we tell 
ourselves, and that these stories are discursive constructions which are 
historically, politically and socially located in relations of power. In exploring 
the processes of subjectification I am attempting to make this construction 
'politically, epistemologically and aesthetically visible' (Kieth, 1995, p.356). 
This is a political struggle, located in the space of the everyday, the territory 
where socio-political discourses and practices are realised and gendered 
subjectivities produced and reproduced. 
The practices in which subjects are produced are both material and 
discursive, but the relation is not one of representation but signification. 
Indeed if fictions can function in truth then fictions can have real effects. 
Subjects are created in multiple positionings in material and discursive 
practices, in specific historical conditions in which certain apparatuses of 
social regulation become techniques of self-reproduction. These are 
imbued with fantasy. We cannot therefore separate ... the fictions and 
fantasies in which life is produced and read. 
(Walkerdine, 1995, p.325) 
Ideology 
Like Lather (1991) I understand ideology to be the medium through 
which consciousness and meaningfulness operate in everyday life. Ideologies 
are the stories a culture tells about itself, and I position these stories as 
persuasive fictions which have material effects and hence come to be 
understood as fact. Thus ideology, far from being disembodied ideas, occurs 
in material forms and has material effects. Ideology works through 
constituting persons as social subjects, simultaneously fixing them in subject 
positions and creating the illusion that they are free, self-determining agents 
(Fairclough, 1993, p.30). 
Whereas an individual's subjectivity may appear natural to them it is, 
rather, an effect of ideology. Ideology constitutes subjectivity in and through 
language, and this constitution of subjects and available subject positions is a 
feature of all ideology (Weedon, 1991). In poststructuralist feminist theory 
ideology mediates between individual subjects and their lived experience and 
the relationship between individual subjects and the subject positions they 
take up in a specific ideology is imaginary, fictive and produced, not given. 
This assumes that ideology 'is always the precondition of social existence 
which takes place through historically specific ideologies' (Weedon, 1991, 
p.31). Meanings are thus constructed and generated within an ideological 
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structure or system which itself generates particular historically, politically 
and socially located ideologies. For example, until the mid 1970's 
homosexuality was defined as a psycho-pathological condition. Located as an 
illness within discourses of psychiatry it was a condition that was assumed to 
be curable. Such definition and location justified the use of lobotomies and 
convulsive shock therapy to return the homosexual patient to a position of 
normalised heterosexuality (Spencer, 1995). Further, such definition and 
location both informed and justified the social and legal position of 
homosexual men as aberrant, immoral and illegal. 
I am interested in the generation and circulation of meanings relating 
to sex, gender and sexuality and the ways in which these meanings are taken 
up, refused or transformed by particular subjects in particular contexts. 
Through the inclusion and interrogation of autobiographical stories I position 
myself as one of these particular subjects, located in a particular context. 
Having located this text in the context of patriarchy, meanings about sex, 
gender and sexuality are situated in relations of power. Thus I understand that 
ideologies function as significations or constructions of reality, incorporating 
the physical world, social relations and social identities, which are built into 
various dimensions of the forms and meanings of discursive practices, and 
which contribute to the production, reproduction or transformation of relations 
of domination (Fairclough, 1993; Lather, 1991; Weedon, 1991). 
Patriarchy, conceived as ideology, as 'a lived system of meanings and 
values' (Ruthven, 1990, p.35) is experienced in the form of hegemony that is 
both constitutive and constituting. Experienced as social practices these 
hegemonic meanings and values constitute our sense of reality. Ideology, 'that 
never fully articulated system of assumptions by which a society operates, and 
which permeates everything it produces' (Ruthven, 1990, p.31) is manifest in 
the ways we represent ourselves and are represented to one another. In this 
way ideology functions to justify the status quo and persuade the powerless 
that their powerlessness is inevitable (Miller, 1986; Friere, 1990; Ruthven, 
1990). Acts of compliance, complicity and collusion maintain those social 
structures and practices which determine who holds power and who does not. 
Where these structures and practices come to be naturalised they become 
invisible and understood as inevitable. In my own historical/political/social 
context it has been difficult to experience my homosexuality as anything other 
than disempowering, and I have come to accept this as inevitable within a 
patriarchal gender order. Institutionalised, and in some cases legally 
sanctioned, homophobia has been informed by ideologies which assume a 
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natural, biologically necessary, god-given heterosexual reproductive order 
within which homosexuality is located as unnatural and hence both immoral 
and illegal. Thus located, the subject position 'homosexual' has been 
marginalised and rendered less powerful than the hegemonic heterosexual 
model from which it is seen to deviate. The ideologically situated meanings 
and values associated with particular subject positions, in this case 
'homosexual', correlate to the amount of social power those positions accrue. 
Culture is concerned with meanings and pleasures: our culture consists of 
the meanings we make of our social experience and of our social 
relations, and therefore the sense we have of 'selves'. It also situates those 
meanings within the social system, for a social system can only be held in 
place by the meanings that people make of it. Culture is deeply inscribed 
in the differential distribution of power within a society, for power 
relations can only be stabilised or destabilised by the meanings that 
people make of them. Culture is a struggle for meanings as society is a 
struggle for power. 
(Fiske, 1987, p.20) 
I recognise that the ideologies embedded in discursive practices are 
most effective when they become naturalised, and achieve the status of self 
evident or common sense truths. Yet I recognise also that this stable and 
established property of ideologies should not be overstated. My interest in the 
possibilities for personal and social transformation identifies ideological 
struggle as a dimension of discursive practice. Such a struggle aims to 
reshape discursive practices and the ideologies which inform them by 
contesting, restructuring or transforming relations of domination. 
As both the medium and the outcome of lived experience ideology 
functions not only to limit human action but also to enable it ... Central to 
understanding how ideology functions in the interest of social 
reproduction is the issue of how ideology works on and through 
individuals to secure their basic consent to the basic ethos and practices 
of the dominant society. Equally important for an understanding of how 
ideology functions in the interest of social transformation is the issue of 
how ideology creates the terrain for self-reflection and transformative 
action. 
(Giroux, 1984, p.314) 
I want here to reiterate Lather's (1991) argument that ideology is the 
medium through which consciousness and meaningfulness operate in 
everyday life. Patriarchal ideologies reflect social structures, values, beliefs 
and practices, all of which are constructed in terms of oppositional 
hierarchical dualisms of which the terms 'male' and 'female' are the primary 
pair. In this way ideology is understood to be gendered, and given the 
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proposed relationship between ideology and consciousness 'then our 
consciousness is gendered' (Lather, 1991, p.2). Gendered ideologies and 
ideologies of gender, as stories, circumscribe the boundaries of our fictive 
realities. Given the centrality of sex, gender, sexuality and consciousness to 
the construction of subjectivity and reality, then a consciousness of gender and 
the difference gender makes is critical to any transformation of our gendered 
consciousness. This in turn, is critical to any transformation of our reality and 
the social conditions which prevail within it. The issue of consciousness will 
be taken up elsewhere in this text, especially in terms of the kind of self-
reflexive, transformative consciousness proposed by Friere (1990), Giroux 
(1984), Lather (1991) and Rinehart (1992). 
Discourse 
The term discourse emphasises the ideological nature of language use, 
and in using the term discourse, I am foregrounding language use as a 
dimension of social practice, rather than a purely individual activity. Thus 
discourse is understood as a mode of action through which people may act on 
the world and on each other. It also implies that there is a dialectical 
relationship between discourse and social structure (Fairclough, 1993, p.64). 
How we live our lives as conscious thinking subjects, and how we give 
meanings to the material social relations under which we live and which 
structure our everyday lives, depends on the range and social power of 
existing discourses, our access to them and the political strength of the 
interests they represent (Weedon, 1991, p.26). 
In poststructuralist feminist theory both the structure and the function 
of the subject within discourse are preconditions for the availability of 
historically specific subject positions within particular discourses, discursive 
contexts and practices (Weedon, 1991). Both discourses and ideologies are 
seen as operating in a dynamic ideological field, where ideologies do not 
operate through single ideas but rather 'through discursive chains, in clusters, 
in semantic fields, in discursive formations' (Gilbert & Taylor, 1991, p.8). 
These chains, clusters, fields and formations coalesce in the production 
and reproduction of seemingly coherent, consistent and compelling meanings. 
Here I am using the term discourse to map relations between ideology, 
language and social relations. 
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Like Fairclough (1993) I recognise that in attempting to avoid the 
pitfalls of over emphasising either the social determination of discourse or the 
construction of the social in discourse, it is important that the relationship 
between discourse and social structure be seen dialectically. Discourse is a 
practice not just of representing the world, but of signifying the world, 
constituting and constructing the world in meaning. 
I am interested in reflecting upon the ways in which discourse 'contributes to 
the construction of what are variously referred to as 'social identities' and 
'subject positions' for social 'subjects' and types of 'self ' (Fairclough, 1993, 
p.65) as well as the ways in which discourse helps to construct social 
relationships in terms of gender and power. 
I thus consider discourse in relation to ideology and power, and place 
discourse within a view of power as hegemony, and view the evolution of 
power relations as hegemonic struggle. It is discourse as a mode of social, 
political and ideological practice that is the focus of my discussion. 
Discourse as practice 
Discourse as a political practice establishes, sustains and changes power 
relations, and the collective entities (classes, blocs, communities, groups) 
between which power relations obtain. Discourse as an ideological 
practice constitutes, naturalises, sustains and changes significations of the 
world from diverse positions in power relations. 
(Fairclough, 1993, p.67) 
The power relations I am here foregrounding are those to do with 
gender and the classes, blocs, communities and groups I am especially 
focussing on are women and men. Thus I focus on the ways in which the 
construction of gendered subjectivities is made possible through sets of 
discursive practices which are understood, within patriarchy and patriarchal 
ideology, as always being about relations of power. I am also foregrounding 
the material effects of discourses and discursive practices on the body, both 
social and individual. 
In understanding discourses as identifiable, interrelated sets of 
practices and institutions it is possible to conceive of subjectivity as 
constituted by the practices through which it is described and through which it 
is created and lived, animated and experienced. Given this context I 
understand that 'words such as body and self seem to describe things, but in 
Chapter 2: ideology, discourse and language  
fact disguise their constitution by those very words' (Pile & Thrift, 1995, p.4). 
The subject, understood in terms of both structure and agency, is located 
within various power laden discursive positions within which the body or self 
is not positioned as a passive medium on which cultural meanings are 
inscribed. Further the subject is understood as neither a fixed thing, nor a free-
floating set of attributes. 
In poststructuralist theory the focus is on the way each person actively 
takes up the discourses through which they and others speak/write the 
world into existence as if they were their own. Through those discourses 
they are made speaking subjects at the same time as they are subjected to 
the constitutive force of those discourses. 
(Davies, 1993, p.13) 
Thus the poststructuralist use of the term discourse signals an 
understanding of the person as made subject through the discourses made 
available to, and taken up by, them. 
Discourses about gender make particular subject positions available in 
culture. Gendered discourses assume natural relations between biology and 
society, bodies and identities, gender and power, and conflate the terms 
man/male/masculine and woman/female/feminine as coherent reflections of 
the real rather than as discursive productions. For Butler (1990) gender is 'the 
repeated stylisation of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid 
frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a 
natural sort of being' (Butler, 1990, p.33). Subject positions are thus 
'reproduced both through discursive practices and through power-laden 
regulatory practices' (Pile & Thrift, 1995, p.5). I conform to my social 
inscription as male in the way I clothe myself, always in trousers, never 
dresses. I consciously alter my behaviour to appear more masculine when I 
perceive threat of homophobic abuse from other men. Yet paradoxically, 
something about my curls, my earrings, my body language, signals my lack of 
masculinity, my homosexuality, and these things, and more, are conscious 
choices or affectations meant to signal my difference. As much as I conform 
to the category 'male' I resist conformity to the categories 'masculine' and 
'heterosexual' and understand that the positions I take up are discursive 
constructions which imply different relations of power in different contexts. 
Discourses then, are more than ways of thinking and producing 
meaning. They constitute the 'nature' of the body and the unconscious and 
emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern (Weedon, 1991, p.108). 
Thus, bodies, thoughts and feelings have no meaning beyond their discursive 
articulation. This text then, is a discursive articulation of its author's 
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subjectivity, or more precisely, of the extent to which this subjectivity is 
understood by its author. This understanding is necessarily limited by the 
discursive contexts within which it is apprehended and articulated. In 
presenting this text as a series of multiple, fragmented polyvocal narratives I 
seek to constantly foreground the constructed nature of text, author and 
reader, and seek also to foreground the intersection of the personal and the 
theoretical and the extent to which all acts of thinking, reading, talking and 
writing are discursive practices located within the limitations of the discourses 
through which they are simultaneously made possible and rendered invisible. 
The constitutive effects of discourse 
Generally discourses and their attendant storylines are taken up as one's 
own in a way that is not visible, since discourse is understood as the 
transparent medium through which we see real worlds. 
(Davies, 1993, p.153) 
Drawing on the work of Foucault, Barrett theorises the relationship 
between knowledge, discourse, truth and power (Barrett, 1991, p.vii). 
Relations of truth and power are understood as 'constitutive of hegemony' 
(Barrett, 1991, p.141) within which 'consciousness largely functions through 
symbolic language codes' (Barrett, 1991, p.30). Barrett argues that although 
discourses are composed of signs they do more than designate things; 'they 
systematically form the objects about which they speak' (Barrett, 1991, 
p.130). Thus discourses do not describe an already there and otherwise silent 
reality. Rather they define the ordering of objects. This process of ordering 
involves the organisation of experience and knowledge according to the 
categories, hierarchies, meanings and truths privileged by given discourses. 
Discourses operate through sets of rules which, having established limits, 
define and recognise propositions as either true or false. This process of 
validation, and the discourses which makes it possible, give rise to what 
Foucault refers to as a 'regime of truth' (Foucault, 1980). This regime endorses 
some propositions and knowledges and suppresses those which threaten its 
boundaries. A regime of truth is language and metaphor 'hardened into a kind 
of reality' (Grosz & de Lepervarche, 1988, p.21). This sedimentation and 
solidification of reality also involves the construction of fossilised and 
seemingly impenetrable boundaries. These boundaries determine the limits of 
reality and existence and thus determine the parameters of the territory on 
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which gendered subjectivity is mapped. For Bartky (1990) subjectivity is 
constructed 
through a continuous process of personal engagement in the discourses, 
institutions and practices that construct meaning and ascribe value to the 
lived experience of the subject and the world-view or reality constructed 
by them. 
(Bartky, 1990, p.113) 
Within the context of patriarchy these discourses, institutions and 
practices are described as phallocentric, and phallocentrism is understood to 
circumscribe all dominant Western ways of thinking, talking about and 
making our world (Threadgold, 1990). For Threadgold phallocentrism is a 
discursive and representational construction of that world in binary terms 
such as that one term is always regarded as the norm and highly 
valorised, while the other is defined only ever in relation to it and 
devalorised. 
(Threadgold, 1990, p.1) 
Thus, phallocentric discourses and representations are founded on 
binary oppositions, and these oppositions shape the kinds of worlds and 
knowledges we construct. Further, these constructed worlds and knowledges 
support and maintain patriarchal institutions and practices where that which is 
associated with the male attains hegemony, manifest as power and privilege, 
over that which is associated with the not male, the other, the female 
(Threadgold, 1990, p.23). 
Grosz' (1990) analysis of the cultural inscription of sexed bodies 
explores and questions prevailing categories of sexual polarisation. This 
analysis recognises that subjectivity is both circumscribed by and mapped in 
the territory between polarities, and represented in terms of oppositional 
hierarchical dualisms. Given the relationship between language, knowledge, 
consciousness, power, reality, subjectivity and the discourses through which 
they are constructed, these too are circumscribed by polarities, by hierarchical 
binary categories of thinking and being. 
Discourses contribute to the construction of systems of knowledge and 
belief and are not simply ideas, they are also practices, ways of producing 
knowledge and ways of shaping the world according to that knowledge. 
Further, discourses can only be understood in relation to other discourses 
(Crowley & Himmelweit, 1992, p.237). Subjects are therefore not seen as 
fixed but rather understood as being constantly in process, as being constituted 
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and reconstituted through the discursive practices to which they have access in 
their daily lives (Davies, 1993, p.11). 
Lived experience, daily lives and everyday spaces are ideological, 
discursive linguistic constructions produced and reproduced in variable 
historical, political and social contexts. Like Fairclough (1993) I recognise 
that patriarchal society is characterised by relations of domination on the basis 
of class, gender, race, and so on, and that in so far as human beings are 
capable of transcending such societies, they are capable of transcending 
ideology (Fairclough, 1993, p.91). Thus whilst ideology and discourse are 
sites in which social subjects are produced and reproduced they are also sites 
in which subjects may contest the terms of their subjectification, and in 
contesting and transforming ideologies and discourses, transform both 
themselves and their society. 
The individual subject is understood at one and the same time to be 
constituted through social structures and through language, and becoming 
a speaking subject, one who can continue to speak/write into existence 
those same structures and those same discourses. But, as speaking 
subject, they can also invent and break old structures and patterns and 
discourses and thus speak/write into existence other ways of being. 
(Davies, 1993, p.xviii) 
Thus, poststructuralist feminist theory foregrounds the ways in which 
language situates, limits, shapes or makes possible one kind of a world or 
another (Davies, 1993, p.xviii). 
Language 
Like all theories, poststructuralism makes certain assumptions about 
language, subjectivity, knowledge and truth. Its founding insight ... is 
that language, far from reflecting an already given social reality, 
constitutes social reality for us. Neither social reality nor the 'natural' 
world has fixed intrinsic meanings which language reflects or expresses. 
Different languages and different discourses within the same language 
divide up the world and give it meaning in different ways which cannot 
be reduced to one another through translation or by an appeal to 
universally shared concepts reflecting a fixed reality. 
(Weedon, 1991, p.22) 
Within poststructuralist theory, language is central to the analysis of 
social organisation, social meanings, and issues of power and consciousness. 
Language is the site where both actual and possible forms of social 
organisation are articulated and where they may be contested. Language is 
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also the site in which subjectivity is constructed (Weedon, 1991). Language is 
not taken to be an expression of a unique individuality, but rather understood 
as the site in which historically/politically/socially specific subjectivities are 
constructed. Subjectivities and meanings are understood as produced within 
language rather than reflected by it. Thus, language is 'truly social and a site 
of political struggle' (Weedon, 1991, p.23). Language, as a way of 
constituting social reality, makes available certain discursive positions for 
social and individual consumption and performance. These positions include 
discourses relating to sex, gender and sexuality. The lived experience of the 
subject is then a linguistic construct within which subject positions are taken 
up and performed (Belsey, 1991; Butler, 1990; Davies, 1989, 1993, 1994). 
Subjectivity, knowledge and reality are thus positioned as 
discursive/linguistic constructions. They are constituted through the 
discourses with which we 'speak and write ourselves into existence' (Davies, 
1993, p.1). These discourses occur within, and are articulated through, 
language, and it is through this language that they are ascribed meaning and a 
substantive social status as true. It is also through language that discourses 
solidify as lived relations of power. 
In this way the language through which we experience and articulate 
our realities embodies attitudes and beliefs about power, knowledge and 
values. 'Reality is conceived and named through language', (Segal 1991, 
p.xii) and it is through language that we are able to map our reality, or accept 
the reality that has been mapped for us. Language, as 'delimitation, a strategic 
limitation of possible meanings' (Lather, 1991, p.xix) is thus the terrain where 
differently privileged discourses struggle for hegemony through confrontation, 
contestation and displacement. 
Language, reality and meaning 
Threadgold (1990) recognises that meanings are made by speaking 
subjects and that this happens in ways that contribute to the social production 
of consciousness and self-consciousness, and of commonsense ways of 
knowing, believing and experiencing (Threadgold, 1990, p.5). Thus, in the 
process of making meanings, those meanings come to be taken as real, as 
constituting reality. Language, as part of this process, mediates the 
construction of bodies, knowledge and consensual reality. If, as Threadgold 
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(1990) asserts, the world is constructed through discourse, meaning and 
representation, then the people living in that world will be similarly 
constructed. 
Since reality 'has no meaning except in language' (Weedon 1991, p.34) 
then language does not simply reflect an already given social reality. Rather, 
language constitutes social reality. Thus, language is central to the analysis of 
social organisation, social meanings, power and individual consciousness. It 
is also through language that our subjectivity, our sense of ourselves, is 
constructed. Subjectivity, then, is not innate or genetically determined, but 
constructed through social practices and language, where privileged meanings 
are mediated by power. 
Language in the form of an historically specific range of ways of giving 
meaning to social reality, offers us various discursive positions, including 
models of femininity and masculinity, through which we consciously live 
our lives. 
(Weedon, 1991, p.25) 
In drawing on poststructuralist feminist theory I am foregrounding the 
power of language to organise both thought and experience. Language is 
understood as the medium through which epistemological codes are 
generated, and since meaning is generated in terms of pre-established 
categories the ways we speak and write influence our conceptual boundaries 
and create areas of silence (Lather, 1991). As we acquire language and 
articulate the meanings we make of our experience, we draw on particular 
ways of thinking and particular discourses 'which pre-date our entry into 
language' (Weedon, 1991, p.33). Therefore these ways of thinking, or 
categories of thought, pre-exist us and are structured in particular historical, 
political and social contexts from which they derive meaning. These 
categories and the ways of thinking inherent in them, constitute our 
consciousness and the frameworks and boundaries upon which we construct 
our sense of ourselves. Yet, as Weedon (1991) acknowledges, language is not 
monolithic; 'Dominant meanings can be contested, alternative meanings 
affirmed' (Weedon, 1991, p.76). There has been a move among some gay and 
lesbian activists to politicise the meanings of 'queer' and 'dyke' and reclaim 
them from a pejorative heterosexual lexicon. In so doing they have contested 
previously dominant meanings and reinscribed them as affirmations of 
difference, pride and solidarity. 
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In assuming that language is not a neutral descriptive tool 
poststructuralist feminist theory analyses the material and political affects of 
language. In contesting prevailing phallocentric knowledges it also analyses 
the ways in which the language available constrains that which can be said. 
Poststructuralist feminist theory thus foregrounds the possibilities for 
creating new modes of expression, new discursive styles, new enunciative 
positions to experiment with a language that ... avoids the strategic 
deafness hitherto common in male paradigms. 
(Grosz, 1988, p.100) 
Whereas the knowing subject of the phallocentric paradigm is 
disembodied, non-historical and non-social, poststructuralist feminist theory, 
rather than seeing subject and object, knower and known as separate, 
recognises their continuity and interrelatedness. Knowledge is thus produced 
in the relationship between subject and object. Consequently, different 
subjects of knowledge may produce different forms of knowledge and this 
knowledge is constructed and articulated through discourses which are 
produced from sexually coded positions (Grosz, 1988; Weedon, 1991). 
I situate this text as, among many things, a response to the 
epistemological move, or paradigm shift from a found world, a world out 
there waiting to be discovered, to a constructed world (Appleyard, 1993; 
Bohm & Peat, 1987; Capra, 1983; Davies, 1982; Lather, 1991). Like Lather I 
understand this historical moment to be 'a time of openness and questioning of 
established paradigms in intellectual thought' (Lather, 1991, p.7). This 
emphasis on constructed worlds implies similarly constructed subjectivities, 
knowledges and realities, each made possible through • the discursive 
constructions, frames of reference and languages through which they are 
given meaning and voice. Yet 'it is the misfortune (but perhaps also the 
voluptuous pleasure) of language not be able to authenticate itself (Barthes, 
1993, p.85). Language is thus, 'by nature fictional' and reality 'never anything 
but a contingency' (Barthes, 1993, p.87). I argue that discourses and 
ideologies are similarly fictitious and that every fiction is supported by 
a social jargon, a sociolect, with which it identifies. Fiction is that degree 
of consistency a language attains when it has jelled exceptionally and 
finds a sacerdotal class (priests, intellectuals, artists) to speak it generally 
and to circulate it. 
(Barthes, 1994, p.2'7) 
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Each language, each jargon, each ideology or discourse, each fiction, 
struggles for hegemony, and where it triumphs, where it achieves the power 
that hegemony accords, it becomes naturalised, generalised, commonsensical, 
and ascribed the quality of truth. 
Hegemony, truth and the stereotype 
The stereotype is the word repeated without any magic, any enthusiasm, 
as though it were natural, as though by some miracle this recurring word 
were adequate on each occasion for different reasons, as though to imitate 
could no longer be sensed as an imitation: an unconstrained word that 
claims consistency and is unaware of its own insistence ... 'truth' is only 
the solidification of old metaphors. 
(Barthes, 1994, p.42) 
Like Rose (1995) I recognise that patriarchal/phallocentric ideologies 
and discourses establish their hegemony and regulate identity through the 
circulation of stereotypes (Rose, 1995, p.353). It is through making these 
stereotypes visible, and fracturing or disrupting their proliferation in everyday 
space, that patriarchal ideologies and discourses may be unmasked and 
disrupted. Thus stereotyped, cliched, sloganish and proverbial discursive 
usage is foregrounded, and foregrounded as fictional. Such discourses are 
understood to predominate and proliferate in individual speech, thought, 
emotion, volition and action and form the limits within which social 
interactions and meanings are made possible and intelligible. Language then 
is understood as 'more formulaic, automatic and rehearsed, rather than 
propositional, creative or freely generated' (Fillmore, 1976, p.9). Derogatory 
synonyms of the sort foregrounded in the story at the beginning of this 
chapter, and which are characteristic of homophobic verbal abuse, are drawn 
from a pool of cliches, stereotypes and slogans which inform meanings and 
assumptions about sex, gender and sexuality. 
What I am foregrounding here is the relationship between the 
discursive/linguistic conventions of stereotyping and the construction of 
gendered subjectivities. I recognise that images which both represent and 
constitute sexual difference proliferate in everyday space. Ideologies and 
stereotypes function in this space to present the position of the subject as 
fixed and unchangeable, 'an element in a given system of differences which is 
human nature and the world of human experience and to show possible action 
as an endless repetition of 'normal' familiar action' (Belsey, 1991, p.90). 
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Stereotypes simultaneously circulate freely and remain fixed in order 
to produce hegemonised social subjects. Both masculinity and femininity are 
thus understood as performances whose meaning is derived from these fixed 
but freely circulating stereotypes. These performances are located in everyday 
spaces for everyday audiences who come to expect certain displays and reject 
others (Rose, 1995). Performer, performance and audience are constituted 
and reconstituted through the sociocultural practices, discourses and 
institutions devoted to the production of gendered subjects as either male or 
female, man or woman, masculine or feminine, heterosexual or homosexual. 
These sexed, gendered, sexualised performances, as endless repetitions of 
stylised acts, become little more than 'caricatures of reality' (Ornstein & 
Ehrlich, 1991, p.196) 
It is in stereotypes that feelings of identity may be seen to inhere, for 
through the positioning of stereotypical images of difference, individuals 
and groups can maintain their senses of belonging ... In stereotypical 
hyperbole, in short, differences between self and other can be more clear 
•cut. 
(Rapport, 1995, p.279) 
Stereotypes thus function in ways which enable subjects to anticipate, 
explore and manage the unfamiliar, unknown and potentially chaotic, in terms 
of the personally orderly and known. Stereotypes simultaneously perform 
social and personal purposes; the maintenance of beliefs in normative 
stereotypes locates and maintains social subjects in socially designated 
positions in terms of sex, gender, sexuality, class, socio-economic status, race 
and so on. The individual subject may thus use stereotypes for cognitively 
mapping and anchoring themselves 'within a conventional and secure social 
landscape' (Rapport, 1995, p.279). I understand that it is in this way that my 
naming as white, male, homosexual, student, son, brother and so on is made 
possible and meaningful, independent of any intention on my part, or 
knowledge of me on the part of another. 
In this way stereotypes constitute a stable freely circulating social 
currency and provide significant points of reference from which meanings 
may be constructed. They locate the subject in a position from which they are 
able to anticipate action, plot and interpret social relations, initiate knowing 
and generate knowledge; 'indeed, the simpler and more ambiguous the 
stereotype the more situations in which it can be used' (Rapport, 1995, p.280). 
Rapport recognises that whilst each stereotype alone may represent a 
corruption of possible variety or occurrence, as a set they provide more 
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inclusive and varied representations of social reality. However fictitious or 
remote these public labels may be from the lived experience and private 
attributes of other subjects, together they constitute a coherent and predictable 
social world. 
To stereotype is to partake of a cultural discourse ... To stereotype, in 
short, is to evince enculturation into a set of regularly used and possibly 
widely shared practices. 
(Rapport, 1995, p.280) 
Thus I argue that both subjects and the stereotypes through which their 
subjectivity is established are discursive constructions. I argue too that since 
these constructions are mobile, fluid and variable they are open to the 
possibility of re/production and transformation. 
Construction, deconstruction and transformation 
Above all else I am attempting, in producing this text, to reflect on the 
terms of my own subjectification, on how my sense of myself might have 
been, and continue to be, constructed. In so doing I am exploring the ways in 
which this self-reflexivity allows me to critically reflect on the terms of this 
construction that I may be empowered to make different strategic choices and 
reconstruct or transform my sense of myself as an embodied subject. 
Fundamental to the deconstruction of the written and lived texts that 
constitute a sexist world is the ability to imaginatively create alternatives, 
to imaginatively know ways of being which might replace the existing 
ones. 
(Davies, 1993, p.174) 
I recognise there are different understandings of what deconstruction 
might both mean and imply, and my use of the term is specific to my purposes 
in producing this text. I want to foreground the constructed nature of the text, 
be explicit about the meanings I am constructing and critically reflect on the 
means of this production in terms of the meanings available to me and the 
ways in which they are situated in the discourses through which I construct 
my sense of myself as a knowing embodied subject. 
This self-reflexive deconstructivist text represents my attempt to create 
stories that disclose their constructed nature and 'bring the teller of the tale 
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back into the narrative, embodied, desiring, invested in a variety of often 
contradictory privileges and struggles' (Lather, 1991, p.129). 
My use of the term deconstruction is intended to signal the lack of 
innocence in any discourse by identifying the constitutive effects of our uses 
of language and the discursive and textual staging of knowledge (Lather, 
1991). My reference to deconstruction also signals my desire to keep the 
making of meaning and the construction of knowledges and subjectivities in 
constant process; to disrupt them, keep them in play and articulate the 
possibility of continuously demystifying the realities we create, of resisting 
the tendency of our conceptual categories to conceal. Deconstruction 
'provides a corrective moment, a safeguard against dogmatism, a continual 
displacement' (Lather, 1991, p.13). Thus deconstruction informs my desire to 
disrupt the familiar. 
Deconstruction 'carries us from identity to multiplicity, from position 
to potential, from Being to Becoming ... from constants to variables' (Doel, 
1995, p.233). My understanding and use of the term deconstruction 
foregrounds Doel's emphasis on affirmation, movement and responsibility 
(Doel, 1995). These features are brought into stark contrast with a view of 
deconstruction as negative, static and irresponsible. Whilst deconstruction 
does emphasise multiplicity and deferral it does not, in my view, remain 
neutral, impassive or indifferent to the complexities of the lived experience of 
the subject within particular historical/political/social contexts. Rather, 
deconstruction 'intervenes along lines of force, desire and power in order to 
lever open, dislocate and displace forced stabilisations into an Open 
multiplicity' (Doel, 1995, p.233). 
Deconstruction, as a critical practice, critiques humanist discourse and 
its conceptions of subjectivity and language. In rejecting unitary intentional 
subjectivity it locates meaning in texts, written and lived, and their relation 
with other texts. I find the strategic possibilities of deconstruction liberating 
in that they provide a means of decentering both the hierarchical oppositions 
which underpin the construction of gendered subjectivities and the relations of 
power within which they are ascribed meaning in particular contexts 
(Weedon, 1991). Deconstruction, as critique 
must settle, but settle contingently, make arbitrary closures, endorse 
strategic essentialism, make provisional gestures in order that the 
questions 'Whose truth? Whose nature? Whose version of reason? Whose 
history? Whose tradition? may be asked. 
(Bordo, 1990, p.137) 
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Deconstruction as a politics of possibility 
Deconstruction is a means of disrupting understandings of reality 
by revealing alternative meanings. New meanings admit new 
possibilities for thought and action and may thus foster change. Thus 
deconstruction offers a means for examining the ways in which language 
operates 'outside our everyday awareness to create meaning' (Hare-
Mustin & Marecek, 1991, p.46) 
Deconstruction, or putting a word or concept under erasure, is a political 
act. It reveals the generally invisible but repressive politics of any 
particular form of representation. 
(Davies, 1993:8) 
Deconstruction provides a means through which old realities, taken for 
granted meanings and common sense understandings may be unravelled, 
contested, recreated and invested with new meanings. Deconstruction agitates 
'on behalf of the exuberance of life against a too avid fixing and freezing of 
things (Cocks, 1989, p.222). 
There is no single 'truth' only different constructions, different 
representations, some of which are read as 'fact', some as 'fiction' 
depending on the way they are functionally contextualised, and by whom 
and in whose interests. 
(Threadgold, 1990, p.3) 
My emphasis on deconstruction as a means of unmasking, 
understanding and transforming relations of power, hegemonic 
meanings, knowledges and truths, and the discursive production and 
reproduction of subjectivity, forms the basis of my struggle to articulate 
possibilities for empowerment, liberation and both personal and social 
transformation. Such a struggle locates this text in the discursive arena 
of ethics, beliefs and values. 
What I am arguing here is that social subjects are embedded in 
particular ideologies, discourses and systems of belief in which their 
culture attempts to both hegemonise them and their construction of 
meaning, knowledge, truth and reality. These constructions are about 
what is valued and what is not. Here reference to value is understood in 
terms of relations of power, in terms of which group of subjects has 
greatest access to the generation of meanings and how these meanings 
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become naturalised and freed from the value positions from which they 
were discursively produced. 
I argue that the descriptive systems, or discourses, through which 
the world and our experiences in and of it are described, are all 
embedded in values. Thus, the way we describe the world determines 
how we experience and value it; and the way we experience and value 
the world determines how we describe it. 
Subjectivity is constructed through a continuous process of personal 
engagement in the discourses, institutions and practices that construct 
meaning and ascribe value to the lived experience of the subject and the 
world view or reality constructed by them. 
(Bartky, 1990, p.118) 
This deconstructive text, as a 'point of interrogation' (Lather, 1991, 
p.9), problematises received meanings, knowledges, facts and truths. Their 
context and meaning in lived experience, in everyday life, are understood as 
co-constructions; 'multiple, complex, open and changing, neither pregiven nor 
explainable by large scale causal theories, but made and remade across a 
range of multiple and scattered discursive practices' (Lather, 1991, p.43). This 
deconstructive text engages me in the project of speculating about the 
possibilities for 'unsettling received definitions, multiplying subject positions, 
unlearning our own privileges' (Lather, 1991, p.43). 
I suggest that no ideology or discourse, no system of thought or belief 
is entirely closed or free from the possibility of disruption. What I seek are 
possibilities for erasure within regimes of power, knowledge and truth. In so 
doing the production of ideas, knowledges, meanings, truths and realities 
beyond those already frozen or fossilised is made possible. 
Deconstruction rejects the complacency of the historical given by seeking 
to displace it. 
(Heckman, 1992, p.165) 
The struggle here is to write within/against, simultaneously inside and 
beyond the limits of current discourses and articulate a sense of 'the as yet 
unnameable' (Derrida, 1978, p.293). This struggle is political, theoretical and 
practical and is located in the discourses and discursive practices that circulate 
in everyday space. It is within these discourses, practices and spaces that the 
speaking/writing subject may articulate altered knowledges, truths and 
realities and invest them with new meanings. Yet I recognise that 'the 
interchange of (academic) discourse and (political) reality' (Kirkby, 1995, 
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p.210) does not take place easily, nor by simply 'wishing or writing it into 
existence' (Kirkby, 1995, p.210) 
If the real is nothing more than the accretion of discourses, it has become 
real due to long practice and popular 'consent'. As academics, we refuse 
to sacrifice the possibility that changing discourses can change the way 
we live, but must delineate their means of interchange more complexly. 
(Kirkby, 1995, p.210) 
In the next chapter I will interrogate the construction of knowledge, 
truth and reality and in so doing search for possibilities for re-inscription that 
I, in turn, may re-inscribe myself. 
Maybe Foucault was right when he said: 'to work is to try to think 
something other than what one thought before'. 
(Barrett, 1991, p.vi) 
IA 
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CHAPTER THREE: knowledge, truth and reality 
HER STORY 
The earth is round and flat at the same time. This is obvious. That it is 
round appears indisputable; that it is flat is our common experience, also 
indisputable. The globe does not supersede the map; the map does not 
distort the globe. 
Maps are magic. In the bottom corner are whales; at the top, cormorants 
carrying pop-eyed fish. In between is a subjective account of the lie of the 
land. Rough shapes, of countries that may or may not exist, broken red 
lines marking paths that are at best hazardous, at worst already gone. 
Maps are constantly being re-made as knowledge appears to increase. 
But is knowledge increasing or is detail accumulating? 
A map can tell me how to find a place I have not seen but have often 
imagined. When I get there, following the map faithfully the place is not 
the place of my imagination. Maps, growing ever more real, are much 
less true. 
And now, swarming over the earth with our tiny insect bodies and 
putting up flags and building houses, it seems that all the journeys are 
done. 
Not so. Fold up the maps and put away the globes. If someone else had 
charted it, let them. Start another drawing with whales at the bottom 
and cormorants at the top, and in between identify, if you can, the places 
you have not found yet on those other maps, the connections obvious only 
to you. Round and flat, only a very little has been discovered. 
Winterson, 1990, p.81 
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Reading Winterson's text I am confronted by how perceptions, 
knowledges, facts and experiences may appear to be contradictory. I am 
confronted too by the realisation that these contradictions may be 
irreconcilable; that I may simultaneously know and not know, believe and not 
believe, remember and forget something that may or may not have ever 
happened, may or may not be real or true. So what counts as knowledge? 
What is real? What is true? In struggling to find out I am making a map of 
the journey I am taking. My points of reference are the questions I carry with 
me and the meanings I tentatively construct, and continually revise. In taking 
this journey and making this map I am striving to negotiate new pathways, 
destinations and narratives from among the old, familiar and already charted. 
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MY STORY 
Moving pictures of childhood are spliced and rearranged, forming scenes of 
incoherent familiarity. Life is such. Fractured re/collections of incoherent 
moments mis/remembered as if real. As if having some substantive existence 
or meaning. This life is an accumulation of such random moments, moments 
ascribed pattern, meaning and purpose by equally random acts of compulsion 
and imagination. These moments, these acts, constitute a life. This life. 
Mine. My life is an annotation in the margins of a story already told. My 
place is marked. I know which narrative, which part, which words are mine. 
And I play my part. Sometimes I stumble, my words falter, but the 
performance is rehearsed over and again so that the clumsiness recedes and 
the performance begins to appear, even begins to feel, natural. Spontaneous 
even. I even begin to believe that I know who I am. After all, I am told often 
enough. I posture and practice. I learn to construct a coherent narrative, a 
reality I believe in. A truth I can take to bed at night, with which I may 
comfortably sleep and dream. But this sleep, this dream, this truth, this 
knowledge, this reality, is fragile. Vulnerable. Easily disrupted. For in a 
fracturing moment all that was taken as real is shattered. My familiar is 
gone. I am confused. My body contorts in pain at the memory of this thing 
my mind has forgotten. My body, it seems, knows things my mind does not. 
This seems absurd. Incomprehensible. Ridiculous. How is it possible that my 
body might remember something that my mind has forgotten? It makes no 
sense to say this. But the sensation persists, as does the pain. Nothing is the 
same. What was familiar has become strange. What was formerly taken as 
true is now ambiguous. What was formerly taken to be real seems illusory. I 
am left in this nowhere place. Searching for a point of reference from which 
to begin to chart a new map. Start a new journey. Begin again in search of a 
moment of possibility. A moment of possibility lost in that fracturing, 
fragmenting moment of pain. 
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In reflecting on how my sense of truth, knowledge and reality have 
been discursively produced I am confronted by the extent to which the truths, 
knowledges and realities I accept as meaningful are fabrications made 
possible within a particular historical/political/social context. There is, it 
seems, a point at which my experiences are only mine in a notional sense. To 
the extent that I experience them as mine they are mine. But these 
experiences and their meanings are drawn from the social repertoire of 
experiences and meanings available to me. In this sense they are not mine: I 
have simply appropriated them, perhaps in an idiosyncratic way, or at least in 
a way that I sometimes believe to be idiosyncratic. 
I understand that there are limits to experience, truth, knowledge and 
reality in any given context. In my current historical/political/social context 
my sexual behaviour is a criminal offence. I am subject to 25 years 
imprisonment. But is it true that I am a criminal? My self definition and 
social/legal definition contradict one another; so which is more real, or true? 
Clearly oppositional thinking cannot resolve the impasse. This is true also of 
my childhood recollections. Are they true? Did they really happen? How 
can I know? Which version of reality do I choose? How might I confidently 
settle on any particular account? There is a moment of anxiety in which I am 
haunted by this notion that experience is discursively produced. If I had no 
discourse of sexual abuse, rape or incest, what story would I tell, what 
memories would I select or create to describe a given moment in my 
childhood, and how would that story shape my sense of what I know, what is 
true and what is real for me now? 
I am preoccupied with the processes and practices through which I 
have inscribed myself, body and mind, in terms of the categories sex, gender 
and sexuality. In reflecting on these things I have come to see that I am 
betrayed by those socially produced knowledges, meanings, truths and 
realities that come to me ready made as right, immutable and eternal, and 
which proscribe my perception of alternatives. This betrayal is 
simultaneously personal and social, individual and collective. Socially 
constructed knowledges, truths and realities make some things culturally 
intelligible and acceptable, others not. In this way some versions of reality are 
ascribed a status as natural, good, right and true and the political and 
ideological investments that determine them to be such are rendered neutral 
and invisible by these discourses of empirical fact and common good which 
betray the possibility of alternative versions of what counts as knowledge, 
truth and reality. 
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What follows represents my struggle to come to some understanding 
of the structures, processes and practices through which knowledges, truths 
and realities are constructed and made intelligible and how alternative 
versions may be generated according to different values and different 
purposes. 
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OUR STORY 
The problems of the relationship between experience and theory, access 
to knowledge and the patriarchal structure and content of knowledge are 
of central importance to feminism. 
(Weedon, 1991, p.7) 
The many subjects and themes of this text diverge and coalesce at 
different moments in the narrative. Despite these many subjects and multiple 
themes this narrative is always about its author; my subject position, my lived 
experience, my capacity to know and understand. It is simultaneously 
motivated by a desire for personal transformation and social change. In 
reflecting on what I know, what I believe to be true and real I am struggling 
to open spaces within the discourses available to me in which I might rethink 
what it is that I know and believe, what it is that I take to be true and real. In 
reflecting on discourses of knowledge, truth and reality I am not attempting 
to take up a fixed position, arrive at a final conclusion, fully explore and 
debate the complexity of the issues, nor answer all questions. What I am 
attempting to do is clear a space in which I might articulate a narrative of 
possibility, of possibilities beyond those currently available or imagined. I 
am attempting to disrupt the familiar and make way for something different. 
I am continually struggling to articulate a narrative sense of myself and my 
subjects as simultaneously imaginary, symbolic and real. Finally, I am 
searching for an epistemology, a way of knowing myself, others and my 
world, that is not patriarchal, not phallocentric and not predicated on power. 
I am preoccupied, in my own life narrative, with the issues of 
knowledge, truth and reality. I struggle with ambiguity, confusion, 
uncertainty and contradiction. I anxiously avoid assumptions of fixed and 
final truths, yet experience myself as a knower in a context that I take, 
however accurately or erroneously, to be real. Thus in this chapter I am 
concerned with the relationship between the ideological/discursive/ linguistic 
construction of meaning and the generation of knowledges and realities that 
assume the status of truth. I am concerned with how meanings attain 
hegemony and freeze or fossilise into formulations of, or formulae for, 
particular versions of truth, knowledge and reality. I am concerned also with 
how these truths, knowledges and realities are mapped onto the terrain of the 
subject, especially in terms of the body and consciousness, in the production 
of patriarchal subjects. 
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Patriarchal subjects are understood as co-constructions, formulated 
within meaningful configurations of a range of subject positions available in 
patriarchal regimes in particular historical/political/social moments in 
everyday spaces. I begin to map subjectivity in terms of the referents sex, 
gender and sexuality and in terms of the meanings that these referents acquire 
in patriarchal culture. This mapping is explored in more detail in subsequent 
chapters. In so doing I am challenging the conflations of same/normal/good 
and different/deviant/bad that inform binary thinking about that which is 
culturally acceptable and that which is not. Such normative evaluations are 
derived from positions of value, positions which may be invisible, but all the 
more powerful for being so. 
For the most part, the ideas that people hold as valid reflect the activities 
they accept as normal, rather than the other way around. 
(Birch, 1993, p.197) 
What is familiar or enduring within culture comes to be accepted as 
natural, inevitable and true. Underlying this sense of what is normal are 
'stereotypic definitions of masculinity and femininity that reflect the rigid 
gender categories that arise out of a patriarchal society' (Birch, 1993, p.215). 
What I am arguing for is a conception of situated knowledges which 
accommodates 'a multifoundational theory and an anti-relativistic acceptance 
of difference' (Pile & Thrift, 1995, p.19). Hence I argue for knowledges 
which are foundational without being essentialist, relational rather than 
relative (a distinction taken up later in this chapter) and which emphasise the 
dialectical relationship between ideology, discourse, language, society, 
subjectivity, experience, truth, knowledge and reality. 
I am proceeding on the understanding that conceptual categories, facts 
and assertions of truth are open to interrogation, contestation and 
transformation. Knowledge is understood to be socially produced, or 
suppressed, given particular, variable contexts and specific relations of power. 
French (1992, p.43) recognises that women have been systematically 
excluded from public/political life through the suppression of knowledge of 
their capabilities and achievements. Confined within patriarchal ideology to 
the domestic/private sphere the contributions to 'human knowledge and well-
being' (French, 1992, p.43) made by female rulers, philosophers, scientists, 
artists, writers and inventors have been rendered invisible or less significant 
than the achievements of great men. Further the achievements of these 
women have been largely absent from patriarchal histories and school 
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curricula, and have thus not consolidated a place in the body of social 
knowledge considered to be important. In this way the assumption that a 
woman's proper place is in the home is maintained (Gilbert & Taylor, 1991). 
In the last chapter I attempted to denaturalise language use and 
emphasise the interconnection between textuality and thought. Here I am 
emphasising that 
thought is made of sense and value, it is the force or level of intensity, 
that fixes the value of an idea, not its adequate to a pre-established 
normative model ... It is as if beyond/behind the positional content of an 
idea there lay another category - the affective force, level of intensity, 
desire or affirmation - that conveys the idea and ultimately governs its 
truth value. Thinking in other words, is to a very large extent 
unconscious, in that it expresses the desire to know, and this desire is that 
which cannot be adequately expressed in language, simply because it is 
that which sustains language. 
(Braidotti, 1994, p.165) 
Here Braidotti foregrounds the affective foundations of the thinking 
process and in so doing disrupts the hegemony of objectivity as the only 
indicator of what counts as credible, reliable knowledge. 
It is increasingly recognised that the fact/value dichotomy simply drives 
facts underground. Facts are never theory-independent ... they are as 
much social constructs as are theories and values. 
(Lather, 1991, p.51) 
I argue that there is no single, absolute truth, or system through which 
such truths may be apprehended. Truth is rather, complex, multiple and 
situated in relations of power. The nexus between truth and power can be 
contested and disrupted in the formulation of different truths which are 
situated in explicitly articulated values. Such truths/ knowledges are 
conceived as being interactive and contextual, socially constituted, 
historically embedded and values based. Such truths/ knowledges are subject 
to the objective/subjective, true/false, right/wrong dualisms that are invoked 
to determine the validity of particular theories, articulations, or points of 
view. It is, I believe, incumbent on the writing/speaking subject to ground 
their spoken/written texts in theory/value and in so doing make visible the 
location from which they speak/write. 
What I am arguing is that human communities are structured around 
frameworks of socially produced values. These structures are represented in 
and expressed through those legal, social, political pedagogical, religious, and 
other, institutions and practices which achieve hegemony and through which 
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all thoughts and actions are experienced, expressed, interpreted and evaluated. 
No thought or action is outside the performative possibilities, constraints or 
sanctions of these structures. 
Thus human communities exist and cohere through frameworks of 
values which shape thoughts, actions, dreams, desires, imaginings and visions. 
It is through the social, and all institutions and practices implied within it, that 
we experience ourselves, others and our world. It is through the social that we 
construct our reality. It is also the site through which we construct and 
articulate our truths. 
Truth, knowledge and reality are discursive constructions, located in 
particular historical, political and social contexts. As these contexts fossilise 
or shift, so discourses of truth fossilise and shift also. As contexts shift and 
discourses accommodate them, things become more or less true according to 
shifting knowledge, meanings and values. Truth, knowledge and reality are 
then, mobile and fluid, never outside relations of power. They are always 
fossilising and being disrupted, always in process. What I am attempting to 
articulate are truths and knowledges that reflect mobile realities, constantly in 
process, rather than realities apprehended and fixed for eternity. 'Has been' 
need not mean 'always will be'. In taking the view that knowledge, truth and 
reality are constructed it becomes both possible to interrogate the world as 
taken for granted and construct new knowledges, truths and realities. 
Like Lather (1991) and Weedon (1991) I believe that new visions for 
generating social knowledge are required, visions which are capable of 
radically transforming patriarchal structures, practices and relations of power. 
Poststructuralism holds that there is no final knowledge; 'the contingency 
and historical moment of all readings' means that, whatever the object of 
our gaze, it is 'contested, temporal and emergent'. 
(Clifford and Marcus, 1986, pp.18-19) ; (Lather, 1991, p.111) 
Poststructuralism problematises received knowledges, meanings and 
truths. It opens them to interrogation by taking the view that they are 
constructed rather than essential, constructions rather than essences. 
Poststructuralist theory thus provides a framework for unmasking, contesting, 
reimagining, redescribing and recreating our sense of the real. Thus, in 
producing this text, I am engaged in a project of 
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exploring and experimenting with new kinds of speaking/writing, forms 
of experience, and perspectives on the world. These do not necessarily 
claim a universal, objective value; but may openly see themselves as 
particular views, written from particular perspectives. 
(Grosz, 1990, p.91) 
I admit a particular view, a particular perspective. My view is limited 
by the territory, and the idiosyncratic mapping, of my always, already 
fictionalised lived experience and my ability to reinterpret or reimagine it. 
Such reworking of my familiar, habituated life is critical to my speculation 
about the possibilities for, and of, empowerment and transformation, both 
personal and social. In producing this self/text I am perpetually engaged with 
the struggle to know, and to know differently; to juxtapose that which comes 
to me ready made in culture with my feeling that truth and reality are more 
ambiguous, less definite, than the hardened forms that have shaped my sense 
of who I am, of my lived experience, of the nature and terms of my embodied 
subjectivity. 
What I am attempting then is to dis/order and reorient myself in and 
through, newly situated knowledges, truths and realities. This is, as Hassan 
(1987) recognises, the problematic of postmodernism: 'to make of our 
disorders new knowledge' (Hassan, 1987, p.81). 
Knowledge 
The critical search for truth is constrained to be tolerant of ambiguity and 
pluralism, and its outcome will necessarily be knowledge that is relative 
and fallible rather than absolute or certain. 
(Tarnas, 1991, p.396) 
Knowing is ambiguous, partial, contradictiory, made from 'a weave of 
knowing and not-knowing which is what knowing is' (Spivak, 1987, p.78). 
Knowledge is theory hardened into a given reality. Like Pile & Thrift (1995) I 
understand that 'theories are not 'objects' but living territories of 
contemplation, constantly on the move' (Pile & Thrift, 1995, p.24). 
As Lather (1991) recognises we are, at this historical moment, 
experiencing 'an epochal shift marked by a thinking differently about the 
meaning of knowing' (Lather, 1991, p.86). This shift moves away from the 
concept of a found world toward a concept of constructed worlds. 
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we seem somewhere in the midst of a shift away from a view of 
knowledge as disinterested and toward a conceptualisation of knowledge 
as constructed, contested, incessantly perspectival and polyphonic. 
(Lather, 1991, p.xx) 
Instead of separating theory and practice, knowledge and experience, 
or conceiving of them as competing discourses I prefer, like Weedon (1991, 
p.7), to think in terms of transforming both the social relations of knowledge 
production and the type of knowledge produced. To do so requires that the 
issues of how and where knowledge is produced, by whom and what counts as 
knowledge be addressed. Like Lather (1991) I am searching for the 
possibilities for constructing emancipatory knowledge. Such knowledge aims 
to make visible the contradictions distorted or hidden by everyday 
understandings, and in so doing it directs attention to the possibilities for 
social transformation inherent in the present configurations of social processes 
and practices (Lather, 1991, p.52). 
For Lather (1991) the paradigm of modernity has created a space 
where 'we feel we cannot continue as we are' (Lather, 1991, p.86). In this new 
space 'consciousness and subjectivity rise to the fore in critical inquiry as the 
juncture between human agency and structural constraint takes on theoretical 
urgency' (Lather, 1991, p.109). 
What I am struggling to articulate is a view of knowledge as 
embodied, perspectival, socially constructed and discursively produced within 
relations of power; a view which emphasises movement and variability and 
proposes a dialectical relationship between knower and known, subject and 
object, body and consciousness. 
Knowledge, knower and known 
Hare-Mustin & Marecek (1990) identify three core features of 
epistemology: who is the knower; what can be known; and how knowledge is 
established. These entail critical reflection on the relationship between 
knowledge and power. An understanding of how social relations structure 
what counts as valid or authentic knowledge is essential to the project of 
altering or transforming those relations of power. How, and what, we know 
depends on who we are. 'We are situated knowers located within a dynamic 
social structure' (Hare-Mustin & Maracek, 1990, p.174). Knowing is thus 
relational, historical and reflexive. 
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It is relational in that it is dependent on the subject's position and 
participation within a community of knowers. It is historical in that it is a 
transitory process dependent on one's location within a temporally bound 
context. It is reflexive in that reflexivity is instrumental to how we know and 
also in that the knower is not separate from the known (Hare-Mustin & 
Marecek, 1990, pp.  174-5). 
What is seen, understood and known results from the pattern of seeing 
carried within the observer/knower. I may be seen and understood by some to 
be effeminate, but my perceived effeminacy is not an essential quality that 
exists as meaningful without a point of reference. Rather, this perception is 
made possible by the carefully delineated social meanings, values and 
expectations that are carried and employed by both performing and observing 
social subjects. Berman (1990) suggests that since viewpoint is mediated 
through mental constructs, our perceptions of phenomena are determined not 
only by the things themselves, but also by our mindset, our individual 
consciousness and understanding. 
This, in turn depends on our social interaction with phenomena ... Our 
viewpoint is therefore derived not only from our specific material 
conditions and relations but also from our understanding of them, our 
consciousness. 
(Berman, 1990, p.242) 
Social subjects are influenced by the particular belief system in which 
their culture initiates them and this system circumscribes their view of the 
world. This learned value system is projected onto the objects and events 
encountered or experienced by the subject. Perceptions, and evidence which 
supports those perceptions, are selected on the basis of those objects and 
experiences that reinforce the hegemonic discourses and belief systems of the 
culture. Thus subjects learn to see, to know and to understand that which 
culture teaches, indeed requires, them to see (Spender, 1992). Thus social 
subjects are programmed for a limited set of meanings which define, shape 
and limit the boundaries of lived experience. 'Contradictions tend to be 
censored, and we continue to see only that which is consistent with our 
established world view' (Spender, 1992, p.28). Yet this process, as an effect 
of culture, is neither fixed nor inevitable, and can be changed. Knowledge 
then is self-reflexive and constantly self-revising. Nothing can be taken for 
granted; everything is provisional; no absolutes can be assumed. 
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Knowledge is thus understood and described in terms of the 
possibilities of movement, change and transformation. Poststructuralist 
feminist theory interrogates 
how our culture employs and privileges certain categories of thought and 
what relation these categories have to contemporary understanding of 
sexual difference. 
(Gatens, 1991, p.85) 
Whilst the historical and cultural construction of our conceptual 
schema goes unquestioned, the ideological and political nature of much of 
that conceptualisation remains invisible. Therefore critical reflection on these 
concepts is crucial to their transformation. Such reflection contests the 
existence of a monodimensional reality, absolute truth and value free 
knowledge. It also challenges the notion of a found world awaiting 
interpretation. Rather it stresses the importance of the observer and the uses 
to which their observations are put (Farangis, 1990, pp.181-9). 
In challenging prevailing patriarchal models of knowledge Grosz 
(1988, pp.93-99) identifies three types of intellectual misogyny; sexist, 
patriarchal and phallocentric. 
Sexism within knowledge is a 'series of specifically determinable acts 
of discrimination privileging men and depriving women' (Grosz, 1988, p.93). 
These acts include propositions, arguments, assertions and methodologies 
which result in unwarranted differential treatment of women and men. 
Given that patriarchy is a structure that positions women and men 
differently, patriarchal knowledges ascribe different values and social 
meanings to women and men (Grosz, 1988, p.94). Patriarchal knowledges are 
thus systematic forms of oppression experienced by women as the objects of 
sexist knowledge. 
Phallocentrism conflates the two sexes into a single, universal model. 
This model is, however, 'congruent only with the masculine' (Grosz, 1988, 
p.94). This model abstracts, universalises and generalises masculine attributes 
and renders invisible the reality of, or possibility for, autonomous definitions 
or representations of women and femininity. Phallocentrism is located in 
discourses which privilege men and masculinity and conceal alternative 
conceptions of the subject. 
Grosz identifies five central features of the phallocentric paradigm 
through which the 'masculinity of knowledges' is constructed (Grosz, 1988, 
pp.97-99). They are expressed in terms of five epistemological commitments. 
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First, commitment to a perspectiveless, static truth which evades its own 
conditions of production and which invalidates, excludes and silences that 
which does not conform to this truth. Second, commitment to objectivist, 
value free concepts of knowledge founded on a model drawn from 
mechanistic science which relies on the interchangeability of invariant 
objective observers as proof of an invariant objective reality. Third, 
commitment to a model of knowledge in which language is simply an 
instrument through which a fixed reality is represented. Fourth, commitment 
to a separation between the knower and the thing known, between subject and 
object where knowledge can only be true and objective because it is separated 
from the social, political, historical and subjective contexts in which it is 
produced. Fifth, commitment to an intellectual system of concepts and 
categories whose identity and validity depends on its opposition to other 
terms. Notions of reason, truth and objectivity are thus described in terms of 
what they are not. Thus, they are not described substantively, but rather are 
described by their opposite or other where the privileged term is generated by 
the identification and devaluation of its opposite. 
As informed by poststructuralist feminist theory, critical reflection on 
the process of knowledge production within patriarchal culture draws 
attention to the relationship between power and knowledge. In recognising 
this nexus, Foucault (1977) conflates the terms, power-knowledge. This 
conflation challenges the assumption that ideology can be demystified to 
reveal an undistorted, though hidden, truth. Power and knowledge are not 
seen as isolated from, or opposed to each other, but are rather seen as 
connected, inseparable and dialectically related. 
Foucault (1977) argues that there is no power relation without the 
'correlative constitution of a field of knowledge' (Foucault, 1977, p.54). 
Further, there is no knowledge that does not simultaneously presuppose and 
constitute relations of power. The discourses produced by power-knowledge 
are referred to by Foucault as 'regimes of truth'. Truth is thus linked with the 
systems of power-knowledge which produce and sustain it as well as the 
effects of the power-knowledge it creates. Thus for Foucault, power, 
knowledge and truth comprise an 'ensemble of rules according to which the 
true and the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the 
true' (1980, p.132). 
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Truth 
It is in making claims to truth that discourses demonstrate their 
investment in particular versions of meaning as well as their hostility to 
change. 
(Weedon, 1991, p.131) 
I do not claim the status of truth for my text but rather position it 
between fiction and theory. I do not claim to challenge phallocentrism or 
unmask patriarchal falsehoods and replace them with truths differently arrived 
at. Rather, I attempt to reveal the investments patriarchal knowledges have in 
both representing and excluding some knowledges, some subjects, and how 
this is determined by relations of power. 
Poststructuralist feminist theory problematises the aspiration to truth as 
an objective, verifiable eternal value, and unmasks its epistemological, 
political investments (Grosz, 1990). Relations between statements are 
emphasised rather than the relationship between statements and their reference 
to a 'real' world. Such a view informs critique of the concept of truth and 
foregrounds the role of theory in the interrogation of truths and the generation 
of new knowledges. 
What I am arguing for here is the rejection of discourses through 
which knowledges or truths are defined as either absolute or relative. Rather, I 
am arguing for a situated, relational view of knowledge and truth which 
renders the binary opposition of absolute and relative obsolete. 
Rather than privileging singular, value free and universal 
conceptualisations of truth, objectivity, neutrality and reason, poststructuralist 
feminist theory acknowledges its position as context and observer dependent 
and hence historically, politically, socially and sexually motivated. 
Poststructuralist feminist theory thus makes explicit how and where it is 
located, and articulates the conditions through which it has been constructed. 
Yet this does not suggest that 'feminists have embarked on false, subjective or 
irrational projects ... to sharply differentiate it from patriarchal knowledge' 
(Grosz, 1988, p.100). Like Grosz I argue that poststructuralist feminist theory 
is neither subjective nor objective, relativist or absolutist; rather, it occupies 
the middle ground excluded by oppositional categories. Whereas relativism 
has no notified position, poststructuralist feminist theory is relational; it 
occupies a position and is not neutral or free-floating. As located, relational 
and interested it does not rely on a historical universal criteria nor imply 'an 
anything goes attitude' (Grosz, 1988, p.100). Absolutism and relativism 
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ignore the material effects of power relations and the necessity of occupying a 
position within a socio-political context. Thus poststructuralist feminist 
theory contests patriarchal traditions and establishes criteria of validity 
founded on 'intersubjective understandings between different subjects' (Grosz, 
1988, p.100) and not on the requirements of an objectivity which assumes the 
interchangeability of similar observers. 
Spender (1992) suggests that the idea that there are many truths is no 
more difficult to sustain than the notion that 'there is only one truth, with its 
powerful demand for the denial of contradiction' (Spender, 1992, p.26). Yet I 
recognise that discourses that propose multiple, mobile, located deferred truths 
have been understood as, and criticised for, resulting in 'an indeterminate 
neutrality which perpetuates the status quo' (Heckman, 1992, p.164) and are 
therefore incapable of effecting a change in dominant accepted interpretations. 
However, I argue that such discourses are neither negative, nor neutral, but 
part of 'a radical strategy that centres on intervention' (Heckman, 1992, p.164). 
This intervention attacks the classical binary oppositions and displaces the 
discourses, practices and systems they create. Further, it recognises that the 
epistemological polarities of logocentric/dualist thought 'are located and 
reflected in both discursive and non-discursive formations, in linguistic and 
social structures' (Heckman, 1992, p.164). 
Poststructuralist feminism proposes, and articulates, different, 
multiple perspectives from which the world and objects in it may be 
perceived and understood. However, despite this endorsement of difference 
and multiplicity, Farangis (1990) recognises that poststructuralist feminism 
aims to 'avoid the scourge of normative relativism which says that each of 
these perspectives is equally good' (Farangis, 1990, p.217). Rather Farangis 
claims that poststructuralist feminism is imbued with a moral dimension 
which runs counter to relativism and ethical neutrality. Thus, as a critical 
movement, it 'must try to create the conditions whereby we can intelligently 
and reasonably 'agree upon substantive values' (Farangis, 1990, p.217). Such 
a project is central to my purposes in producing this text. Here I am 
attempting to conceptualise possibilities for creating the social conditions in 
which empowered social subjects, liberated from relations of power, 
dominance and subordinance, may construct more egalitarian communities. I 
recognise that this project is located in a particular set of ethical investments, 
and it is these investments that I am attempting to explore. 
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Truth, values and a community of knowers 
Gatens (1991) observes that ethics have historically been the product 
of that group which has had most social power and control and hence 
monopolised moral and political right. Further, this group has historically 
been 'white, male, heads of households' (Gatens, 1991, p.138). Gatens argues 
that the universalised values of this group be replaced by an ethics that takes 
account of historical, social, ethnic and bodily differences. Such an ethics 
emphasises diversity and plurality as the basis of a 'polymorphous socio-
political body' (Gatens, 1991, p.139). For such a body to be realised it will 
need to be capable of discriminating and respecting difference among its 
members. This will involve the ability to 'contextualise actions and their 
meanings rather than taking a relativist stand toward issues of ethics' (Gatens, 
1991, p.139). A non-relativist approach implies an ability to 'hear and 
respond to many voices and many meanings' (Gatens, 1991, p.139). What is 
proposed then is a social body in communication with itself. Such 
communication is understood to imply that each member of that social body, 
whether an individual or a group, would not decide its moral codes for itself. 
Rather each member would interact with other individual or group members 
of the larger body. 
The foundation for ethical judgements is neither a shared reason nor a 
common human essence but the practice of communicative ethics. 
(Welch, 1991, p.86) 
As understood by Welch, communicative ethics do not assume a 
cohesive community with a shared set of principles, norms and mores to be 
the necessary foundation of moral reasoning. Rather, Welch argues that what 
is more important for foundational moral critique is material interaction 
between multiple communities with divergent principles, norms and mores 
(Welch, 1990, p.86). Thus a cohesive community must have the means to 
critique constitutive forms of injustice, exclusion, limitation and oppression 
central to the operation of a given social system. In critiquing patriarchal 
ideologies, discourses, institutions, structures and practices I am attempting 
to illuminate the systemic and systematic oppression of patriarchal subjects, 
especially in terms of sex, gender and sexuality. 
Thus the goal of communicative ethics is not merely consensus but 
mutual critique, critique which leads to more complex, negotiated and 
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continuously renegotiated understandings of what is just and how particular 
forms of justice may be achieved. Such critique, in the form of 'non-coercive 
dialogue' (Welch, 1991, p.92), aims to reach without force, a mutually 
acceptable understanding, the goal of which is 'to bring about an agreement 
that terminates in the intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal understanding, 
mutual trust and accord with one another' (Habermas, 1974, p.3). 
Thus communicative ethics presuppose, and sustain, social 
transformation based on the process of dialogue, mutual critique and political 
action which contribute to a public discourse that is 
simultaneously about the discourse of an engaged plurality and the 
formation of critical citizenship. This must be a discourse that breathes 
life into the notion of democracy by stressing a notion of lived 
community that is not at odds with the principles of justice, liberty and 
equality. 
(Giroux, 1991, p.248) 
Giroux (1991) asserts that such discourse allows for multiple, specific 
and heterogeneous ways of being and living, all of which imply an ethical 
framework of the sort proposed by Habermas (1974) and Welch (1991). 
Foucault (1983) links his conception of subjectivity with his 
conception of ethics, a conception separate from, yet located within, the 
realm of morals. He draws a distinction between socially imposed and 
internally constructed moralities. Socially imposed moral codes determine 
which acts are permitted or forbidden and hence ascribed a positive or 
negative value. Internally constructed moral codes are founded on the ways 
and means by which individuals construct themselves as the moral subjects 
of their own actions. These practices of self-regulation or 'technologies of 
self (Foucault, 1977) are not something that individuals invent in any 
original sense. Rather, they are patterns found in culture which are proposed, 
suggested and imposed on individual subjects by their culture, their society 
and their social group. 
He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes 
responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play 
spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in 
which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his 
own subjection. 
(Foucault, 1977, pp.202-3) 
Thus Foucault's conception of subjectivity confronts the technologies 
through which we make ourselves into subjects, and in so doing, participate 
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in our own subjectification. Yet within these technologies of the self there 
exist 'spaces of freedom' (Foucault, 1988, p.145) spaces opened out by way of 
the choices and specific practices with which we regulate our own actions. It 
is within the realm of these choices, practices and actions that we have the 
capacity to alter aspects of our subjectification. Thus I argue that the more 
aware we are of these practices the greater the space for altering those 
practices , and hence ourselves. 
According to Foucault's analysis there will always be regimes of truth 
and technologies of self. Thus, the purpose of identifying spaces of freedom 
is not to escape all regimes and technologies. Rather, the purpose is to 
transcend the current ones. Such transcendence is a function of; increased 
awareness of current regimes and technologies; recognition that current 
regimes need not be as they are; and continued identification and entry into, 
those spaces of freedom (Foucault, 1988, p.145). 
Thus no system of thought, ideology or discourse is entirely closed, or 
free from the possibility of disruption and transformation. Rather, there exist 
in these regimes of power/knowledge/truth, spaces of freedom. In searching 
out and moving into and through these spaces of freedom, thoughts, ideas, 
inscriptions, subjectivities, actions and practices beyond those currently 
available, are made possible. Ironically, these disruptive, fracturing practices 
may generate new power/knowledge/ truth regimes with their own 
ideological and discursive limitations, spaces of freedom and possibilities for 
disruption. Yet, it might become possible, in contexts where power, as we 
have come to understand and experience it within patriarchy, is no longer 
central to the social organisation of knowledge, truth and reality, to generate 
meanings that are currently unavailable, unimaginable and unutterable. 
Power, knowledge and truth 
Here I am arguing that all knowledge is interpretive, relational and 
produced within particular discursive frameworks which, depending on their 
ideological location, make various, sometimes competing, claims to truth. 
Theoretical discourses which claim to represent the world 'as it really is' 
struggle for hegemony, and attaining it, come to be accepted as true. They 
then claim to represent 'analytically true statements about social reality' 
(Crowley & Himmelweit, 1992, p.237). When particular knowledges about 
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the world are privileged they are accepted across, and incorporated into, social 
institutions and assigned the status of truth. As truths they structure the world 
and exclude other interpretations of it. In this way power and knowledge 
intersect to produce socially accepted conventions about knowledge and the 
nature of reality. Crowley & Himmelweit (1992) recapitulate Foucault's 
assertion that the truth or falsity of knowledge is not something which can be 
established philosophically or empirically. Rather, claims to truth can only be 
made from within a discourse and social subjects are only able to construct an 
understanding of the world through the discourses available to them. Thus 
perception, knowledge and meaning are always structured within existing 
discursive arguments, and since they are constructed relationally their truth 
cannot be fixed. Such a view foregrounds the plurality and non-fixity of 
meaning which, since it is situated and contextual, asserts that it cannot be 
guaranteed by anything external to it (Crowley & Himmelweit, 1992, p.236). 
Since the truth of a discourse resides in the relations of power it sustains and 
not in empirical reality, the function of critique is to challenge dominant ideas 
and reveal the power and interests that such views of the world sustain. For 
example, my homosexuality is legal in some countries and not in others. Thus 
it appears true that I am a criminal in some contexts and not in others. This 
truth is supported by various religious, medical, political and legal discourses 
which justify a variety of punishments, from stoning, whipping, the 
amputation of hands and feet, imprisonment and execution (Spencer, 1995, 
pp.384-6). It is clear that within a patriarchal hierarchy of masculinities 
homosexual men are less powerful than those who conform to the culturally 
exalted form of hegemonic masculinity. 
Central to Foucault's concept of the subject is analysis of the ways in 
which power is deployed in the production of meaning. For Foucault (1980) 
power is consolidated through dominant ideas which congeal into a common, 
commonsense view of the world which constitutes a 'regime of truth'. 
Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, 
the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the 
mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false 
statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and 
procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those 
who are charged with saying what counts as true. 
(Foucault, 1980, p.131) 
As understood by Gore (1993) Foucault's conception of power-
knowledge exists only in action, and is actualised at the site of the body, in 
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our actions and behaviours. This results in 'political regimes of the body' 
(Gore, 1993, p.55). These political regimes of the body refer to the 
actualising of regimes of truth 'in, on, through and around the body' (Gore, 
1993, p.55). Like Foucault, Gore (1993) asserts that socio-political structures 
rely on the self-regulation of its bodies who construct themselves in 
accordance with both regimes of truth and political regimes of the body. This 
is achieved not only, or simply, by coercive external forces or practices, but 
also by securing individual willingness to comply. This act of compliance, 
referred to by Foucault (1977) as 'technologies of the self, is achieved through 
acts of conformity and self-regulation which 'elicit specific practices which 
are enacted at the site of the body' (Gore, 1993, p.55). Thus regimes of truth 
organised around dichotomised sex/gender produce bodies which appear and 
behave in ways that confirm and naturalise, the dichotomised categories 
through which they are constructed. 
Power is activated when people assume identities that are included within 
the prevailing view of the world. By occupying certain places within a 
discourse, the subject, according to Foucault, is empowered to act 
according to the identity prescribed by that discourse. 
(Crowley & Himmelweit, 1992, p.236) 
Regimes of truth, in producing particular regimes of the body, 'work 
on the mind and emotions, on the unconscious, and yes, on the soul, the spirit, 
through the work done on, to, by, with and from the body' (Gore, 1993, p.55). 
Thus individual subjects act in specific, discursively produced ways, 'in order 
to transform themselves and attain a certain state of being' (Gore, 1993, p.91). 
Gore observes that, as situated in, and by poststructuralist feminist discourses, 
subjects are similarly able to act on their bodies, thoughts, emotions, desires, 
behaviours and ways of being 'in order to reclaim themselves' (Gore, 1993, 
p.91) from patriarchal structures. 
I argue that we can resist those structures, discourses and regimes that 
fail to allow us the means of modifying them. We must, therefore, attempt to 
disturb and disrupt the categories of knowledge/power that oppress us 
(Heckman, 1992, p.182). 
Truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that they are illusions, 
worn out metaphors which have become powerless to affect the senses; 
coins which have their obverse effaced and are now no longer of account 
as coins but merely as metal. 
(Nietzsche, 1964, p.180) 
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Thus truth is no more than 'a set of congealed, or frozen metaphors 
whose metaphorical status has become mistaken for the literal' (Grosz, 1993, 
p.58). Such a view challenges the notion of objectivity as disembodied, value 
free knowledge and suggests that knowledge is, rather, a function of 'the 
embodied expression of our affective investment in the world - knowing and 
feeling, seeing and speaking, conception and perception, situation and 
expression' (Conway, 1993, p.112). 
Knowledge is thus generated in particular contexts and from particular 
perspectives. Claims for a perspectival knowing means that knowledge is 
only possible if one's affective engagement with the world is both recognised 
and expressed. Knowledge is thus 'an aggregation of radically situated 
perspectives (or bodies) - none of which affords us an epistemically pure 
glimpse of the world' (Conway, 1993, p.113). 
Perspectival, relational knowledges and truths are thus always partial 
and not simply appearances beneath which there is a stable reality. Rather, 
there are only perspectives, only appearances and only interpretations: 'There 
is nothing beyond the multiplicity of perspectives, positions, bodily forces, no 
anchor in the real' (Grosz, 1993, p.61). 
There is, then, no single truth. Rather, there exists 'a multiplicity of 
mutually inconsistent truths dependent on the particular conditions 
constituting different kinds of discourse' (Sadler, 1993, p.229). Since these 
perspectives cannot be understood nor judged in terms of an ultimate reality, 
the varying degrees of usefulness of various perspectives depend on the 
purposes they serve. Though these purposes are contextual and historically 
variable, some have become 'hardened and fixed in the course of time, giving 
the impression that they are true in some absolute sense' (Sadler, 1993, p.229). 
Poststructuralist feminist theory foregrounds the ways in which gender 
is a critical factor in determining and limiting what counts as truth. For 
Dworkin (1991) the given patriarchal reality is structured on the principal that 
there are two sexes; male and female. Further, these two sexes are understood 
as opposites, as complementary polarities of human existence which unite 
naturally into a harmonious whole. We are, says Dworkin, 'living inside a 
pernicious delusion, a delusion on which all reality as we know it is 
predicated' (Dworkin, 1991, p.110). 
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Reality 
The postmodern crisis of representation ... is an erosion of confidence in 
prevailing concepts of knowledge and truth. Whatever the 'real is it is 
discursive. Rather than dismissing 'the real', postmodernism foregrounds 
how discourses shape our experience of 'the real' in its proposal that the 
way we speak and write reflects the structures of power in our society. 
(Lather, 1991, p.25) 
Such a view disrupts claims to totality, certainty and universality and 
seeks to do more than displace or reverse oppositional thinking; it seeks to 
make a difference, to 'take a stand, act, assess' (Lather, 1991, p.25) whilst 
recognising the contingency and historicity of values. 
Within poststructuralist feminist theory it is possible to 'choose 
between different accounts of reality on the basis of their social implications' 
(Weedon, 1991, p.29). Critical reflection on the hegemonic discourses 
through which social reality is constructed and described is central to the 
generation of different, preferred realities. Reality as spoken/written can be 
contested and transformed, can be respoken/rewritten. Reality, then, is open 
to multiple interpretations, multiple readings and multiple uses. It is not a 
solid self contained given, but a fluid, unfolding process constantly open to 
revision and shaped by human actions and beliefs (Appleyard, 1993; Davies, 
1982; Capra, 1983; Griffin, 1988; Reaney, 1991; Shepherd, 1993). Reality is 
understood more as possibility than fact, and more in terms of relationships 
than fixed discrete objects. Further, since we are constantly implicated and 
engaged in the process of constructing reality we are simultaneously 
transforming both it and ourselves. I argue that the apprehension of reality is 
not a function of the passive reflection of an external, intrinsically ordered 
world, but is rather an active process of perception and cognition. The 
discursive production of meanings, concepts and symbols is fundamental to 
the creation and interpretation of reality. 'Reality is in some sense constructed 
by the mind, not simply perceived by it, and many such constructions are 
possible, none necessarily sovereign' (Tarnas, 1991, p.396). In this view, 
understanding is interpretation, and no interpretation is final. Thus the nature 
of truth and reality, as discursive constructions, is 'radically ambiguous' 
(Tarnas, 1991, p.397) and grounded in the relationship between knower and 
known. 
Davies (1990) asserts that because we experience the world through 
our interactions with it, the world we actually experience cannot be totally 
objective. Thus, it is the mutual interaction between observer and observed 
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that supplies the sensation or illusion of a surrounding reality. Further, our 
sense of this reality is informed by our interpretive model of the world, a 
model constructed by 'experience, emotional predisposition, expectation and 
so on' (Davies, 1990, p.108). Thus, as with the example of my supposed 
effeminacy, the reality we perceive and the category system that makes such 
perception possible cannot be separated (Hare-Mustin & Maracek, 1990). 
Since knower and known, observer and observed are understood to be 
intimately related, the subject/object dualism is collapsed; objects or data have 
no meaning separate from acts of observation and interpretation by the 
subject. Thus we can no longer assume that the world we see is the world that 
is: 'Rather the world we see is the world we make' (Reanny, 1994, p.49). We 
are, in this way, engaged in the construction of an intellectual map of reality, 
classifying, categorising, prioritising and dividing the world into separate 
recognisable, nameable objects and events. Whilst these divisions may be 
useful they cannot, says Capra (1983) be taken as a fundamental feature of 
reality. They are, rather 'abstractions devised by our discriminating and 
categorising intellect' (Capra, 1983, p.141). Reality then is constructed in 
such a way that we are able to make sense of it and acts of cognition operate 
within a given spectrum with the result that we see, think and know the way 
we do because we have learned to do so (Drury, 1989, p.13). This selective 
perception involves the filtering of data to produce a modified, socially 
mediated, consensual reality. 
We assume when we are born that there is an external world out there and 
that all we have to do is see it. This is quite false. Our model of reality is 
our own, and though much of our model overlaps and coincides with 
those of others it is fundamentally a necessary convenience, a magnificent 
lie'. 
(Reanny, 1991, pp.178-9) 
I am here arguing that our sense of reality is a persuasive fiction, 
confirmed by the reassurances of a socially constructed consensual reality. 
The fictional symbols used in the domain of perception and conceptualisation 
are projected onto the world in such a way as to create the illusion that they 
are naturally occurring phenomena and events. We do not simply perceive a 
world separated from us, rather we perceive, choose and act from a range of 
possibilities and actively construct our sense of the real. Given the view that 
consciousness brings forth particular configurations of reality from a range of 
complex and multiple possibilities, then 'consciousness is the faculty in the 
mind that creates reality' (Reanny, 1991, p.181). Yet this process is not 
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arbitrary. Only realities that are self-consistent, or consistent with consensual 
reality, endure. 
Consensual reality 
Consensual reality implies that society, comprising those who form the 
category 'other' as opposed to 'self, plays a role in the structure of our 
conscious experiences (Searle, 1992). Conscious experiences are intentional 
and perspectival; they are always from a point of view. Experience and 
perception are thus partly a function of expectation; we see or perceive that 
which we expect to see, and expectation is learnt through those discursive 
practices that teach us what is real and hence, what to expect. Thus we find 
what we expect to find, see what we expect to see and perceive what we 
expect to perceive. 'A natural corollary of this claim is that the organisation of 
perception is only possible given a set of categories that identify entities 
within the familiar' (Searle, 1992, p.136). 
Meaning-making then, involves categorisation, and these categories 
exist prior to experience. It is upon the basis of these familiar consensual 
categories that meaning may be constructed from what is perceived and 
experienced. 
Conscious experiences come to us as structured, those structures enable 
us to perceive things under aspects, but those aspects are constrained by a 
mastery of a set of categories. 
(Searle, 1992, p.136) 
Knowledge, truth and reality, as socially mediated discursive 
constructions, are multi-dimensional, variable and complex. Thus an 'abstract 
system of conceptual thinking can never describe or understand this reality 
completely' (Capra, 1983, p.35) but rather 'we can only expect an approximate 
representation of reality from such a procedure' (Capra, 1983, p.35). This 
approximate representation is ideological, discursive, conceptual, symbolic, 
and linguistic and suggests that 'knowledge is constructed, contextual and 
mutable' (Shepherd, 1993, p.36). Our perceptions, meanings and knowledges 
of the world are thus experience and context dependent, and a function of the 
ways in which we learn to interpret them. Our apprehension of and adaptation 
to the world is based on agreement with others about what we see and 
experience. Thus reality is a consensual social construction and this 
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consensual reality is a result of, and results in, 'conceptual boundaries that are 
structured in our consciousness' (Shepherd, 1993, p.98). There is therefore, no 
'right way' to perceive the 'real world'. Rather, there are multiple ways in 
which reality may be perceived. Yet, the formulation of a consensual reality 
requires that we freeze that field of possibilities into a certain, given, 
naturalised and taken for granted reality. The construction of consensual 
reality then involves acts of perception and cognition, which, expressed 
through language, result in the construction of particular knowledges, truths 
and realities. As argued in a previous chapter these constructions of 
knowledge, truth and reality are achieved through language, discourse and 
ideology. 
Reality, discourse and language 
The world is intelligible only through discourse: there is no unmediated 
experience, no access to the raw reality of self and others. 
(Belsey, 1996, p.359) 
Our sense of self, our subjectivity, cannot be separated from our sense 
that we have a name, and that we can name our reality: 'We are our names' 
(Rosenfield, 1993, p.120). Names establish relationships between people, 
events and objects. Further, the act of naming reflects our understanding of 
relations, associations and abstractions. The acquisition of language depends 
on the ability to create generalisations and establish relations between 
discourses and lived experience. Language connects, interrelates and 
abstracts images and is implicated in the ways in which we organise our 
experience in, on and with the world (Belsey, 1990; Cameron, 1990; Davies, 
1989, 1993, 1994; Weedon, 1991). 
Cameron (1990) recognises that whilst we believed that 'reality' or 'the 
world' simply existed 'out there', ready-made for our apprehension as a 'series 
of images with names attached' (Cameron, 1990, p.94) then the question of 
the constitutive effects of language on our perceptions was not at issue. The 
view of a made reality, not a found one, foregrounds the role of language, 
ideology and discourse in the construction of reality, knowledge and truth. 
Through language we classify, name, categorise and order 'what would 
otherwise be undifferentiated meaningless chaos' (Cameron, 1990, p.94). 
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The linguistic categories available within culture, the models of 
explanations that are privileged, and the dominant cultural ideology, influence 
the construction of reality. The belief that something is real, is plausible not 
because it reflects the world, but because it is 'constructed out of what is 
discursively familiar' (Belsey, 1991, p.47). There is then 'no world without 
words' (Hare-Mustin & Maracek, 1990, p.1) and all communication is 
predicated on context and patterns of relationships. Further, under conditions 
of social inequality, privileged members of society have control over 
meaning-making. Thus, representations of reality serve the interests of those 
who make them (Friere, 1990). 'Hegemony translates, through power and 
privilege, from the privileged members to the meanings and discourses they 
generate (Hare-Mustin & Maracek, 1990, p.xii). As a consequence some 
versions of reality, truth and knowledge have hegemony over others. It is 
only when these privileged discourses are disrupted that they become unstable 
and other previously suppressed or marginalised meanings may emerge. 
What is at issue here then, is not simply what or how we think. Rather, what 
and how we think, grow out of, and limit, the character of the social 
relationships we have and hence the meanings, knowledges and realities we 
construct. Thus, reality is social; it is 'whatever people at a given time believe 
it to be' (Dworkin, 1991, p.109). For Dworkin, reality is always a function of 
politics in general, and sexual politics in particular, where socially mediated 
consensual reality serves the powerful by justifying their right to dominate 
those less powerful. 
Thus I argue that reality is circumscribed by the discourses within 
which social institutions are constructed. This is self perpetuating, for the 
social institutions built on these premises also embody and enforce those 
premises. Reality is enforced by those whom it serves so that it appears to be 
self evident, and it is made self evident through the ideology of common 
sense. Further, 'by making hegemonic sets of assumptions visible, the nature 
of what we take to be factual or real is profoundly shifted' (Davies, 1994, 
p.20). 
Common language, common sense, common reality 
Common sense, says Weedon (1991) consists of a 'number of social 
meanings and the practical ways of understanding the world which guarantee 
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them' (Weedon, 1991, p.75). These meanings, which represent only the 
interests of particular social groups become fixed and widely accepted as true. 
Common sense relies on a naive view of language as transparent and true. 
The power and authority of common sense knowledge is derived from its 
claims to be natural and obvious, and therefore true. Common sense then is 
the medium through which truths about the world, society and individuals are 
represented and expressed as fixed and absolute. 
Common sense demands we 'use language which gives the appearance 
of clear referential meaning and conceals the artifice that produces this 
appearance of objectivity' (Lather, 1991, p.91). 
Poststructuralist feminist discourses question assumptions of common 
sense and in so doing dislodge those beliefs which take the authority of the 
concept common sense for granted as obvious and natural. 
Belsey (1991) argues that the 'obvious' and the 'natural' are not given, 
but produced in a specific society 'by the ways in which that society talks and 
thinks about itself and its experience' (Belsey, 1991, p.3). Common sense 
appears obvious and natural not as a function of an independent objective 
reality but rather because it is inscribed in the language we speak, a language 
which is neither neutral nor transparent. If, as Belsey (1991), Cameron (1990) 
and Weedon (1991) suggest, the transparency of language is an illusion, then 
language, ideology, knowledge and reality may be seen as situated in 
discourses which are constructed through relations of value and power. Thus, 
meaning, knowledge and reality are discursive and constructed through the 
reproduction and repetition of the familiar. As repetitions they become 
'caricatures of reality' (Ornstein & Ehrlich, 1991, p.196). 
These caricatured repetitions become common currency in the 
generation of social discourses about common sense lcnowledges, truths and 
realities. These social discourses solidify into sets of ready made meanings 
and form 'lay social theories' (Haste, 1993, p.10) on which subjects come to 
rely for the generation of knowledges and understandings about particular 
issues or events. 
A lay social theory is a scenario for explanation which contains schemas 
about how things work. The scenario tells a story, gives an account, 
provides a script. 
(Haste, 1993, p.10) 
Lay social theories imply certain desirable outcomes and shared 
socially acceptable concepts and beliefs. Individual subjects are able to 
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communicate their lay social theory because it is derived from the available 
cultural repertoire. Individual subjects may believe their version of the 
scenario or script to be particular to them, but the resources for this process of 
making sense are available only within the culture in which they are situated 
and are intersubjective and constantly socially negotiated in ordinary 
interaction. Stereotypes and metaphors are central to this process of sense 
making and negotiating and constructing knowledge. 
Stereotype and metaphor 
Metaphor is the bridge between individual thinker and social context, 
between existing ideas and new ideas, between where one person is and 
where the interlocutor wants to take that person. We need metaphors and 
analogies to explain new concepts, to resolve uncertainty or 
misunderstanding. We need metaphors to communicate new ideas, to 
move between the familiar and the unfamiliar. Metaphors underpin our 
taken-for-granted assumptions about the world. 
(Haste, 1993, p.11) 
Stereotypes and metaphors are frames which serve as categories for 
grouping things. Metaphors describing subjectivity prescribe and limit 
options for taking up subject positions and interpreting the subject positions 
taken up by others. Within patriarchal ideologies and discourses polarity or 
dualism is a common principle for the organisation of these metaphors and 
stereotypes (Goodison, 1992; Davies, 1993; Haste, 1993). Dualistic, 
oppositional, hierarchical metaphors carry evaluative connotations and affect 
interpretations and explanations of behaviour as well as assumptions and 
expectations. Metaphors explain relationship and in a dualistic metaphor the 
implied relationship between the two aspects or poles is one of opposition. 
Poststructuralist feminist theory contests simplistic binarisms which 
'squeeze the multiplicity and variability of everyday life into binary categories' 
(Davies, 1993, p.53). These binarisms are taken up as one's own 'both as a 
way of telling about the world and as a way of feeling' (Davies, 1993, p.55) 
and as a way of positioning oneself in relation to the world of knowledge and 
knowing, especially in terms of one's gendered subjectivity. In this view, 
seemingly apparent, common sense assumptions and knowledges about 
femininity and masculinity have less to do with empirical fact or evidence 
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than they do with the social values of the society in which they were produced 
(Kaplan & Rogers, 1990, p.205). 
Discourses about sex, gender and sexuality thus rely on 
stereotypical/metaphorical meanings for their production and articulation. In 
this way conceptions of difference between the sexes, of sex roles and sexual 
relations, come to be couched in metaphors that explain and justify them. 
Further, the metaphors derived from gender and sexuality permeate other 
dimensions of social structures and relations. Within patriarchy the primary 
metaphors of gender are dualism and polarity and difference is understood in 
terms of hierarchy and opposition. The power of the metaphor is derived from 
the way in which it maps other dualities onto gender and this process operates 
in a continuous cycle, constantly reinforcing and reproducing itself. Common 
sense ideas and everyday thinking are so deeply embedded in the metaphors 
of gender, and the analogies associated with them, that we take them for 
granted. 'They are so embedded that we are not conscious that they are 
metaphors' (Haste, 1993, p.12). It is not surprising then that these metaphors, 
deeply rooted in our subject positions, are resistant to questioning and the 
development of a self-reflexive critical consciousness. Indeed 'the concepts 
we carry for making sense of the world have so deeply entered our 
consciousness, our gender identities, there is a great deal of emotional 
investment in our world-views' (Haste, 1993, p.15). Confronting issues of 
sex, gender and sexuality entails acknowledging the role that such 
investments, and the desire, pleasure and anxiety they entail, play in 
sustaining the existing frameworks. Further, these frameworks play a 
significant role in fulfilling those desires, and assuaging those anxieties. 
Haste (1993) cautions that we should not underestimate the power of 
cognitive categories nor overlook the roles of dualism and metaphor in their 
construction. She suggests that stereotyping 'minimises the intellectual effort' 
(Haste, 1993, p.3) of dealing with the mass of information about other people. 
Whilst critiques of gender need to interrogate the processes by which 
femininity and masculinity are mapped onto other areas of cultural life, they 
need also to take into account 'the depth of our engagement with our own 
gender identity' (Haste, 1993, p.4). Thus such critique is necessarily self-
reflexive and motivated towards unmasking the structures, processes and 
practices through which the subject, the lived experience of the subject, and 
the everyday lives of the subject are made meaningful through the discursive 
construction of knowledge, truth and reality. 
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It is extremely convenient to make assumptions simply on the basis of 
whether a person is male or female. To have these neat assumptions 
challenged or questioned disturbs the cool tenor of the mind. Therefore, 
even if dualism were only a cognitive category, there would be problems 
in changing it. By mapping masculine and feminine onto so many other 
dimensions to which we also ascribe polarity, we deepen the problem. 
(Haste, 1993, p.3) 
Construction, deconstruction and invention 
Poststructuralist feminist discourses of truth, reality and knowledge 
emphasise the constructed nature of cognition, perception and subjectivity, all 
of which are integral to, and result in, a constructed truth, reality and 
knowledge. Having been constructed these can be deconstructed and 
re/constructed. The principles of constructivism and deconstruction challenge 
both the idea of a single meaning of reality and of a single truth. Rather than 
searching for 'the truth' they interrogate the ways in which meanings are 
negotiated and how meanings are represented in language. This interrogation 
dislodges essentialist theories of truth and asserts that meanings are 
historically situated, constructed and reconstructed through language and 
located in the relation between meaning and power. Language then, 
structures our individual experience of a socially mediated reality. 
Constructivism asserts that we do not discover reality, we invent it. 
Our experience 'does not directly reflect what is out there' (Hare-Mustin & 
Marecek, 1991, p.27) but is rather a selecting, ordering and organising of it. 
Rather than passively observing reality we actively construct the meanings 
that frame and organise our experience, knowledge and the meanings we 
make from them. Thus our understanding of reality is a representation, not an 
exact replica of what is out there waiting to be seen, known and understood. 
Every object of knowledge is already part of a preinterpreted context, and 
beyond that context are only other preinterpreted contexts. All human 
knowledge is mediated by signs and symbols of uncertain provenance, 
constituted by historically and culturally variable predispositions, and 
influenced by often unconscious human interests. 
(Tarnas, 1991, p.397) 
In this view, representations of reality are shared meanings derived 
from a shared language, history and culture. The 'realities' of social life are 
products of language and agreed meanings. Constructivism challenges the 
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scientific tradition of positivism which posits a fixed reality which can be 
directly observed without influence from the observer. Constructivism also 
challenges the belief that it is possible to distinguish facts from values. 
Rather, values and attitudes determine what are taken to be facts. Thus, 
knowledge cannot be disinterested or politically neutral. 
For Hare-Mustin and Marecek (1993) 'Reality as we perceive it and 
the category system by which we perceive it are ... indissoluble' (Hare-Mustin 
& Marecek, 1991, p.194). Discourses only make visible 'those objects or 
problems that occur within its horizons and upon its terrain' (Coward, 1983, 
p.1). Other objects and problems are marginalised and rendered invisible. 
Yet there are, says Coward, oversights, omissions and blank spaces in these 
discourses that may be made visible by a 'new and informed gaze' (Coward, 
1983, p.81) and made possible by 'changes on the exercise of vision, changes 
in social and political conditions' (Coward, 1983, p.81). My exploration of 
ideology, discourse and language in chapter two, and of knowledge, truth and 
reality in this chapter has been motivated by the desire to develop a new and 
informed gaze, to imagine and articulate possibilities for changing social and 
political conditions. 
Deconstruction is a means of disrupting understandings of reality by 
revealing alternative meanings. New meanings admit new possibilities for 
thought and action and may thus foster change. Thus deconstruction offers a 
means of examining the ways in which language operates 'outside our 
everyday awareness to create meaning' (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1991, p.46). 
Dominant meanings, those considered more 'true', 'right' or 'revealing' 
are often embedded in 'everyday language and commonplace metaphors' 
(Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1991, p.50). Deconstruction challenges linguistic 
conventions by unpacking metaphors and meanings to reveal the process of 
their production. In so doing these meanings may be disrupted, enabling new 
meanings to emerge. As multiple meanings become apparent more 
possibilities for change also emerge. 
Since both knowledge and the knowing subject are socially negotiated 
and constructed they are open to deconstruction and reconstruction. This is a 
social and political project aimed at challenging and transforming those 
discourses which have hegemony in any given culture or historical moment. 
Deconstruction involves critique of those social structures which determine 
the hegemony of particular ideas, beliefs and values in relation to the 
construction of both individual and social subjectivities and realities. For 
Giroux (1984) critical theory explores possibilities for change by identifying 
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spaces of opposition and resistance within discourses. Given that ideology 
functions not only to limit human action, but also enable it, ideology 'creates 
a terrain for self reflection and transformative action' (Giroux, 1984, p.314). 
The goal of deconstruction is to keep things in process, to disrupt, to keep 
the system in play, to set up procedures to continually demystify the 
realities we create and to fight for our categories to congeal. 
(Lather, 1991, p.120) 
Rather than separating the 'true' from the 'false', deconstruction aims 
to destabilise assumptions of interpretive validity and shift the emphasis to 
the contexts in which meanings are produced. Context and meaning are 
posited as co-constructions which are multiple, complex, open and changing 
(Lather, 1992). 
Within patriarchal discourses and discursive practices both context 
and meaning are subject to, and co-constructions of, a binary system of 
hierarchical dualistic oppositions. Further, both knower and known are also 
co-constructions of this dichotomised reality. Fundamental to this reality is 
the male/female dualism onto which all other hierarchical oppositions are 
mapped. Thus, knowledge, knower and the reality known are all gendered. 
Representations of reality and theories of gender are organised within 
particular assumptive frameworks that reflect certain interests. Thus, from a 
constructivist standpoint, the 'real' or 'true' nature of male and female cannot 
be determined. Rather, attention is given to representations of gender, and to 
the consequences of these representations. Thus, the ways in which 
representations of gender provide the meanings and symbols that organise 
social reality and the lived experience of the subject become the locus of 
concern. 
Like Connell (1994) I recognise that 'gender relations invest the whole 
of social life and the production of all knowledge' (Connell, 1994, p.12). The 
system of classification upon which knowledge is constructed is 
communicated through 'the whole structure of our experience within society' 
(Goodison, 1992, p.32). This institutionalisation and communication of 
categories and knowledges so saturates both consciousness and experience 
that they come to be seen as 'natural' or 'real', 'so much so that no alternative 
view seems possible' (Goodison, 1992, p.32). 
Yet, as Foucault (1988) has suggested, no ideology or discourse is 
entirely closed, or impervious to the possibility of disruption and 
transformation. Rather, there exist in these regimes of power/knowledge/truth, 
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spaces of freedom. In searching out and moving into and beyond these 
spaces, thoughts, ideas, inscriptions, subjectivities, actions and practices 
beyond those currently available are made possible. Yet, ironically, these 
disruptive practices generate new power/knowledge/truth regimes, with their 
own ideological and discursive limitations, spaces of freedom and possibilities 
for disruption. 
As understood by Lather (1991) poststructuralism emphasises the 
need for critical reflection on our interpretive frames and exploration of ways 
of knowing which interrupt relations of dominance and subordination. This 
involves seeking out and mobilising 'those discourses/practices seeking to 
challenge the legitimacy of the dominant order and break its hold over social 
life' (Lather, 1991, p.xv). 
Within poststructuralist theory, knowledge, truth and reality are 
characterised by: an appreciation of the plasticity of a constantly changing 
reality and body of knowledge; a stress on the priority of concrete experience 
over fixed abstract principles; and a conviction that no single a priori thought 
system should govern belief or investigation. It recognises that knowledge is 
subjectively determined by a multitude of factors, that objective essences are 
neither possible nor accessible and that the value of all truths and assumptions 
must be continually subjected to direct testing and scrutiny. 
In moving from a static dualistic model to a dynamic dialectical one, 
knowledges and epistemologies of certainty and absolutes are disrupted by 
knowledges that emphasise multiplicity and possibility. Yet the shift from 
absolute truths, knowledges and realities 'need not degenerate into a view 
from everywhere and thus from nowhere' (Luke, 1992, p.47). It is possible to 
avoid 'slipping into a relativism of endless difference by standing firm on 
contextual and theoretical limits' (Luke, 1992, p.47). These limits to 
difference, uncertainty, multiplicity, partiality, and locality are observed 
within the process, and through the practice, of locating and articulating 
perspective, experience and knowledge in historical, political and social 
contexts. 
Thus situational, perspectival, relational knowledges, truths and 
realities are neither neutral nor free floating, but located in 'specific historical, 
cultural and political trajectories which are always in historic relation to other 
trajectories, other relations of domination' (Grosz, 1988, p.100). In defining 
the context in which this text is spoken/written as patriarchal I understand that 
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The univocity of sex, the internal coherence of gender, and the binary 
framework for both sex and gender are considered throughout as 
regulatory fictions that consolidate and naturalise the convergent power 
regimes of masculine and heterosexist oppression. 
(Butler, 1990, p.33) 
It is this understanding of both my own subjectivity and that of others 
as regulatory fictions that informs the production of this text. This self-
reflexive text is motivated by a struggle to come to know myself differently, 
and this struggle engages me in critical reflection upon the terms, and tenuity, 
of my knowledge, of my reality, of my truth. I am struggling to come to some 
knowing, some understanding, of how I have acted as a social subject to 
inscribe myself in terms of the sex/gendered/sexualised subject positions 
available to me and how this inscription might be invested with new, different 
or liberating meanings. 
I have attempted in this chapter to locate the subject in relation to a set 
of structures and practices through which they and their knowledges, truths 
and realities are discursively constructed, articulated and lived. I am thus 
struggling toward an understanding of the subject as an embodiment of 
discursive possibilities. I argue that the embodied subject is understood as 
meaningful in terms of a set of related co-ordinates, sex, gender sexuality and 
so on, and that the knowledges, truths and realities that inform the 
performance of those meaningful subjectivities will reflect the co-ordinates 
through which they are inscribed, described and proscribed. 
Thus where sex, gender and sexuality are primary categories through 
which embodied subjects are inscribed, then the knowledges, truths and 
realities those subjects construct or privilege will be similarly inscribed. Thus 
I argue that knowledge, truth and reality are sexed/gendered/sexualised 
discursive constructions. 
In the following chapter I undertake an exploration of the relationship 
between social structure, subjectivity and agency. In reflecting on the 
discursive construction of sexed/gendered/sexualised subjectivities I hope to 
locate spaces of freedom for invention and reinscription, for the construction 
of new subject positions, knowledges, truths and realities. 
What we call experience, or history, is this endless progressive 
structuring of events. We rewrite history, we revise our notions of our 
experiences, by restructuring our thoughts about people and events in our 
past. 
(Rosenfield, 1993, p.86) 
CHAPTER FOUR: society, subjectivity and agency 
HER STORY 
You may have heard of Rapunzel. 
Against the wishes of her family, who can best be described by their 
passion for collecting miniature dolls, she went to live in a tower with an 
older woman. Her family were so incensed by her refusal to marry the 
prince next door that they vilified the couple, calling one a witch and the 
other a little girl. Not content with names, they ceaselessly tried to break 
into the tower, so much so that the happy pair had to seal up any 
entrance that was not on a level with the sky. The lover got in by 
climbing up Rapunzel's hair, and Rapunzel got in by nailing a wig to the 
floor and shinning up the tresses flung out of the window. Both of them 
could have used a ladder, but they were in love. 
One day the prince, who had always liked to borrow his mother's frocks, 
dressed up as Rapunzel's lover and dragged himself into the tower. Once 
inside he tied her up and waited for the wicked witch to arrive. The 
moment she leaped through the window, bringing their dinner for the 
evening, the prince hit her over the head and threw her out again. Then 
he carried Rapunzel down the rope he had brought with him and forced 
her to watch while he blinded her broken lover in a field of thorns. 
After that they lived happily ever after, of course. 
As for me, my body healed, though my eyes never did, and eventually I 
was found by my sisters, who had come in their various ways to live on 
this estate. 
Winterson, 1987, p.52 
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Winterson's retelling of Rapunzel foregrounds the constructedness of 
narrative. In disrupting the familiar, known and learned narrative she 
demonstrates how that which has been discursively produced may be 
reproduced, and altered in the retelling. This alteration draws attention to the 
ideological investments which shape the narrative and make it culturally 
intelligible. Here, Winterson invests the same characters and plot with new 
meanings, motives and subject positions. A patriarchal ordering, including a 
justification of vilification and murder through the naming 'lesbian' and 
'witch', is disrupted not so much by an alternative non-patriarchal order but by 
retelling the narrative from a perspective which unmasks those previously 
invisible, taken for granted elements of the narrative which associate the 
prince with power, moral right and justice. Here the patriarchal order 
remains, but remains to be seen differently. This is my struggle, to 
simultaneously think/speak/write within and against the discourses and 
narratives to which I am subjected and through which my subject position is 
constructed and taken up. 
In producing this text I am attempting to find ways of retelling myself, 
of unmasking and disrupting the investments I place in that particular set of 
subject positions I refer to as my self. In so doing I am searching for ways of 
constructing new narratives through which new performances are made 
possible. I also hope to disrupt the familiarity and naturalness of the 
patriarchal narratives through which subjects are inscribed, especially in terms 
of sex, gender and sexuality. In the following story I want to capture a 
particular moment, a moment in which I found an alternative location from 
which to perceive and experience my homosexuality. 
Finally I want to read Winterson's retelling of Rapunzel as a narrative 
of possibility, of the possibility for the healing of wounds and of the formation 
of a community of equals, where equality implies the absence of patriarchal 
relations of power. 
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MY STORY 
I don't know how to explain this to you, but I feel that it is important to try. 
I'm struggling for words because what I want to tell you is somehow new and 
strange and I'm anxious that the words I already know might inadequately 
convey my meanings. 
I am in an office. It is cool and not bright. The walls are lined with books. It 
is a place of knowledge. A place for talk. A place of safety. A place where 
revelation is possible. We are talking, my friend and I, as we often do. 
Oscillating between theories of everything and narratives of lived experience. 
Making connections. Negotiating meanings. I am excited and listen to myself 
say things that I feel unprepared to hear. I am strangely anxious about the 
place my narrative is taking me. I have some dim sense of the destination, 
some foreboding. It is a place I want to avoid, yet it is simultaneously 
seductive, and I am seduced. I can't help myself. Or so it seems. I know I 
will go there to this place I am anxious about. I am going. Am there now. It 
is strangely familiar. I have been here before. In this whirling, dizzying 
vortex where things suddenly become confusingly clear. Illuminated. I am 
reoriented to the familiar. This is somehow shocking. I am shocked. Last 
time I was here in this place I re/experienced the subjugation to my father. To 
his power. His phallus. And now, in this place again, I understand how 
thoroughly, willingly, I subjugate myself to all the fathers, their phallocentric 
language. Their knowledge, their meaning, their reality. Their definition of 
me as other, deviant, bad, wrong, sinner, pervert, evil, criminal, aberration. 
And I believed them. I took these things for granted. Embedded myself so 
deeply, inscribed myself so thoroughly, internalised them so successfully that I 
took them to be true. I deferred to their desire to name me, define me, confine 
me. Render me less powerful. Powerless. Invisibly. Invisible that is, until 
now. This moment. This painful, shockingly beautiful moment. 
I am in an office. It is cool and not bright. I am saying things. I am saying 
that the subject is constructed. That the subject is constructed within a 
patriarchal, heterosexual, phallocentric, paradigm. I am saying that this 
paradigm constructs difference as deviance. As other in a binary universe. 
Where other means inferior. I am saying that the category or subject position 
'homosexual' is a social construction. I am saying that I am socially 
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constructed. Made. That somehow my homosexuality, my otherness, my 
inferiority is constructed. A fiction. A lie. A betrayal in which I am 
complicit. I am engulfed now by an overwhelming sense of shame. It is 
somehow appalling that I have chosen, willingly taken up, this reviled 
position. A wrong turn. An act of stupidity. For the first time I experience 
thoroughly, completely, full-consciously, the learned shame that my 
inscription carries. In the same moment that I experience its crushing weight 
I see the irony. Understand the joke. All positions are constructed. None 
necessarily more true, right, real or sovereign than any other. Each an 
illusion. All a fiction. I feel somehow lighter. Freer. Free. I can begin 
again. Reimagine the terms of my own inscription. Reinscribe myself in my 
own terms. I can rename myself Reclaim that which has been variously 
given up, taken or withheld from me. The courage and dignity to be visible, to 
be bold and to speak as if I matter. 
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I have come to believe that I have made choices about who I am and 
how I behave. I have come to understand that in defining myself as 
homosexual I have taken up a range of discourses, metaphors and stereotypes 
associated with that subject position, and taken them up as my own. Whilst I 
recognise that these choices have been Produced within a 
historical/political/social context that has made a particular range of discursive 
positions available to me, I want to acknowledge my own complicity in taking 
up the negative associations and pejorative meanings as if they described me 
in some real, true and accurate way. I carried these meanings with me and 
they shaped my sense of self and my relationships with others, especially men. 
In the company of men I took up, without coercion or resistance, a 
subordinated position. I inscribed myself as smaller, weaker, younger, uglier 
and less intelligent. In this way I signalled that I knew my place and in so 
doing did not compete with the other masculinities I encountered. Never did I 
consider myself equal. I was always inferior, always powerless, always 
vulnerable. I was quiet, deferential and hopefully invisible. This was the 
safest position I had learned was open to me. It was with women that I felt 
more comfortable, safe and equal. This subtly informed the terms of my 
inscription as feminine, as somehow lacking an appropriate masculinity. 
I conceptualise this now as a betrayal of self, as self-betrayal. I 
betrayed myself by taking up positions which situated me as vulnerable, 
powerless and inadequate, and actively refused or avoided any position that 
conferred anything that might be defined as positive. I consistently censored 
and manipulated my perceptions, experiences and actions in ways that 
reflected and confirmed my inadequacy. Trapped in a binary universe I 
consistently confined myself to the negative polarity, believing that I was, in 
some fundamental way, a failure, an aberration, that which was expressly not 
positive. I have come to understand that this self-regulation is made possible 
by the ideological construction of those discourses and discursive practices to 
which I and other social subjects are subjected. I conceptualise this as a 
structural/institutional/social/ ideological betrayal which imposes false, 
limited and dichotomised choices upon a potentially more diverse and 
polyvalent social arena. This betrayal emphasises essential, fixed, natural, 
normal and individual human identities; assumes empirical, linear causality; 
promotes conformity, punishment and self-regulation; and pathologises 
difference. 
In attempting, in what follows, to unmask these betrayals, I consider 
the relationship between social context, subjectivity and agency. In so doing I 
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hope to open spaces for the production of new fictive narratives and possible 
performances beyond those currently available. Having had my familiar 
disrupted I am exploring the transformative possibilities of disrupting the 
familiar of others. 
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OUR STORY 
Personal context 
Critical theory springs from an assumption that we live amid a world of 
pain, that much can be done to alleviate that pain, and that theory has a 
crucial role to play in that process. 
(Poster, 1989, p.3) 
I have written myself to a moment of profound anxiety, a moment I 
have simultaneously struggled to reach and avoid. The preceding theoretical 
reflections have brought me to this moment of painful reflection on my own 
investments in particular subject positions. Consideration of sex and gender 
as discursively produced is not problematic and I am able to reflect with 
interest on the ways I have consciously, even comfortably, taken up a 
sometimes oppositional subject position in relation to hegemonic masculinity. 
I have variously inscribed myself with characteristics more often associated 
with feminine subject positions, and derived some satisfaction from doing so. 
Yet, in contradiction to this, my homosexuality is less comfortably situated, 
especially as it is situated intimately, somehow irrevocably, within the 
experience of abuse, pain, humiliation and powerlessness that lay at the heart 
of this matter of my sexuality. Here I understand that discourses of deviance, 
crime and immorality have created a not always conscious, but ever present, 
personal and cultural anxiety. I am not here engaged in any struggle between 
understanding my homosexuality as a biological given, a social construct or a 
personal choice. Rather I am arguing in favour of a discursive social 
construction, and yet it seems somehow perverse or ridiculous that I have 
taken up a subject position that is so problematic within patriarchal culture. 
More than anything else it is my sexuality that positions me as other in 
patriarchal culture. This otherness constitutes the position from which I 
construct my subject position, my knowledge, truth and reality. This location 
as ex-centric (Lather, 1991, p.33) affords me a different view, a different 
opportunity for speculation about the possibilities for the construction of 
counter-hegemonic knowledges and subject positions. 
To challenge canons, to expose systems of power which authorise some 
representations while blocking others - this has been the task of the 
uprising of the marginalised, the silenced, the ex-centrics. 
(Lather, 1991, p.33) 
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It is this understanding of my homosexuality as an ex-centric location, 
and of myself as occupying an ex-centric space within patriarchal culture, 
ideology and discourse, that I put at the centre of my attempt to understand the 
relationship between my sexed/gendered/sexualised subjectivity and my 
commitment to see things differently, to disrupt the familiar. I thus recast my 
otherness, my marginality, as a space of freedom from within which I am 
empowered to see, think, feel and act differently. 
I am engaged, in this chapter, in reflecting on how subject positions 
are made available and taken up within certain historical/political/social 
contexts; with the implications of these positions for lived experience within 
culture; and with the opportunities for personal and social transformation 
which ascribe the function of agency to the subject. My engagement with the 
concept of agency informs my understanding that I have made choices, 
consciously or otherwise; it also allows me the means through which I may be 
empowered to make different, conscious, intentional, motivated choices. 
I propose then, a subject that is neither wholly determined nor wholly 
autonomous, neither wholly constituted or explicable in, through or by 
theories of biology, society, agency or discourse. I recognise that each of 
these locations are discursively produced and capable of contestation, critique 
and deconstruction. Further they are each only capable of producing 
particular, limited sets of meanings and knowledges. What I am proposing is 
a subject articulated in terms of a dialectical relationship between these 
locations. In seeking spaces of freedom, sites of transformation, possibilities 
for transgression, I speak/write from those locations I find most useful to my 
project of intervention and invention, in/ter/vention (Grosz, 1988, p.92). 
Whilst I recognise the transformative possibilities of the body, for example 
hormone therapy and transgender surgery, and the ways in which these might 
both disrupt the boundaries and shift the collective social meanings and 
parameters of the physical body, it is within the relationship between society, 
discourse and agency that I locate the transformative possibilities I seek. 
I am trying to make connections here between the subject, meaning 
and power as expressed through discursive social structures and practices. 
The resulting reflections, articulations and meanings about the subject are 
admittedly representative, interpretive and abstracted, but none the less 
motivated toward conceptualising the possibilities for action available to the 
subject. 
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Before you can set about changing the world, you need to define it in 
such a way that changes are possible. You do this by conceiving it not as 
a physical essence (a bundle of atoms held together by gravity) but as a 
social system (a bundle of categories held together by custom). 
(Ruthven, 1990, p.36) 
Social Context 
We habitually think of the social as less real than the biological, what 
changes as less real than what stays the same. But there is a colossal 
reality to history. It is the modality of human life, precisely what defines 
us as human. No other species produces and lives in history, replacing 
organic evolution with radically new determinants of change. 
(Connell, 1995, p.81) 
For Connell this recognition of subject positions as historically 
variable does not suggest that they are flimsy or trivial. Rather it locates them 
firmly in the world of social agency where subject positions are formed and 
transformed over time (Connell, 1995, pp.81-82). 
For Pile and Thrift (1995) the social domain consists of a set of 
relational configurations between positions which are based on certain forms 
of power, where 'each field prescribes its own particular values and possesses 
its own regulative principles which agents struggle to change or preserve' (Pile 
& Thrift, 1995, p.31). 
I recognise that this relational set of configurations coheres around sets 
of positions, categories and assumptions through which the materiality of 
social subjects is established, stabilised and constantly reproduced. These 
categories establish meanings, knowledges and boundaries within which 
discourses of the real and the natural are generated. These real, natural, 
material social subjects are rendered visible and meaningful in terms of 
categories such as class, race, socio-economic status, religion, sex, gender and 
sexuality. These categories are produced and reproduced within specific 
historical/political/social contexts, and within patriarchy are understood as 
meaningful within relations of power. As argued earlier in this text these 
relations of power are hierarchical, dualistic and oppositional, where 
difference is expressed in terms of dominance and subordinance. This 
concept of difference is understood to be located in discourses which 
establish, sustain and justify the hegemony of the dominant group. In this text 
I am foregrounding the discursive categories sex, gender and sexuality as the 
locus for the inscription of both the individual and the social body, especially 
in terms of difference and power. 
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Like Bacchi (1990) my principal concern is not with an exploration of 
the natures of women and men nor of the differences between them. I do not 
attempt to resolve the question of whether anatomy is destiny, nor resolve the 
nature/nurture, biology/culture debate. Rather, I am concerned with the 
processes through which ideas about sexual difference shape social theory 
and practice, through which knowledge is acquired and gendered 
subjectivities produced and reproduced. Like Davies (1989) I take the view 
that 
It is not yet possible to prove that we are simply biologically or socially 
determined. Rather, a subtle, complex, irreducible and inseparable 
relationship between physiology and environment is suggested. 
(Davies, 1989, p.10) 
Like Coward (1983), Davies (1989) and Segal (1990) I argue that the 
nature/nurture, biology/culture, framework is conceptually inadequate. 
Human action and experience are not read as the simple addition or mix of 
biological and social components: rather, 'the one already contains the other' 
(Segal, 1990, p.64). Whilst biology, as discursive constructions of meaning 
and knowledge about the body, is understood to affect culture, these effects 
are recognised as being historically and culturally variable: 'What becomes of 
our bodies has a history determined by human action' (Segal, 1990, p.64). In 
this way biology cannot be specified independently of culture. Rather, 
biological facts gain the power to shape human behaviour through the 
meanings given to them in particular historical/political/social contexts. I 
argue that human behaviours, bodies, desires, thoughts, beliefs and practices 
are thus influenced by social contexts and the ideologies, discourses, 
meanings and values produced within them. Like Coward (1983) I recognise 
that any transformation of sexual relations in society will depend on the 
displacement of dominant ways of thinking about them and that such 
displacement will have radical implications for our understanding of both the 
subject and society. 
Connell (1991) notes that for many people the notion of natural sex 
difference 'forms a limit beyond which thought cannot go' (Connell, 1991, 
p.66). Connell argues that doctrines of natural difference are fundamentally 
mistaken. He challenges the assumption that the biological/ reproductive 
make-up of our bodies is the foundation or essence of lived social relations. 
Rather, the social gender order is understood as 'a historically constructed 
pattern of power relations between men and women, and definitions of 
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femininity and masculinity' (Connell, 1991, p.98). Thus the categories 'man' 
and 'woman' are socially constructed and 'achieved through practices which 
assert the solidarity of the categories' (Connell, 1991, p.81). This socially 
constructed solidarity is construction and invention, 'a new fact' (Connell, 
1991, p.81) in no way implied by biology. To interpret social relations as 
natural or inevitable is to deny their historicity and to do that is to 'close off 
the possibility of human practice recreating humanity' (Connell, 1991 p.245). 
Given that the categories man/male/masculine and woman/female/feminine 
are variably, historically constructed, it is possible for new conceptualisations 
of gender to emerge. Thus the boundaries of gendered subjectivity can be 
contested and remade; masculinities and femininties can be reconstructed. 
Such reconstruction will involve critical reflection, re-examination and 
redefinition of the relationship between the social and biological in the 
construction of subjectivity. 
For Segal (1991) the biological/social divide is misleading. She 
asserts that we can only experience, describe and understand bodily states 
within specific social contexts, employing the cultural meanings available to 
us. Coward (1983) contends that men and women have historically been seen 
as radically distinct groups, with different sexual identities and interests. 
These interests, seen as different and complementary, are combined and 
positioned as central to the practice of marriage and reproduction. In 
recognising this as 'the practice on which all civilisation rests' (Coward, 1983, 
p.254), Coward acknowledges that the heterosexual reproductive couple is 
the paradigm for male and female subjectivities and relationships. 
Subjectivities are thus acquired through social relationships and the 
acquisition of a social position. 
Like Davies (1989) I recognise that individuals do not, and cannot, 
float free from social structures. Whilst individuals may choose to contest or 
transform these structures, their actions, individual or collective, are always 
constrained by the structures within which they are located. These structures 
provide the conceptual framework, the psychic patterns, the emotions 
through which individuals position themselves in relation to the social 
world ... Masculinity and femininity are not inherent properties of 
individuals, then, they are inherent or structural properties of our society 
that is, they both condition and arise from social action. 
(Davies, 1989, p.13) 
Thus I assert that femininities and masculinities are made; they are 
fictions, inventions, myths, metaphors and constructions. As constructions 
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they can be deconstructed and reconstructed. Davies (1993) defines her task 
as one of 'disrupting the apparent inevitability of the male-female dualism' 
(Davies 1993, p.ix). In so doing she hopes to open up the possibility of 
multiple, fluid, gender categories, where individuals are free to 'move in and 
out of a range of ways of being which were not limited by the dualistic 
categories of maleness and femaleness' (Davies, 1993, p.ix). In this way 
women and men would be free to take up a wider range of possible subject 
positions, positions which would break the associations between; maleness, 
power, autonomy and aggression; femaleness, nurturance, dependence and 
passivity; gayness and effeminacy; lesbianism and mannishness. 
Davies (1989) suggests that sex and gender are elements of social 
structures created by, and within, individuals as they learn the discursive 
practices through which those structures are created and maintained. Social 
structures then are not separate from the individuals who construct or inhabit 
them. Though social structures have a material force they cannot be imposed 
on individuals. Rather they are actively taken up and provide the means 
through which individual subject positions may be legitimated, contested, 
subverted or transformed. Any challenge to existing discourses of 
sex/gender/sexuality thus involves a struggle with personal/subjective and 
social/cultural constraints. 
This text represents my struggle to confront and disrupt ideas of 
femaleness and maleness which underpin patriarchal subject positions and 
sexual relations. I understand feminine and masculine subject positions to be 
constructed on the basis of female and male genital sex and reproductive 
capacity. Yet, like Davies (1989, 1993, 1994), I assert that these do not have 
any necessary implications for the subjectivity or subject positionings that any 
individual can take up. As understood by Davies, poststructuralist feminist 
theory assumes that femaleness and maleness do not have to be, or continue to 
be, structured in the way they currently are. The individual is seen as a 
shifting nexus of possibilities rather than a 'unitary unproblematically sexed 
being' (Davies, 1989, p.12). In a world not constructed on the basis of a 
male/female dualism, these possibilities would not be limited by reproductive 
sexual capacity, but rather, would be opened up to a range of multiple, 
possible positions that each individual would be capable of, or interested in, 
taking up. It is this territory of the possible that I seek to explore, that as 
writing/speaking subject I may write/speak the possibility of alternative 
subject positions beyond those already available. 
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Subjectivity 
The subject ... is an assemblage which is constantly breaking down, 
leaking in all directions ... But is also a site for endless experimentation, 
complication and invention; a site that is only ever actualised as the 
singularity of the context in which it is produced as a recording surface. 
(Doel, 1995, p.232) 
The reconstruction of the subject in terms of a proliferation of 
possibilities is recognised by Eagleton (1996) to be founded on three 
principles: the idea of shifting, reformulated identities; the critique of dualistic 
thinking; and the political importance of discourse and language (Eagleton, 
1996, p.347). The political importance of language and discourse has been 
discussed in a previous chapter; the critique of dualistic thinking is undertaken 
in the next chapter; and an exploration of the idea of shifting, reformulated 
identities is foregrounded in this chapter. 
Of the many available, or possible, meanings about subjectivity, the 
subject, subject positions and subjectification, I want to focus on three 
interrelated presuppositions. First, the subject is understood to be a knowing 
agent, 'an entity aware of itself and of a wider world' (Rose, 1995, p.249), who 
has the power to act upon that knowledge and the world. Second, the subject 
is in part defined by that world, or in relation to that world, and is located in 
specific historical/political/social contexts. Third, the notion of the subject 
suggests the exercise of power and subjection to that power. A subject may 
exercise power over other subjects or objects, or experience the exercise of 
power over them by others. Poststructuralist feminist theory locates 
subjectivity in terms of both relations of power as they constitute identity and 
efforts to elude those relations (Davies, 1989; Rose, 1995; Weedon, 1991). 
Like Rose (1995) I am looking for a way of thinking about subjectivity 
that offers a view of the subject as complex and contradictory. This stress on 
contradiction and complexity is a strategic location which attempts to avoid 
essentialism, universalism and exclusion. If the subject is 'no longer innocent 
but problematic' (Rose, 1995, p.233), then so too are the knowledges in which 
the subject is embedded and through which the subject is constructed. 
The effort to think through a subject position in terms of difference, 
contradiction and instability is connected to the effort to situate the 
production of knowledge, including knowledge about the subject, in a 
highly complex, shifting and power-ridden world, and to render any 
action on the basis of such knowledge both accountable to a specific 
position and vulnerable to other interpretations. 
(Rose, 1995, p.233) 
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Subjectivity and social context 
Locating the subject in a patriarchal context recognises that 
subjectivity is contingent on the relations of power in which subjects are 
placed. In so doing I am arguing that any sense of being an individual is an 
effect of these relations. In positioning this discussion as a political project I 
am attempting to intervene in these relations of power/knowledge by 
redefining subjectivity. Thus, as well as being the result of political struggles, 
this redefined notion of subjectivity is political in that in/ter/vention in the 
power/knowledge nexus aims to reconstitute the subject in relational terms 
(Rose, 1995). What I am attempting to do is articulate and explore a 
subjectivity that is relational, embodied, sees difference as 'qualitative 
multiplicity' (Pile & Thrift, 1995, p.17) and which is capable of providing new 
and empowering speaking/writing positions. In constructing more open 
configurations of the subject I am moving towards the creation of new sites 
and possibilities for action and subject constitution which elude, and elide, 
relations of power and domination. I am trying to evoke a sense of the subject 
as a subject in process, in the process of becoming, as a process of provisional 
and open ended movement. I am thus attempting to resist and disrupt the 
fixed meanings through which I have learned to inscribe myself, and am 
seeking alternative meanings and new possibilities for inhabiting, 
experiencing and expressing my body, my sexuality, my thoughts and 
feelings, and my relationships. 
The subject, as understood in this text, is concerned with 'concepts of 
what it means to be called, or name oneself, 'a woman' or 'a man" (Eagleton, 
1996, p.339) and the ways in which this is linked with the concept of 
collective subjects, 'women' and 'men'. From a poststructuralist feminist 
position the individual or collective subject is not fixed or immutable. Rather 
the subject, as always a subject in process, is understood to be 'incomplete, 
always becoming, never stable' (Eagleton,1996, p.340). 
Yet, to function, the subject requires some sense of stability. From a 
poststructuralist feminist perspective this stability is an illusion, but one that is 
necessary for the maintenance of everyday living. Thus the subject is in some 
sense changeable and unstable, yet in another, gives the illusion that it is 
fixed, solid and dependable (Pile & Thrift, 1995). My purpose in exploring 
subjectivity is to locate, or imagine, new spaces, new politics and new 
possibilities. 
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I do not conceptualise the subject as a powerless victim of controlling 
social forces, but rather understand that the subject is simultaneously 
subjected to social structures, practices and formations, and able to choose 
from, adopt or take up particular positions, or versions of positions, available 
to them within that structure. Ironically, some of these positions confer 
different status and power on the subject, and may not always be in their 
interest. What I am interested in, then, is the relationship between social 
structures and agency in the formulation of subject positions. 
What I am arguing for, and seeking out, is a theoretical position that 
acknowledges that subjects can act upon the world as partially autonomous 
agents. This position is critical to the emphasis on change and transformation, 
in terms of conscious, intentional and motivated action, that is central to the 
formulation of this text. What I am arguing is that the subject is socially 
constructed in language and discourse and not the product of a natural self, 
which is prior to, or outside, the social. The subject is a collective subject, 
constructed through relationships between ideologies, discourses, social 
structures and practices and other social subjects. Bell and Valentine, 
(1995:149) in emphasising discourse over essence, also emphasise the 
principle of relatedness, where the 'you' and 'I' are transformed into 'us'. In so 
doing they capture the sense of the subject as constituted relationally in terms 
of a collective social context. The subject thus assumes an identity on the 
basis of commonality with others and yet simultaneously assumes that they 
are a unique individual (Pile & Thrift, 1995, p.39). 
The subjection of the subject is instituted through the inscription of 
meaning and power through the never merely physical body: mastery, 
mind, skin, class, sexuality are systematically mapped onto the body of 
the same/other. The body becomes a point of capture, where the dense 
meanings of power are animated, where cultural codes gain their apparent 
coherence and where boundaries between the same and the other are 
installed and naturalised. 
(Pile & Thrift, 1995, p.41) 
Yet the performance of these animated subject positions is not always 
comfortable, confident or convincing. Indeed there are moments when 
subjects are 'not sure how to behave, or what other people think of them, or 
where people suddenly feel self conscious, or alienated' (Pile & Thrift, 1995, 
p.49). This sense of nervous performance, of vulnerable inscription, suggests 
a precarious fictional subject position, 'a fiction which must continually be 
established as truth' (Pile & Thrift, 1995, p.49). 
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Nowadays, the subject and subjectivity are more likely to be conceived of 
as rooted in the spatial home of the body, and therefore situated, as 
composed of and by a 'federation' of different discourses/persona, united 
and orchestrated to a greater or lesser extent by narrative. 
(Pile & Thrift, 1995, p.11) 
The subject, as a narrative construct, is thus understood to be a fiction 
with no essential characteristics, a text, always in the process of being 
spoken/written in different discursive arenas. Thus, like Doel, (1995) I 
recognise that the production of the subject is never complete. It is always 'a 
work-in-progress' (Doel, 1995, p.230) and a site of continuous 
experimentation. Hence the subject is always 'a body to come; it endures 
without ever existing as such' (Doel, 1995, p.230). Being is redefined in 
terms of becoming, where becoming 'begins as a desire to escape bodily 
limitation' (Doel, 1995, p.230). The subject is thus variable and involved in a 
process of continuous modification, understood as neither universal nor 
individual, but as 'a virtual multiplicity' (Doel, 1995, p.235). 
Multiple subjects 
This view of the subject informs my understanding of myself, other 
subjects and the contexts within which we are situated. For Bonner (1992) 
this location or situation is described in terms of position. Positionality refers 
to 'the individual's viewpoint, as influenced by such factors as gender, age, 
race, class and sexual orientation' (Bonner et al, 1992, p.7). The subject 
develops a particular perspective depending on how they are positioned in 
these terms. Yet, that subject may have more than one perspective, and it is in 
this sense that the subject may be understood as multiple, not singular. 
To view the human subject as socially constructed, multiple and 
'devoid of determining universal characteristics' (Gatens, 1991 p.98), is to 
view its possibilities as open-ended. This does not deny that the subject is 
constrained by 'historical context or by rudimentary biological facts' (Gatens, 
1991, p.98) but rather, suggests that these factors set the outer parameters of 
possibility only. There exists within these constraints, multiple possibilities. 
Though my male body is not capable of conception and childbirth it does not 
follow that I am incapable of nurturing children nor embodying any of the 
qualities usually associated with nurturance; gentleness, tenderness, patience, 
kindness, selflessness and so on. The limits of my maleness are thus not 
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simply determined by my biology but are also limited by the meanings 
associated with my male body. New meanings thus admit new possibilities 
and it is these new meanings and possibilities that I am struggling to 
conceptualise, that I may be empowered to reinscribe myself. 
Within poststructuralist feminist theory the concept of subjectivity 
replaces the concept of an essential, authentic self. Subjectivity is understood 
to be culturally and socially shaped and constantly shifting according to 
changing historical conditions and the dominant ideological/discursive 
frameworks within which it is formed. Instead of a single, unchanging self 
that is waiting to be revealed 'poststructuralism decentres the traditional self 
and introduces the possibility of multiple selves, much more fragmented and 
contradictory in make-up being socially formed within changing conditions, 
relations and frameworks' (Jackson, 1990, p.40). 
Subjectivity and discourse 
Subjectivity is constructed through a continuous process of personal 
engagement in the discourses, institutions and practices that construct 
meaning and ascribe value to the lived experience of the subject and the 
world view or reality constructed by them. 
(Bartky, 1990, p.118) 
This perspective makes visible both the process through which 
subjects are 'caught up in structures and storylines that constitute them as who 
they are and who they each might be' (Davies, 1994, p.76) and the processes 
of subjectification, where the subject 'takes up the discourses through which 
they and others speak/write the world into existence as if they were their own' 
(Davies, 1993, p.13). In this way the concept of subjectification makes visible 
the coercive and constitutive power of discourses through which subjects 
actively construct their own subjectivity. 
Like Davies (1994) and Jackson (1990) I recognise that subjectivity is 
constructed on the basis of a particular life history and experience of being in 
the world. Yet both this experience of that life history and how it is told, are 
the result of 'intersections of discourses, storylines and relations of power' 
(Davies, 1994, p.3). In this sense I am a fiction and this text is my history. It 
is brought to the page through language, made possible through discourse and 
expressed through narrative forms that locate myself at the heart of the story. 
In simultaneously reflecting on the processes through which subjectivity is 
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constructed and the constitutive force of discourse, I am exploring the ways in 
which all social subjects are constructed through much the same discourses in 
much the same ways. 
The detailed ways in which any one person experiences being a person 
can be examined, not just to see what the specificity of that person is, but 
to see the common threads through which, being a person, or being male 
or female, or white or black is accomplished. 
(Davies, 1994, p.3) 
Subjectivity and change 
As understood by Weedon (1991) subjectivity refers to the conscious 
and unconscious thoughts and emotions of the individual, their sense of 
themself and the ways in which they understand their relation to the world. In 
this way the concept of subjectivity captures both the notion of people as 
intentional subjects and as subject to forces beyond their control. In 
attempting to politicise the concept of subjectivity I am emphasising a 
subjectivity that is conscious and wilful, emphasising also the possibilities for 
imagining, affirming and enacting different subjectivities and subject 
positions. Faust (1991) recognises that this view opens both subjectivity and 
consciousness to the possibility of change. 'Changes in the objective 
conditions of life cannot succeed unless consciousness is also changed' (Faust, 
1991, p.224). 
Gatens (1991) asserts that feminist critical theory aims to come to 
some understanding of how culture employs and privileges certain categories 
of thought and the relation these categories have to contemporary 
understandings of sexual difference. This requires critical reflection on, and 
analysis of, how these categories result in the production of different 
subjectivities, in terms of roles, desires, thoughts, behaviours, feelings, 
identities and so on, for female and male subjects. It also requires reflection 
on the different values attached to those subjectivities and the ways in which 
these values are embedded in, and reproduced by, social institutions and 
practices. Davies (1994) acknowledges that 'by making hegemonic sets of 
assumptions visible, the nature of what we take to be factual or real is 
profoundly shifted' (Davies, 1994, p.20). It is through critique of notions of 
commonsense that the persistent replication of the hegemonic forms of the 
dominant culture may be avoided (Seidler, 1991). 
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Like Thorne (1993) I argue that subjects become invested in particular 
forms of femininity and masculinity and oppositional gender arrangements 
based on relations of domination. I am searching, in this text, for points of 
resistance and opposition, and for the possibility of relationships based on 
mutuality and reciprocity. Such a search requires both intervention and 
invention, 'in/ter/vention' (Grosz, 1988, p.92) that we may imagine, and 
realise other possibilities. Such possibilities will necessarily contest the 
hegemony of those discourses and regimes of truth that have influence in 
shaping both individual and collective identities. Thus both personal and 
social transformations require a counter-hegemonic logic, theory and practice 
(Connell, 1994). Such counter-hegemonic practice challenges 'the outer 
limits of the epistemological horizon where the masculinist logic of the 
universal subject and its naming of the other is firmly inscribed' (Luke, 1992, 
p.37). Thus, the gendered structural divisions upon which society, and the 
social production of subjectivity, reality and knowledge are based, must be 
theoretically, and practically, contested and transformed. 
Braidotti describes this theoretical challenge in terms of a 'politics of 
location' (Braidotti, 1992, p.185) which aims to explore, contest and remake 
the boundaries and epistemological parameters of a community of knowing 
subjects. Such practice is motivated toward a redefinition of the subject 
through the collective quest for a political critique of sexuality as a social and 
symbolic system. 
What I am arguing here is that there can be no subjectivity outside the 
processes by which, and the language through which, subjects are ascribed a 
sex, gender or sexuality. Whilst the subject is always understood in these 
terms the subject is not 'a nominal essence' (Braidotti 1992, p.185) but merely 
a convenient fiction, a grammatical necessity which holds together the 
multiple experiences and structures through which the embodied subject is 
produced and reproduced. This recognition of the subject as embodied, 
foregrounds a view of both the subject and the body as located, or positioned, 
within discourses. Both my genitalia and the absence of breasts confer upon 
me the status 'male'. In this way my physical body conforms to definitions 
and discourses of maleness. Yet as much as I am recognisably male, I am less 
successfully masculine. This is not a function of my biology or physiology, 
but rather a function of the complex and sometimes contradictory ways in 
which I inhabit my body, how I use it to perform the subject positions I take 
up. I choose not to use my body in ways which signal power, dominance or 
authority, nor any other quality I associate with hegemonic masculinity. My 
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visible lack of masculinity is taken by some to confirm my homosexuality and 
my homosexuality taken to confirm my lack of masculinity. Thus I am 
defined by the sets of discourses through which I inscribe and understand 
myself and am understood by others. 
Given that subjectivity and subject positions are socially constructed 
through discursive processes, then it follows that present social relations and 
the subject positions available within them are mutable. The processes and 
practices through which social subjects are inscribed are thus capable of 
change, and 'therein lies the possibility of transformation' (Gatens, 1991, 
p.106). The body then has no fixed character which defines the boundaries of 
'possible socio-political structures in which the body could live' (Gatens, 
1991, p.138). Rather, it is socio-political structures which define the 
boundaries of particular kinds of bodies. Thus, both bodies and boundaries 
are fictions, narratives located in particular historical, political and social 
contexts which result in the construction of particular bodies. These bodies, 
as texts, are inscribed by the categories, meanings and boundaries of that 
context. Bodies then, are the embodiment of particular discourses and 
discursive practices. 
For Braidotti (1992) the redefinition of the subject begins with 'the 
reevaluation of the bodily roots of subjectivity' (Braidotti, 1992, p.182) and a 
rejection of the traditional vision of the knowing subject as universal, neutral 
and gender-free. This positional, or situated, way of seeing the subject 
recognises that the most important location of the subject is in the spatial 
frame of the body. 
The body 
Flesh, a raw formless bodily materiality, the mythical primary material, is 
constituted, through corporeal inscriptions (juridical, medical, punitive, 
disciplinary), as a distinctive body capable of acting in distinctive ways, 
performing specific tasks, in socially concrete ways. Bodies are 
fictionalised, that is, positioned by various cultural (religious, familial, 
secular, educational etc) narratives and discourses, which are themselves 
embodiments of canons, norms and representational forms; they are 
culturally established as living narratives, narratives not always or even 
usually transparent to themselves. 
(Grosz, 1993, p.50) 
Rather than viewing the forms and functions of the body as 
determinant in the organisation of culture, Gatens (1988, p.62) suggests 
Chapter 4: society, subjectivity and agency 	 149 
bodies be viewed as products of the way that culture organises, regulates and 
remakes itself. This view shifts the conceptual ground from a question of how 
the body is taken up in culture to a question of how culture constructs the 
body in such a way that it is understood to be a biological given. 
For Grosz (1993) the body is inscribed by the social; flesh is 
transformed into a body 'organised and hierarchised according to the 
requirements of a particular social and familial nexus' (Grosz, 1993, p.50). 
The body is a text, a fiction, a surface inscribed by culture. As a text, the 
body is fictionalised and positioned within the myths, beliefs, categories, 
metaphors and stereotypes that form a culture's social narratives and self-
representations. From this text, this surface, the culture, within and through 
which it is written, may be read. For Braidotti (1994) the body is understood 
in terms of 
a complex interplay of highly constituted social and symbolic forces. The 
body is not an essence, let alone a biological substance. It is a play of 
forces, a surface of intensities. 
(Braidotti, 1994, p.163) 
What I want to emphasise here is this notion of embodiment, of the 
sense of the imaginary and symbolic transformed into materiality in, on, 
through and by the body. 
The body, understood as the embodiment of available subject 
positions, has been defined as central to the poststructuralist feminist struggle 
for the redefinition of subjectivity (Braidotti, 1992, 1994; Gatens, 1991; 
Grosz, 1993). For Braidotti (1992) the body is neither a biological nor 
sociological category, but rather 'a point of overlap between the physical, the 
symbolic and the sociological' (Braidotti, 1992, p.184.). Thus the body is 
understood to be 'a surface of signification' situated at the intersection between 
the 'alleged facticity of anatomy' and the symbolic dimension of language 
(Braidotti, 1992, p.184). This understanding of the body foregrounds the 
multiple and complex structures of subjectivity and 'the specifically human 
capacity' (Braidotti, 1992, p.184) for transcending any given variable, 
including class, race and sex, whilst remaining situated within them. Of these 
many variables, patriarchal culture prioritises the production of the sexed 
body. In so doing, sex, gender and sexuality are given high status among a set 
of hierarchical variables. The embodied subject is thus situated in a complex 
web of power relations. 
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Sexuality as power, that is, as institution, is also a semiotic code that 
organises our perception of morphological differences between the sexes. 
It is through the inscription into language that the embodied subject is 
constructed as a functional, socialised gendered entity. 
(Braidotti, 1992, p.185) 
The social body 
Like Gatens (1991) I am arguing that there is no raw, real or natural 
body and that sexual differences are always embodied and lived in culture, 
and always mediated by its ideologies and discourses. I do not assume the 
existence of an a priori self, but rather understand that bodies are socially and 
discursively produced as sexed bodies (Gatens 1991, p.100). Subjects then, 
are understood in terms of embodied, sexed subject positions (Gatens, 1993, 
p.104). This view shifts the emphasis from nature and biology to the ways in 
which bodies are encoded, trained and made meaningful within social 
institutions and practices. For Connell (1995) subjectivity is understood as 
A historical process involving the body, not a fixed set of biological 
determinants. Gender is a social practice that refers to what bodies do, it 
is not social practice reduced to the body ... Gender exists precisely to the 
extent that biology does not determine the social. It marks one of those 
points of transition where the historical process supersedes biological 
evolution as the form of change. 
(Connell, 1995, p.71) 
I am not arguing that the body is not in some sense biological, nor that 
there is no physical body in terms of genes, hormones, chromosomes and so 
on. What I am arguing is that these terms derive their meanings from 
discourses and are therefore not seen as having an original, essential substance 
or referent. I recognise that even within biology, and other physical/medical 
sciences, there exist competing theories and meanings about the body. I 
recognise too that biological discourses produce biological knowledges, just 
as psychoanalytical discourses produce psychoanalytical knowledges, and so 
on. 
Thus, the ways in which we conceptualise the body form and limit its 
meanings. I am struggling here to articulate an account of the body and its 
relationship to social life, politics and ethics that does not depend on the 
hierarchical dualisms and relations of power that characterise patriarchal 
ideologies and discourses. Such an account does not naturalise difference nor 
conceptualise it as either dichotomised or polarised. That women and men 
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have visible physiological sex-specific characteristics is not disputed. Rather, 
what is disputed is the ways in which these differences are interpreted, and the 
social implications of these differences in terms of lived experience and 
relations of power. 
The body then, is understood as an interplay of forces, structures and 
practices which generate various knowledges/truths depending on how they 
are discursively located. The body, as discursively located and constituted in 
patriarchal culture, is a sexed, gendered, sexualised body, and constructed in 
terms of binary oppositions; man/woman, male/female, masculine/feminine, 
heterosexual/homosexual. 
Like Crowley and Himmelweit (1992) I stress that denial of biological 
determinism does not simply mean that the social construction of the subject 
is emphasised and the body denied altogether. 
We have to find ways of bringing biological bodies back into our 
theorising. Bodies are social too, and our experience of, and engagement 
with, a gendered world is as embodied persons. Surely those bodies, and 
their (often messy) processes, must be part of any continuing construction 
of gender? 
(Crowley & Himmelweit, 1992, p.76) 
Crowley & Himmelweit (1992) propose a transformative account of 
human development that allows movement beyond either/or thinking and 
which sees bodies as part of the social context. Ideas about subjectivity and 
human development may then be freed to move beyond those temporal 
dichotomies and additive viewpoints which separate the social from the 
biological, and which account for development as biology first and social 
experience second. 
In exploring this relationship between the biological and the social 
Grosz (1990), distinguishes anatomical differences between the sexes from the 
ways in which sexed bodies are culturally classified. She asserts that 
differences between bodies are greater than admitted by a binary 
classification, yet are subject to categorisation according to binary pairs 
'which reduce ambiguous terms not amenable to binary hierarchisation, back 
into this polarised structure' (Grosz, 1990, p.73). Thus the limitations of the 
social and signifying systems which determine the 
conceptualisation/categorisation of gender, limit the possible ways of 
perceiving, understanding and living in sexed bodies. The body is thus bound 
by conceptual categories and the discourses through which they are manifest, 
of which biology itself is one. 
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The procedures which mark male and female bodies ensure that 
biological capacities of bodies are always socially coded into sexually 
distinct categories. 
(Grosz, 1990, p."73) 
Emphasising a non-essential and non-dichotomised view of the body 
foregrounds its cultural and historical specificity. Gatens (1988) argues that 
alternative points-of-view of the body need to address the connections 
between representations of sexed bodies, and the social, political and ethical 
frameworks through which those representations are made. 
Sexing the body 
Diprose (1993) recognises that the body is a social structure comprised 
of multiple drives and emotions that are socially constructed. She describes 
the subject as the social constitution of embodied subject positions. 
Subjectivity is thus 'determined by the concepts which govern the structure of 
the social world and which sculpture the body accordingly' (Diprose, 1993, 
p.3). The body, as a construction, social structure or artefact, is organised and 
unified through social concepts. In patriarchal culture the embodied self is 
frozen into particular configurations based on genital sex and is 'constituted by 
social concepts which discourage difference, creativity and change' (Diprose, 
1993, p.4). The body, as cultural artefact, is thus produced through the 
exclusion of other possibilities for an embodied place in the world. Such 
conforming bodies act out, or perform, the social roles available to them 
within the cultural repertoire. 
In learning the discursive practices we learn the categories, the relations 
between categories, and the fine conceptual and interactive detail with 
which we take up our personhood, and with which to interpret who we 
are in relation to others. Positioning oneself as person within the terms 
made available within a particular social order also creates and sustains 
that social order. 
(Davies, 1989, p.14) 
Yet positioning oneself as female or male is not simply a conceptual 
process, it is also a physical process. Each body takes on the knowledge of 
femaleness or maleness through its practices (Davies, 1989). 
Chapter 4: society, subjectivity and agency 	 153 
The body as used, the body I am, is a social body that has taken meanings 
rather than conferred them. My male body does not confer masculinity 
on me; it receives masculinity (or some fragment thereof) as a social 
definition. Nor is my sexuality the eruption of the natural; is too is part of 
a social process. In the most extraordinary detail, my body's responses 
reflect back, like the little mirrors on an Indian dress, a kaleidoscope of 
social meanings. The body, without ceasing to be the body, is taken in 
hand and transformed in social practice. 
(Connell, 1991, p.83) 
Connell (1991) acknowledges that the body not only takes its identity 
from, and through, ideology and symbolism but also from, and through, the 
material effects of the social structure of gender. 'Through the organisation 
and regulation of the time, space and movements of our daily lives, our bodies 
are trained, shaped and impressed with the stamp of prevailing historical 
forms of selfhood, desire, masculinity and femininity' (Bordo 1990, p.14). 
Over time, these trained shaped bodies change as a result of social purposes 
and social struggle: 'That is to say they are fully historical' (Connell, 1991, 
p.87). 
The process of bodily inscription thus proceeds from the idea to the 
reality. What one is able to be/come is constrained by the idea of what one 
can/might be. Thus the.way in which we discursively position ourselves as 
male or female is reflected in our physical being. We embody the idea we 
have of ourselves. Our understanding of the body as able to do some things 
and not others not only effects the shape, meaning and activity of the body, 
but also its relationship to others and its environment. Thus the idea and 
enactment of sex/gender has a material effect on the body. 'One's sex is thus 
inscribed in one's body through the activities associated with one's ascribed 
sex' (Davies, 1989, p.17). Davies acknowledges that having taken on the 
bodily, emotional and cognitive patterns with which the body is both inscribed 
and ascribed, it becomes difficult to imagine any alternative to the given 
social structure. Consensual social reality fossilises around the apparent 
facitity of two opposite sex/genders. Any behaviours, thoughts and emotions 
which cross the boundaries of this binary construction of 'true femaleness' and 
'true maleness' signify incompetence, inadequacy or immorality, and incur a 
range of social sanctions. The boundaries of appropriate behaviour constitute 
a regime of truth which is policed and regulated both by coercion and 
complicity, power and desire. Porter (1991) suggests that 'any conclusion that 
accommodation to constructed gender roles and stereotypes is natural, 
biological or inevitable misses the complexity of the issue' (Porter, 1991, 
p.31). Rather, given narrow and inhibitory either/or choices, individuals 
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develop selected traits and suppress their perceived opposites. As much as I 
choose not to inscribe myself as masculine, I choose not to inscribe myself as 
female. Thus whilst I might take up some positions more usually associated 
with femininity, gentleness, nurturance, domesticity and so on, I reject 
inscriptions more usually associated with being female, make-up, hairstyle, 
dresses, stockings and so on. Despite the apparent complexity and 
contradiction in this, the choices I make and the positions I take up are still 
informed by oppositional either/or choices of the sort involved in more 
conventional male/female, masculine/feminine inscriptions. 
In this way multiple possibilities are reduced to a two fold choice. 
Further, this binary structure reduces one term of the pair to a definitional 
dependence on the other, creating a hierarchy where one term is defined as the 
absence, lack or negation of the other. Defined in these terms the subject is 
encoded in power laden regulatory practices which are inscribed on both the 
individual and social body. 
Mobile bodies, changeable performances 
For Grosz (1994) the inscription of the social surface of the body is a 
tracing of pedagogical, juridical, medical and economic discourses, texts, laws 
and practices onto the flesh, to 'carve out a social subject' (Grosz, 1994, 
p.117). However these surface inscriptions are not merely superficial; rather, 
they generate and produce 'all the effects of a psychical interior, an underlying 
depth, individuality or consciousness' (Grosz, 1994, p.116) and are understood 
as a 'series of flows, energies, movements, strata, segments, organs, intensities 
- fragments capable of being linked together or severed in potentially infinite 
ways other than those which congeal them into identities' (Grosz, 1994, 
p.167). Given that bodies and subjectivities are in constant movement and 
action, in the constant process of becoming, and always made not found, then 
these fluid, multiple, made bodies and subjectivities can be remade. The 
body, as the subject of knowledge, is thus mobile, open to refiguration, and 
subject to refigured knowledge. 
Such a reading of the body locates an articulation of the possibilities 
for change within theories and practices that emphasise mobility, flexibility 
and the possibility of conscious, motivated, intentional action. What I want to 
emphasise here is the possibility of transformation, where subjectivity is 
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understood as a discursive regulatory fiction embodied and performed by the 
subject, where there are ever present, if invisible, opportunities for different 
performances. 
For Diprose (1993) the body is a cultural artefact, a body which 
conforms to, and performs, the social roles imposed upon it. Subject positions 
are thus taken up through 'a process of self-fabrication with the artistic ability 
to stage, watch and overcome the self according to a self given plan' (Diprose, 
1993, p.5). Diprose recognises that the project of creating an image of the 
subject beyond its present form and interpretation requires a view at a 
distance from, or outside, the frameworks and boundaries within which 
subjects are currently constituted. Critical reflection which connects theory 
and action is thus central to transforming consciousness, embodiment, social 
practice, knowledge and reality. Critical reflection involves both self and 
social analysis and is an intentional practice. The subject is thus understood 
as an active agent, able to effect the ways in which their subjectivity is 
embodied, represented and understood. Thus, as agent, the subject is 
positioned as complicit in the construction of identity, whether consciously or 
not. The aim of critical reflection is to bring to consciousness both the 
conditions of the constructed nature of the subject, and the means by which 
this construction may be contested and transformed. This is motivated toward 
'the emergence of people who ... are conscious of themselves as active and 
deciding beings, who bear responsibility for their choices and who are able to 
explain them in terms of their own freely adopted purposes and ideals' (Fay, 
1987, p.74). 
Theorising the performativity of the subject offers possibilities for 
doing the performance differently. When we speak/write ourselves within 
theoretical contexts which challenge the coherence of the patriarchal subject, 
the subject is opened up, and this move into theory makes the creation of other 
subject positions possible. In this way the notion of a stable identity is 
destabilised and radical new spaces for subjectivities 'freed from rigid 
binarisms and cultural matrices' (Bell & Valentine, 1995, p.157) are opened 
up. The binarisms and cultural matrices that make the performance of the 
subject possible, and culturally intelligible, are constructed in terms of the 
categories sex, gender and sexuality. The performing body, as culturally 
produced, is thus always sexed, gendered and sexualised, embodying the 
discourses that it is presumed to reflect. 
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Sex, gender and sexuality 
I have argued throughout this text that meaning, value, knowledge, 
reality and truth are ideological, discursive, linguistic, contextual and 
relational constructions. What I am interested in exploring here is how 
normative, prescriptive subject positions are produced, made available and 
taken up by the subject. I am also interested in how these positions come to 
be taken as natural, normal and necessary. 
Here, normality is understood in terms of culturally appropriate, and 
culturally endorsed, sexed, gendered and sexualised subjectivities. These 
subjectivities are understood to be discursively produced, their meanings 
variable according to the discursive contexts in which they are articulated and 
constantly produced and reproduced. I recognise that in particular 
historical/political/social contexts certain discourses attain hegemony over 
others and that this hegemony is a constant site of contest and struggle. These 
hegemonic discourses are therefore open to disruption and transformation. I 
am interested in the meanings that discourses of sex, gender and sexuality 
accrue, and am interested in the possibilities for contesting, disrupting and 
transforming them. I argue that the discursive categories sex, gender and 
sexuality are projected, or written, on the body as if real, and once embodied, 
seem to have their reality confirmed. 
Like Thorne (1993) I am arguing that gendered meanings are deeply 
embedded in many of the discourses we draw on to make sense of the world. 
Thus, differences between the sexes are often not so much based on externally 
observable behaviour, but on the 'symbolic dimension of experience' (Thorne, 
1993, p.105) in terms of patterns of meaning, stereotypes, beliefs, ideologies, 
metaphors and discourses. Like Walkerdine I argue that femininity and 
masculinity are powerful fictions, imbued with fantasy and lived as fact 
(1990, p.xiii). 
In exploring the fictive nature of the subject I interrogate lived 
experience as simultaneously real, imaginary and symbolic. In emphasising 
subjectivity as the performance of regulatory fictions I want to unmask the 
processes whereby symbolic meanings, in this case sex, gender and sexuality, 
are projected, inscribed or conferred on the body. I want also to explore 
spaces of freedom, or possibility, in which patriarchal discourses of sex, 
gender and sexuality are rendered meaningless, a space in which subjectivity, 
subject positions and subjects are opened to a play of possibility where 
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neither the genitals or the reproductive functions of bodies, nor patriarchal 
ideologies or discourses, determine the limits of available, or possible, subject 
positions. I want to imagine something altogether different, an elsewhere, 
where difference proliferates beyond the current hierarchical binary 
oppositions within which patriarchal subjects are inscribed. Like Cream 
(1995) I recognise that anatomical and physiological narratives are embodied 
within cultural values about how the sexes should be ordered as well as the 
roles and spaces they are expected to inhabit (Cream, 1995, p.1162). 
In recognising this I want to explore the ways in which bodies are 
made culturally intelligible. For Butler (1990) intelligible subject positions 
are those which in some sense 'institute and maintain relations of coherence 
and continuity among, sex, gender, sexual practice and desire' (Butler, 1990, 
p.17). These intelligible subject positions are understood as performed by the 
subject and this performance is understood to constitute, and be constituted 
by, sexed, gendered and sexualised subjectivities and relations among 
subjects. Thus there could be no sexed, gendered or sexualised body if there 
were no discourses to make that body culturally intelligible; 'This is not to say 
that there would be no bodies, but they would mean something different' 
(Cream, 1995, p.162). In this way the assumed mimetic relationship between 
bodies and behaviour, between sex, gender and sexuality, 
man/male/masculine/heterosexual and woman/female/feminine/heterosexual 
would be disrupted, and once disrupted their discursively produced meanings 
would be opened to the possibility of revision. My male body and my 
homosexuality would then confer upon me a different set of meanings than 
those through which I am currently constructed and understood. Indeed I may 
cease to be intelligible as either 'male' or 'homosexual'. 
Sex, gender, sexuality and discourse 
My point is that each of the categories sex, gender and sexuality, and 
their analysis, are discursive. Thus, whether sex, gender and sexuality are 
fixed or free is a function of the particular discourses through which they are 
articulated and which set the limits to analysis. For Butler (1990) the body is 
not 'a ready surface awaiting signification' but rather 'a set of boundaries, 
individual and social, politically signified and maintained' (Butler, 1990, p.33) 
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Constraint is thus 'built into what the language constitutes as the imaginable 
domain of gender' (Butler, 1990, p.9). 
Thus the limits of the discursive analysis of the subject presuppose and 
pre-empt the possibilities of cultural configurations of it at both the 
symbolic/imaginable and the realisable level. 
Sexual difference ... is translated by and translates a difference in the 
relationship of subjects to the symbolic contract which is the social 
contract: a difference, then, in the relationship to power, language and 
meaning. 
(Kristeva, 1979, p.196) 
For Butler (1990) subjectivity is performatively constituted by the very 
expressions that are said to be its results (Butler, 1990, p.25). Thus what is 
understood in culture to be an intelligible subject position is not the 
consequence or product of natural identities and differences. Rather, the 
meanings of sexed, gendered and sexualised subject positions are produced 
through the repeated performance of words and actions which are coded as 
male/female, masculine/feminine or heterosexual/homosexual. 
Like Flax (1992) I recognise that meanings, or definitions, of sex, 
gender and sexuality are historically variable and 'internally differentiated' 
(Flax, 1992, p.194) relations of domination. They connote and reflect 
asymmetric power relations rather than natural, biological or anatomical 
differences. Within binary logic, abstract differences are identified as real 
differences and are linked to sex, gender and sexuality. These differences are 
also conceived as oppositional, hierarchical, absolute and asymmetrical 
dualisms rather than 'pluralisms in an indefinite and open universe' (Flax, 
1992, p.194). 
It is important I think to recognise that oppositional or phallocentric 
representations of sexed, gendered and sexualised bodies can be challenged 
and transformed, and that we need not accept propositions of biological, 
unchallengeable natural differences between the sexes as the basis for their 
social status. Thus, whilst biology provides a basis for social inscription of 
the body it is not fixed or static, but understood to interact with a complex 
web of social and signifying relations. 
Indeed, it is my argument that biology itself, as ideology and 
discourse, is a cultural construction and 'the link between a sexed body and a 
gendered individual is not necessary but contingent' (Cornwall & Lindisfarne, 
1994, p.34). Similarly, Crowley & Himmelweit (1992) suggest that 
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It is only through cultural practices, the discourses of society, that we 
have experience of anything that we might call our biology and in 
particular, our bodies. 
(Crowley & Himmelweit, 1992, p.65) 
Sex and gender, sex/gender 
Davies (1989) suggests that sex and gender are both elements of social 
structures, created by and within individuals as they learn the discursive 
practices through which those structures are created and maintained. Thus 
these social structures are not separate from the individuals who construct or 
inhabit them. Though social structures have a material force they cannot be 
imposed on individuals. Rather, they are actively taken up, contested or 
transformed. 
Seidler (1989) recognises that the biological and the natural are often 
opposed to the socially and historically constructed. In a similar way sex is 
seen as part of the natural, which in turn comes to be seen as the biological, 
and gender is seen as a radically separated discourse which is socially and 
historically constituted. In this way discussion and analysis of gender is split 
into separate and autonomous realms. Yet, observes Seidler (1989) 
many of the interesting questions seem to straddle, if not contest, these 
categorisations. We discover intellectual distinctions coming to have an 
existence and reality of their own, independent of the problems and 
contradictions in the experience of women and men they are supposed to 
illuminate. 
(Seidler, 1989, p.188) 
In distinguishing between the biological and the social and 
highlighting the difference between sex and gender, sex has been defined as 
the biological distinction/difference between males and females, including 
genes, chromosomes, hormones, reproductive functions and genitals, and 
gender has been defined as the differences between women and men that are 
socially constructed and inform the way they identify, behave, think and 
experience themselves, as women and men. However, Connell (1991), 
Crowley & Himmelweit (1992), Davies (1989, 1993) and Rhode (1990) 
question any absolute distinction between sex and gender and, by implication, 
any distinction between body and mind, where sex is defined by the body and 
gender by a state of mind. Rather, Crowley & Himmelweit (1992) assert that 
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It is only through cultural practices, the discourses of society, that we 
have experience of anything that we might call our biology and, in 
particular, our bodies. 
(Crowley & Himmelweit, 1992, p.65) 
This view collapses the certainties of binary logic through which 
choices between two things are rendered oppositional and where one of the 
choices is always privileged at the expense of the other. Given this blurring of 
the boundaries between the biological and the social Davies (1993) collapses 
the boundaries between the terms by joining and slashing them, sex/gender, 
and in so doing 'the term 'gender' gathers to it the term 'sex' from which it was 
previously separated' (Davies, 1993, p.10). For Dollimore (1992) this slash 
between sex/gender acknowledges the provisional aspect of each of the 
categories and also the 'confused, unresolved, but always significant 
dimension of their relationship' (Dollimore, 1992, p.22). 
For Butler (1990) any distinction between sex and gender maintains 
the dichotomous framework within which they are conceived and supports the 
argument that 'whatever biological intractability sex appears to have, gender is 
culturally constructed' (Butler, 1990, p.6). If gender refers to the cultural 
meanings that the sexed body assumes then a gender cannot, suggests Butler, 
be said to follow from a sex in any one way. This suggests 'a radical 
discontinuity' (Butler, 1990, p.6) between sexed bodies and culturally 
constructed gender where femininity does not necessarily correspond with 
female bodies, nor masculinity with male bodies. Whereas a binary gender 
system assumes a mimetic relation of gender to sex, through which gender 
mirrors sex or is restricted by it, Butler (1990) suggests that 'there is no reason 
to assume that genders ought also to remain as two' (Butler, 1990, p.6). 
Gender ought not to be conceived merely as the cultural inscription of 
meaning on a pre-given sex ... gender must also designate the very 
apparatus of production whereby the sexes themselves are established. 
(Butler, 1990, p.7) 
In considering how the body comes to be sexed in the first place, 
Butler suggests that sex was perhaps 'always already gender, with the 
consequence that the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no 
distinction at all' (Butler, 1990, p.7). Thus if sex itself is a gendered category, 
it makes little sense to define gender as the cultural interpretation of sex. 
Gender then, as understood by Butler, is the discursive means by 
which a 'sexed nature' or 'natural sex' is produced and established as 
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prediscursive, prior to culture, and understood as a 'politically neutral surface 
on which culture acts' (Butler, 1990, p.7). Thus, claims for the internal 
stability and binary frame for sex are premised on the duality of sex in a 
prediscursive domain. This production of sex as prediscursive is understood 
by Butler to be the apparatus and result of a cultural construction designated 
by gender. Butler is thus interested in a reformulation of gender that 
encompasses the relations of power that produce the effect of a prediscursive 
sex and at the same time conceal its discursive production. 
For Butler sex is both discursive and perceptual, and denotes 'an 
historically contingent epistemic regime, a language that forms perception by 
forcibly shaping the interrelationships through which physical bodies are 
perceived' (Butler, 1990, p.114). In this way the 'socially real' is produced 
through the locutionary acts of speaking subjects (Butler, 1990, p.115). 
Discursive categories like sex and gender are thus linguistic abstractions, 
categories and conventions which are imposed upon the social field and which 
result in a reified consensual reality. 
In this way, physical attributes acquire social meaning and unification 
through their articulation within the category of sex. Sex, as a means of 
categorising/defining the subject/body thus imposes an artificial unity and 
coherence on an 'otherwise discontinuous set of attributes' (Butler, 1990, 
p.114) and reduces multiplicity and possibility to either/or dualistic choices 
between fixed options. The naming of sex is, for Butler, both an act of 
domination and compulsion. It is institutionalised and performative, and as 
such creates, legislates and polices social reality by requiring the construction 
of bodies that conform to dualistic principles of sexual difference. 'Language 
assumes and alters its power to act upon the real through locutionary acts, 
which, repeated, become entrenched practices and, ultimately institutions' 
(Butler, 1990, p.116). Thus, for Butler, the power of language to act on 
bodies is both the cause of sexual oppression and the way beyond it. In 
generating new discourses it becomes possible to speak/write new subject 
positions into existence, positions from which current configurations of sex, 
gender and sexuality, and the relations of power they imply, may cease to be 
meaningful. 
Like Butler (1990) I argue that sex and gender are both discursive and 
performative and constitute the identity they are purported to describe. There 
is no gendered identity behind the expression of gender, nor any sexed 
identity behind the expressions of sex. Rather, they are both performatively 
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constituted by the expressions that are claimed to be their result; they are 
effect recast as cause (Butler, 1990, p.25). 
Sex/gender attributes are thus understood as constitutive and 
performative, and not expressive. This distinction between expression and 
performance is critical, for if gender attributes and acts, 'the various ways in 
which a body shows or produces its cultural signification', are performative, 
then 'there is no pre-existing identity by which an act or attribute might be 
measured ... and the postulation of a true gender identity would be revealed as 
a regulatory fiction' (Butler, 1990, p.141). 
The appearance of a sexed or gendered subject is thus produced by 'the 
regulation of attributes along culturally established lines of coherence' and 
taken to be 'a fictive production .... performatively produced and compelled by 
the regulatory practices of gender coherence' (Butler, 1990, p.24). Sex and 
gender, then, are constructions, the genesis of which is concealed through the 
tacit collective agreement to perform, produce and sustain discrete polar 
subject positions. These polarised positions are cultural fictions, yet their 
fictional status is obscured by the credibility of their construction and the 
punishments that attend disagreement with, or divergence from, them. 
'Gender is performative with clearly punitive consequences' (Butler, 1990, 
p.139) and compels belief in its necessity and naturalness. 'The historical 
possibilities materialised through various corporeal styles are nothing other 
than those punitively regulated cultural fictions alternatively embodied and 
deflected under duress' (Butler 1990, p.140). 
Sexuality 
Sexualities, like genders, are performative constructions naturalised 
through repetition. These repetitions foreground how sexuality like 
gender, is worked and reworked by the subject within performative 
constraints. 
(Pile & Thrift, 1995, p.142) 
Like Seidler (1995) I argue that knowledge itself is constituted by 
sexuality and, more precisely heterosexuality, in a context where the 
powerful, usually men, are able to identify themselves with things that are 
culturally valued and thereby denigrate the powerless, often women, by 
associating them with the things that are socially abhorred. 
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Within a system of hierarchical oppositional dualisms, this process of 
othering privileges the powerful. I have argued earlier that power is unequally 
distributed on the basis of sex, gender and sexuality, and that heterosexual 
men, especially those representing the exalted form of hegemonic masculinity, 
have greater access to various forms of social power than women or those 
men who represent subordinated masculinities. Here I am arguing that all 
sexualities are defined in terms of heterosexual norms which are 
fundamentally masculinist. Heterosexual women are constructed as men's 
other, and those women who identify as lesbian are doubly othered in that 
they are still ascribed a position in sexual relations in terms of the presence or 
absence of sexual encounters with men. Male homosexuality is clearly other 
to the heterosexual, masculinist norm. As Connell (1995) observes 
Gayness, in patriarchal ideology, is the repository of whatever is 
symbolically expelled from hegemonic masculinity ... Hence, from the 
point of view of hegemonic masculinity, gayness is easily assimilated to 
femininity. 
(Connell, 1995, p.78) 
Thus I am arguing that the categories sex, gender and sexuality are 
discursively produced and reproduced in specific historical, political and 
social contexts; that their meanings are relationally constructed and not fixed; 
and that they cannot be meaningfully separated. Like Butler (1990) I assert 
that subjectivity, subject positions and social subjects are produced through 
sustained, stylised and repetitive social performances within a context of 
social permission and regulation, and that notions of an essential, fixed and 
true femininity or masculinity conceal both the performative character of sex, 
gender and sexuality, and the performative possibilities for configurations of 
them outside the restrictive binarisms which result in 'masculinist domination 
and compulsory heterosexuality' (Butler, 1990, p.141). 
Sexuality is a component in the practices of social meaning, where 
people with sexual identities in sexualised locations make themselves 
intelligible to others 'through specific grids of meaning which are written (as it 
were) on the body' (Pile & Thrift, 1995, p.142). 
Sexuality is not , then, simply defined by private sexual acts or 
preferences but is 'a public process of power relations' (Pile & Thrift, 1995, 
p.141) in which everyday interactions take place between actors with sexual 
identities in sexualised locations. In a patriarchal context these sexualised 
locations are heterosexual and in this way patriarchal, phallocentric discourses 
systematically heterosexualise both the personal and the public dimension. 
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Like Bell and Valentine (1995) I am arguing that by destabilising 
heterosexual identities it is possible to destabilise the heterosexual space that 
those performing hegemonic, heterosexual identities produce. Further, it is 
only through revealing their performativity that the link between certain 
identities and meanings is disrupted and 'the slipperiness of all selves is 
revealed' (Bell & Valentine, 1995, p.149). 
Butler (1990), in arguing that sex, gender and sexuality are regulatory 
fictions, explores the possibilities for their disruption or subversion. This does 
not involve denial of any sense of identity but rather, embraces multiple 
discordant identities which subvert the dichotomous categories and causal 
links between sex/gender, male/female heterosexual/homosexual, and which 
contest the coherence of male/man/masculine and female/woman/feminine. 
In/ter/vention 
• 	 The subject, as understood by Butler (1990), is not determined by the 
rules through which it is generated because signification is a regulated process 
of repetition and not a founding act. Yet, the rules governing signification 
both restrict and enable the assertion of alternatives, of new possibilities for 
gender that contest the rigid conditions and boundaries of hierarchical 
binarisms. 
The injunction to be a given gender produces necessary failures, a variety 
of incoherent configurations that in their multiplicity exceed and defy the 
injunction by which they are generated. 
(Butler, 1990, p.145) 
Conformity to, or divergence from, available subject positions, results 
from the contradictory and idiosyncratic responses of the subject being 
inscribed. This recognition of diversely inscribed and constructed bodies and 
subjectivities suggests that the current sex/gender order may be disrupted. If 
we challenge the categories by which bodies are currently inscribed, and 
create multiple, possible subject positions, then bodies which cease to 
conform to the old stereotypes and expectations may be constructed in ways 
yet to be imagined, ways that do more than reverse the traditional binary logic 
to which all discourses are captive. 
Prime among possible in/ter/ventions is the acknowledgment that 'the 
real and factual are functions that bodies are compelled to approximate but 
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never can' (Butler, 1990, p.145). In/ter/ventions need therefore to expose the 
rift between the real and the fictive, 'whereby the real admits itself as 
phantasmic' (Butler, 1990, p.145). 
Just as bodily surfaces are enacted as the natural, these surfaces can 
become the site of a 'dissonant and denaturalised performance that reveals the 
performative status of the natural itself (Butler, 1990, p.146). The subsequent 
destabilisation and loss of gender norms would result in the proliferation of 
configurations of gender and the binary fictions 'man' and 'woman' that 
underlie 'the naturalising narratives of compulsory heterosexuality' (Butler, 
1990, p.146). Through the repetition of these radical proliferations, gender 
norms are further destabilised and subverted. These intentional subversive 
repetitions disrupt the commonsense, natural conceptions and understandings 
of binary gender identity and in so doing create 'gender trouble' (Butler, 1990, 
p.34). 
Yet, as Haste (1993) recognises, crossing the boundary of binary 
gender identity is problematic, 'even if the acquisition of certain positively 
valued Other qualities is a benefit' (Haste, 1993, p.85). For both women or 
men becoming more, or less, like a woman or man may be negatively 
interpreted by a culture which holds binary sex/gender differences as innate 
and natural. Thus, transgressions across sex/gendered boundaries may result 
in reprisals and sanctions, both formal and informal. Yet, as Bell and 
Valentine (1995) and Butler (1990) recognise, these transgressions do occur. 
Within the tense arena of sexual politics, the performative choices 
available to those with non- or counter- hegemonic sexualities are in part 
an embodiment of the regulatory regimes which operate to constrain the 
possibilities of performance, and in part a claiming of the sexed self as a 
site of resistance precisely to those regulatory regimes. 
(Bell & Valentine, 1995, p.143) 
Subjects then, are not uniformly subjected to a closed set of subject 
positions. Rather, available subject positions are taken up in a variety of ways 
within a variety of contexts and locations (Butler, 1990; Spencer, 1995). 
Transgender identities, drag, straight or macho homosexualities, lesbian 
mothers, female weight-lifters and other similarly diverse subject positions 
subvert the sex/gender stereotypes and norms characteristic of the particular 
historical/political/social context in which they are generated. As Connell 
(1995) recognises, sexed/gendered/sexualised subjectivities are fractured and 
shifting as a result of the ways in which multiple discourses intersect in any 
individual life. In arguing that individual subjects take up, resist or subvert 
Chapter 4: society. subjectivity and agency 	 166 
available subject positions, I am foregrounding the role of the subject in 
making choices and taking action. 
Through the process of socialisation, the extant physical environment, 
and so on, individuals draw upon social structure. But at each moment 
they do this they must also reconstitute that structure through the 
production or reproduction of the conditions of production and 
reproduction. They therefore have the possibility, as, in some sense, 
capable and knowing agents, of reconstituting or even transforming that 
structure. 
(Thrift, 1983, p.29) 
Agency 
To stand before someone else's mirror is to find yourself travestied and 
distorted. To step through the looking-glass into the space of illusion is 
to become exposed, unstable, inventing yourself and knowing it. 
(Sage, 1992, p.121) 
What I am arguing for here is a view of the subject as capable of 
change, where agency is understood as conscious, intentional, motivated 
action. For Eagleton (1996) agency refers to the capacity, possibility and 
opportunity for the subject to act 'on their own behalf and in their own 
interests' (Eagleton, 1996, p.342). As articulated in this text the concept of 
agency explores the processes and practices through which subjects come to 
'place themselves in power-ridden, discursively constituted, practically-
limited, materially-bound identities' (Pile & Thrift, 1995, p.39). The agent, or 
doer, then, is not understood to possess 'some stable existence prior to the 
cultural field it negotiates' (Eagleton, 1996, p.342). 
I argue that the subject is neither fixed nor stable, but rather a place 
where meaning emerges and is contested, and is therefore a locus of power. 
In my exploration of agency I want to emphasise a view of subjectivity that 
emphasises choosing rather than being, and am searching for new situations, 
or new perspectives on familiar situations, where new choices are ever 
present. This disruption of the familiar is a central theme in both my 
autobiographical stories and my articulation of theory as transformative 
practice. 
Chapter 4: society. subjectivity and agency 	 167 
There is now a general swing back in the social sciences and humanities 
from extreme forms of poststructuralist thought, in which the subject is 
only an effect of discourses, to a consideration of forms of subjectivity 
which, although limited and contingent, can still assert a degree of 
agency. 
(Pile & Thrift, 1995, p.23) 
The concept of agency assumes that the subject is not simply 
determined by the cultural norms of gender difference. It recognises that there 
is no single masculine or feminine identity, but rather variable and disputed 
positions in which different subjects locate themselves differently. The 
subject, then, actively participates in the performance of stylised repetitions 
through which these norms are established. There is space for change, for the 
rules to be challenged and rewritten, for variation of the regulated processes 
and practices of repetition. The subject then is 'not only the product of 
discursive practices and signification but retains a certain autonomy to act 
with, through and against those practices and signs' (Eagleton, 1996, p.343). 
Like Butler (1990) I stress that construction is not opposed to agency. 
The critical task is the location of strategies for in/ter/vention enabled by these 
constructions. These strategies affirm the possibilities of in/ter/ventions 
through participating in those practices that both constitute subjectivity and 
present the possibility of contesting them. As much as I am able to make 
choices about what I think, believe and value, how I inhabit, present and 
animate my body, how I inscribe myself as 'male' and 'homosexual', these 
choices are constrained by the options available to me in particular contexts 
and by my own selection from, and combination of, these options. Thus I 
argue that in contesting, critiquing and transforming currently available 
options, new possibilities, new subject positions, may be generated. This is an 
act of in/ter/vention. 
For Butler (1990) the reconceptualisation of identity as an effect, as 
produced, constructed and generated, opens up possibilities of agency that are 
foreclosed by positions that take identity categories to be foundational and 
fixed. Understanding identity as an effect, means that: 
It is neither fatally determined nor fully artificial and arbitrary. That the 
constructed status of identity is misconstrued along these two lines 
suggests the ways in which ... discourse on cultural construction remains 
trapped within the unnecessary binarism of free will and determinism. 
(Butler, 1990, p.147) 
Heckman (1992) acknowledges that although individual subjects are 
constructed through categories and social formations and practices, they are 
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able to rework these influences in their own ways. They are thus able to avoid 
complete determination by them and are able to construct a particular subject 
position from the various ideological formations available to them. de 
Laurentis (1984) argues that the agency of the subject is made possible 
through shifting and multiple forms of consciousness which are constructed 
through available discourses and practices. Yet, they are always open to 
interrogation through the process of self reflexive, self-analysing critique and 
inquiry. de Laurentis (1984) connects the notion of an inner self, the basis of 
the cartesian subject, with the notion of external determination, the 
postmodern constituted subject. de Laurentis argues that the subject is formed 
through the interaction and intersection of these inner and outer worlds. 
Subjectivity then, is an ongoing construction, not a fixed entity and is not 
simply produced by external ideas, values or material causes 'but by one's 
personal, subjective engagement in the practices, discourses and institutions 
that lend significance (value, meaning, effect) to the events of the world' (de 
Laurentis, 1984, p.159). Thus de Laurentis conceptualises the subject as 
simultaneously having agency and being part of discursive practices; a 
socially constructed subject with agency. 
Thus subjectivity is both an individual and social construction. Such 
a view shifts the emphasis from structural constants that program behaviour to 
conditions that foster variability and change as a function of human agency. 
Passive determinism is displaced by a theory of dynamic action where socially 
structured relationships are produced and reproduced through people's 
actions. Yet, to assume flexibility and choice in the construction of 
subjectivity requires an appreciation of the context in which those identities 
are constructed. 
Choices are not made in a vacuum but are shaped by such transitory 
factors as the other people involved and the prevailing societal norms ... 
social interaction can be viewed as a process of identity negotiation. 
(Deaux & Major, 1990, p.92) 
What I am proposing is that subjects, as knowers, observers and actors, 
have an active role in maintaining or creating social reality through their 
cognitions and behaviours. Thus, people choose, though not necessarily at a 
conscious level, to act out gender related behaviours which may vary with 
circumstances. The choices they make reflect the interaction between 
cognitive factors, mental constructs based on conceptual categories, beliefs, 
values and self-definitions, and desires and motives that relate to objectives or 
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intentions for particular actions or interactions. Deaux and Major (1992, p.92) 
assert that individual acts cannot be understood without recognition of the 
determinants of behaviour in mental acts or without reference to social 
context. Changes in context result in changes in outcome and these challenge 
assumptions about the stability of male/female differences. This suggests a 
move from rigid dualisms to a view of gender as fluid and situated. 
Attention to the dynamics of social contexts helps situate gender in 
relationship to other lines of difference and inequality. The meanings of 
gender are not unitary but multiple, and sometimes contradictory. 
(Thorne, 1990, p.110) 
Like Violi (1992) I suggest that the process of self representation 
involves a relationship between an internal image or individual representation 
and the collective images impressed upon us. Subjectivity then, is 'like a sort 
of hinge between these two realities; it is the way we inscribe our internal self 
representations into existing forms of social and hence visible representations' 
(Violi, 1992, p.174). 
Purpose 
What I am struggling to do here is conceptualise a set of variously 
described terms, body, self, person, consciousness, identity and subjectivity, 
in terms of both structure and agency. Like Pile & Thrift (1995) I recognise 
that social structures do not exist without human agency and that social 
structures at least set the parameters within which human subjects behave, and 
at most set the rules for allowed, prohibited and enabled thoughts and actions. 
In negotiating this set of interconnected terms I recognise that their 
meanings are 'more equivocal, ambiguous, sometimes evasive and always 
contested' (Pile & Thrift, 1995, p.6). I am not attempting to fix meanings as 
final, but rather situate them as relational, contingent and partial, as part of the 
continual process of moving into new territory, apprehending new ideas and 
'constructing new knowledges which have the potential to empower people 
and communities by producing in them new capacities for action' (Pile & 
Thrift, 1995, p.10). 
Now the movement in and out of gender as ideological representation, 
which I propose characterises the subject of feminism, is a movement 
back and forth between the representation of gender (in its male-centred 
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frame of reference) and what that representation leaves out, or, more 
pointedly, makes unrepresentable. It is a movement between the 
(represented) discursive space of the positions made available by 
•hegemonic discourses and the space-off, the elsewhere, of those 
discourses: those other spaces both discursive and social that exist, since 
feminist practices have (re)constructed them, in the margins ... of 
hegemonic discourses and in the interstices of institutions. 
(de Laurentis, 1987, p.26) 
It is this space-off, this elsewhere that I seek. I have located this 
search in the context of a politicised subjectivity that is both conscious and 
wilful, capable of agency in the project of both personal and social 
transformation. I recognise three strategic locations in which such 
transformation might be possible; the idea of shifting, reformulated identities; 
the critique of dualistic thinking; and the political importance of language and 
discourse. I have begun an exploration of the idea of shifting identities in this 
chapter, and continue it in the next; chapter two focuses on language and 
discourse; and in the next chapter I undertake a critique of dualistic thinking. 
In foregrounding conscious, wilful action as prerequisite to change I include, 
alongside a critique of binary thinking, an exploration of both consciousness 
and possibilities for transformation. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: dualism, consciousness and transformation 
HER STORY 
Grafting is the means whereby a plant, perhaps tender or uncertain, is 
fused into a hardier member of its strain, and so the two take advantage 
of each other and produce a third kind, without seed or parent. In this 
way fruits have been made resistant to disease and certain plants have 
learned to grow where previously they could not. 
There are many in the Church who condemn this practice as unnatural, 
holding that the Lord who made the world made its flora as he wished 
and in no other way. 
Tradescant has been praised in England for his work with the cherry, 
and it was on the cherry that I first learned the art of grafting and 
wondered whether it was an art I might apply to myself. 
My mother, when she saw me patiently trying to make a yield 
between a Polstead Black and a Morello, cried ... 'Of what sex is that 
monster you are making?' 
I tried to explain to her that the tree would still be female although it 
had not been born from seed, but she said such things had no gender 
and were a confusion to themselves. 
'Let the world mate of its own accord,' she said, 'or not at all'. 
What I would like is to have some of Tradescant grafted on to me ... 
Winterson, 1987, p.78 
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This metaphor of grafting brings together the many elements of my 
text. Here the sense of fusion connects the familiar with the strange, the old 
with the new, the habitual with the possible. This sense of fusion is critical to 
my desire to think/write/speak differently, beyond the discursive limits of an 
either/or paradigm. It captures too my desire for reinscription, for becoming, 
for personal transformation and social change. In seeking to disrupt the 
familiar I want to bring into question all that is taken to be true, real, right, 
good and natural. I recognise that such questioning, such transformation and 
change will, like the grafters in Winterson's tale, be variously met with 
hostility, resistance and condemnation. Yet I recognise too that this act of 
grafting may transform weakness into strength, uncertainty into clarity, 
vulnerability into resistance. Here the familiar is reinscribed within available 
discursive possibilities. Thus this act of grafting is simultaneously within and 
against. Finally, this metaphoric grafting is what I have been seeking. I want 
to locate, imagine and create different narrative possibilities through which 
my fictive subjectivity may be told, and continuously retold, invented and 
reinvented. 
In what follows I attempt to capture some sense of a moment in which 
I relocated myself from within a discourse of power to a discourse of love, 
grafting myself onto something more desired, more empowering, more 
liberating. 
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MY STORY 
I am in a room. A consulting room. I am consulting this man. He is a 
psychiatrist. I am telling him everything I can about who I have been. Who I 
no longer want to be. I can't, as yet, tell him who I would like to be. What I 
want to become. I don't know yet. All I know is that I don't want to be who I 
am now. Or who I was, back then. In that childhood in which I was so 
wounded. So carelessly. So long ago. Since when I have carried my wound 
with me. Always with me. So diligently. Both anchor and shackle. Yet 
always, somehow, despite my sense of nothingness, of woundedness, I carried 
also some small and protected kernel of inchoate joy. This fragile thing 
helped me negotiate and survive the complexity of the life lived so far. I have 
survived, I tell this man, myself As i f I somehow doubt it. I have survived. I 
am still here. Struggling. But optimistic. I am trying to explain this feeling 
to this man who listens to me. So carefully. I am trying to make sense of 
something. But in a different way. Not a this or a that way. A simple one or 
the other way. I seek a different geometry with which to map my meanings. 
My sell Not straight lines between opposite points. But triangles. Stacked 
on top of one another. Triangulating. Tessellating. Proliferating. Endlessly. 
Right now I see two triangles. Sometimes base to base, forming a diamond. 
Sometimes drifting apart. I am at the apex of each. But the base lines are 
different. On one triangle it is comprised of father and brother. On the other, 
sister and mother. One line wholly male. One wholly female. One 
connecting to me on both sides, triangulating relations of power. The other, 
triangulating also, but in a relation of love. My binary worlds. Each world 
equally solid at its base. Male. Female. Power. Love. This is both my 
wound and my survival. My tense balance. The tense balance that keeps me 
taut at the edge of the abyss of my fear and pain. I know it is not hopeless, 
this situation. I am not lost. I am not helpless. I am redeemable. I am 
redeemed. I am redeemed by love. Reclaimed. Reinscribed. That inchoate 
kernel of joy burgeons. And I see, in this moment, in this room, with this man, 
the possibility of healing. The possibility of reinscription. For reinscribing 
myself ourselves, each other, our reality. Our world. I see the 
transformative possibility of love. Leaving this man's room, consulted, I carry 
with me my wound. But it is not alone. I carry also, consciously for the first 
time, this love that makes things possible. I carry it carefully. With 
reverence. I want to preserve it. Share it. Share its possibility. 
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I have, both through and throughout this text, reconstructed a 
fictionalised narrative of my childhood. Central to this narrative is the 
retelling of an experience of sexual abuse. This experience has been recast as 
betrayal, and the idea of betrayal has become a theme through which the 
various subjects of my text have been drawn together. 
As much as I was betrayed by my father and his power, I have 
betrayed myself, and others, by taking up attitudes, values, beliefs, actions 
and subject positions that have been shaped by binary thinking and logic. I 
have taken for granted the oversimplified categorisation of all people, objects, 
phenomena and experiences into polarised meanings and positions. I assumed 
that these things could only be understood as either true or false, right or 
wrong, good or bad, negative or positive, victor or victim, ally or enemy, 
active or passive, natural or artificial, essential or arbitrary, normal or deviant, 
male or female, masculine or feminine, heterosexual or homosexual, and so, 
endlessly, on. Despite some awareness of a complexity beyond these 
assumptions, some discomfort with their inadequacy, I lacked a discursive 
framework within which to contest or disrupt them. I lacked a language of 
complaint. Thus lacking I was trapped in an ideological framework 
constrained by hierarchical, oppositional, dualistic thinking. 
My way through and beyond this has been alternatively complex, 
confusing and revealing, and I have struggled, in this text, to move beyond 
where I was. This has necessitated a self-conscious, self-reflexive exploration 
of a range of issues, ideas and theoretical discourses. This has been a struggle 
motivated towards an altered awareness or consciousness of the ideologically 
invested discourses and discursive practices that have shaped my subject 
position, my relationships, my values, knowledge, imagination and reality. I 
conceptualise betrayal as a cultural pattern, experienced individually and 
collectively. I suggest that in a culture of betrayal, social subjects, once 
betrayed, learn to betray both themselves and others, and come to accept 
betrayal as an inevitable dimension of human experience, so much so that it 
becomes invisible. I propose that this betrayal is experienced and expressed 
within the dimension of human relationships; personal, social and political, 
sexual, familial and custodial. I suggest that the issue of power lies at the 
heart of this complex web of betrayals. In unmasking this betrayal of power I 
am struggling to articulate a vision of love that enables movement into a 
complex web of possibility. In what follows I explore the relationship 
between dualisms, consciousness and transformation, and in so doing 
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continue to map the territory I am traversing between the familiar and the 
strange, between the habitual and the possible. 
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OUR STORY 
Purpose 
I am attempting, in producing this text, to make connections across a 
variety of discourses and search for relationships that illuminate the territory I 
am attempting to map. That territory is simultaneously myself, my embodied 
subject position, and that of the historical/political/social location in which I, 
and other embodied subjects, reside. 
My purpose in mapping this territory is to become familiar with the 
discourses through which it is made meaningful and come to some 
understanding of the processes and practices through which it has become 
familiar; through which it has become my familiar. It is also my intention, in 
this self-reflexive deconstructivist text, to disrupt this familiarity that I might 
foreground its constructedness and in so doing locate points of fracture, or 
spaces of freedom, in which possibilities for new discourses and new subject 
positions proliferate. 
This search for proliferating possibilities is grounded in a politics of 
empowerment where subjects as social agents are ascribed with, and inscribed 
by, the possibility of conscious, intentional, motivated, wilful action. Like 
Connell (1995) I am attempting to articulate 'a politics of pure possibility' 
(Connell, 1995, p.243) where existing knowledge is not abandoned but 
reconfigured in ways that open up possibilities concealed by hegemonic social 
structures, discourses and practices. 
Practice never occurs in a vacuum. It always responds to a situation, and 
situations are structured in ways that admit certain possibilities and not 
others. Practice does not proceed into a vacuum either. Practice makes a 
world. In acting, we convert initial situations into new situations. 
Practice constitutes and reconstitutes structures. Human practice is onto-
formative. It makes the reality we live in. 
(Connell, 1995, p.65) 
Practice, as onto -formative, constitutes reality, a reality that is 
'dynamic in time' (Connell, 1995, p.81), changeable and open to the 
possibility of transformation through practice which is 'literally history 
making' (Connell, 1995, p.81). 
My project is thus simultaneously historical, political and social and 
engages me in thinking 'both in our current situations and beyond them, about 
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current practice and possible utopia' (Connell, 1995, p.225). Such thinking 
invites speculation about a world of possibility which will 'indeed be 
'something rich & strange' not something we have had before' (Connell, 1995, 
p.225). 
This chapter provides a background for such a project by exploring the 
idea of difference; of how hierarchical, dualistic, oppositional thinking 
constructs difference in terms of sex, gender and sexuality; of the difference 
this makes in both social relations and relations of power; and of how we 
might think differently about knowledge, truth, reality and subjectivity, that 
we may transform them through colinter-hegemonic practice. What I am 
foregrounding here is the relationship between hierarchical, oppositional 
dualisms, consciousness and transformation. 
In situating discussion of the subject in the historical/political/social 
context of patriarchy I am, like Connell (1995), focussing on 'the processes 
through which men and women conduct gendered lives' (Connell, 1995, p.71). 
Subjectivity is thus conceived in terms of; a location in gender relations and 
relations of power; the practices through which women and men are 
positioned as female/male, feminine/masculine, homosexual/heterosexual; 
and the effect of these practices on bodily experience, personality and culture 
(Connell, 1995, p.71). 
Dualism 
I recognise that different authors variously refer to the terms dualism, 
binarism and dichotomy and rather than homogenising them, I take their 
meanings to be synonymous and use them interchangeably. 
Within patriarchal culture binary logic reduces available subject 
positions to a series of mutually exclusive, twofold choices; male/female, 
masculine/feminine, heterosexual/homosexual, where there is some assumed 
continuity both across and between the categories. These dualisms also 
define the terms in which knowledges, truths and realities are constructed 
through specific structures and practices in specific contexts. Like Connell 
(1995) I recognise that practice does not consist of isolated acts, but is 
generated within definite structures of social relations. For Connell these 
relations are organised through the reproductive arena and 'form one of the 
major structures of all documented societies' (Connell, 1995, p.'72). 
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In this way the male/female dualism, and all the distinctions that flow 
from it, is embodied in the discursive representation of 'the different 
(possible) reproductive functions of bodies discursively produced as either 
male or female' (Connell, 1995, p.72). Further, these discursive/linguistic 
distinctions become solidified, and generalised, in discourses through which 
those distinctions come to be taken as real, true and absolute. 
I have argued in an earlier chapter that the knowing human subject 
exists as an embodied agent, and that this embodiment is made meaningful in 
terms of the categories of sex, gender and sexuality through which they are 
inscribed. These categories are dualistic and inform the interpretive 
frameworks through which meaning is made and knowledge becomes known. 
Thus, both the subject and their world are conceived, imagined and known in 
terms of polarities. These dualisms are hierarchical, authority-dependent and 
always imply relations of power. Further, these dualisms are 'powerful 
templates ... etched ... in our minds' (Belenky et al, 1986, p.9). Cameron 
emphasises that the urge to dichotomise is 'secondary indoctrination rather 
than native habit' (1990, p.61) and is typical not so much of ordinary talk but 
of the systems of logic and dialectic that are socially taught and learned. 
Further, these systems of logic and dialectic reflect 'a general and conscious 
patriarchal policy of constructing a sexual dichotomy in every area of human 
experience' (Cameron, 1990, p.62). Cameron observes that this tendency to 
classify in terms of an opposition of male and female principles is recurrent in 
patriarchal thinking and asserts that this opposition is neither true nor 
fundamental, but is rather artifice and construct (1990, p.57). 
These artificial, constructed binary pairs are fundamental to the 
discursive production of concepts such as truth, reality, knowledge, and 
identity (Grosz, 1990, p.93). In recognising that thinking in terms of 
oppositions has deep roots in culture and thought, Siedler (1991) asserts that 
these dualistic modes of thought form, and inform, our commonsense 
understanding of ourselves, others and our reality, and operate in the everyday 
organisation of our relationships. 
By foregrounding the centrality of dualisms in the production and 
reproduction of patriarchal discourses, I am arguing that patterns of perception 
and classification in patriarchal culture are organised through dual hierarchical 
oppositions. I recognise that these dualisms are historically and socially 
produced and function to validate and perpetuate the status quo. Cixous 
(1981) recognises the pattern of oppositions in patriarchal ideology and 
discourse to be broadly grouped around two poles: the feminine, 
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negative/passive/nature; and the male, positive/active/spirit. 	These 
polarisations are encoded in language and run through the symbolic system 
through which we experience and understand the world. They impute 
sovereignty to that which is defined positive over that which is defined 
negative; good over evil, right over wrong, man over woman, heterosexual 
over homosexual. For Cixous these hierarchically ordered patterns of 
oppositions amount to a language of oppression (1981, p.44). 
Grosz (1990) observes that Western metaphysics is structured in terms 
of dichotomies and binary oppositions, the dominant of which defines the 
terrain of the other. This other is ascribed the position of subordination or 
secondariness. Thus, binary pairs do not define two equal and independent 
terms. In each pair, the first is autonomous and represents a positive value, 
the second is contingent and represents a negative value. Further, the second 
is a deprived or lacking version of the first and is determined and described by 
the absence of features, values and associations ascribed to the first and 
ascendant term. The very structure of binary oppositions is privileged by the 
male/non-male distinction. Yet, as Grosz (1990, p.100) notes, simple reversal 
of the position of the binary terms, privileging female over male, is a strategy 
that remains within binary logic and does not therefore contest the 
phallocentric, logocentric nature of the structures themselves. 
Badinter (1989), Plumwood (1993) and Wiltshire (1989) recognise the 
centrality of sets of contrasting pairs as key elements in the dualistic structure 
of western thought and assert that 'any distinction can in principle be treated 
as a dualism' (Plumwood, 1993, p.43). These dualisms 
are key ones for western thought, and reflect the major forms of 
oppression in western culture. In particular the dualisms of male/female, 
mental/manual (mind/body), civilised/primitive, human/nature 
correspond directly to and naturalise gender, class, race and nature 
oppressions respectively, although a number of others are indirectly 
involved. Their development has been a historical process, following a 
historical sequence of evolution. 
(Plumwood, 1993, p.43) 
The following table by Wiltshire (1989) demonstrates how the 
metaphor of dualism is mapped from the male/female distinction onto 
other oppositional pairs. Badinter's (1989) table demonstrates how 
binary logic informs stereotyped conceptions of difference as opposition 
and how these stereotypes inform commonsense understandings of 
masculine and feminine traits, capabilities and potentials. 
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Knowledge (accepted wisdom) / ignorance (the occult and 
taboo) 
higher (up) / lower (down) 
	
good, positive / 	negative, bad 
mind (ideas), head, spirit / 	body (flesh) womb (blood) 
Nature (Earth) 
reason (the rational) / 	emotions and feelings (the 
irrational) 
cool / 	hot 
order / chaos 
control / 	letting be, allowing, 
spontaneity 
objective (outside, 'out there') / 	subjective (inside, immanent) 
literal truth, fact / 	poetic truth, metaphor, art 
goals / process 
light / 	darkness 
written text, Logos / 	oral tradition, enactment, 
myth 
Apollo as sky-sun / Sophia as earth-cave-moon 
public sphere / private sphere 
seeing, detached / 	listening, attached 
secular / holy and sacred 
linear / 	cyclical 
permanence, ideal (fixed) forms / 	change, fluctuations, 
evolution 
'changeless and immortal' / process, ephemeras 
(performance) 
hard / 	soft 
independent, individual, isolated / 	dependent, social, 
interconnected, shared 
dualistic / 	whole 
MALE / FEMALE 
(Wilshire 1989, pp.95-6) 
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The logic of opposites (Badinter 1989, p.93) 
Emotional stability 
Control mechanisms 
Autonomy, dependence 
Dominance, self-assertion 
Aggressiveness 
Level of activity 
Acquisition 
Intellectual qualities, creativity 
Affective tendencies, sexuality 
Traits of the 
masculine stereotype 
Decided, firm steady, calm 
Disciplined, methodical, 
organised, rigid, likes 
organising, discreet, 
outspoken 
Patriotic, likes risk, 
independent 
Need of power, need of 
fame, ambitious, likes to be 
in charge, dominating, self- 
important, sure of himself, 
need of prestige, arriviste, 
need to assert himself 
Combative, cynical, likes a 
fight 
Impetuous 
Egoistic, materialistic 
Creative, lucid, objective, 
likes theoretical ideas. 
Natural disposition for 
science and mathematics. 
Sceptical, rational 
Obscene 
Traits of the 
feminine stereotype 
Capricious, hysterical, 
sensitive, nervous, 
emotional, puerile, frivolous 
Talkative, incoherent, 
affected, secretive, 
scatterbrained, sly 
Need to confide, need to 
please, flirtatious, 
submissive 
Weak 
Sly 
Passive 
Inquisitive 
Intuitive 
Affectionate, sympathetic, 
gentle, modest, likes clothes, 
need to have children, need 
of love 
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Davies recognises that these distinctions form a 'highly recognisable 
set of concepts' (1994, p.9) through which ideas and ideals of femaleness and 
maleness are understood as simultaneously imaginary, symbolic and real. 
Like Davies I recognise something of myself on both sides of these 
oppositional pairs, acknowledging and taking up those I endorse and rejecting 
those I do not. 
This double visioning is important since it reveals the way in which we 
can hold intact the idea of maleness and femaleness as binary opposites, 
even recognise ourselves in that division, at the same time as we can 
enumerate many examples of transgressions, movement outside the 
binary division. 
(Davies, 1994, p.9) 
Disrupting the dualism 
Drawing on the work of Butler (1990), Cornwall & Lindisfarne (1994) 
and Davies (1989, 1993, 1994) I am attempting to locate and explore ways in 
which the binary construction of sex/gender/sexuality may be disrupted. I 
argue that the male/female dualism has no intrinsic biological, or any other, 
essential reality and is, rather, a metaphor for difference. The distinction 
between the sexed body and the gendered body is understood as a false 
dichotomy, as is the biological/sociological opposition. I have previously 
argued that both the sexed body and the gendered subject are culturally 
constructed through discourses and that biology is no more primary or real 
than any other discursive construction of lived experience. The interpretation 
and conflation of the terms man/male/masculine and woman/female/feminine 
is thus understood as neither inevitable or natural, nor neutral, but as 
constructed in hierarchical relations of power. The processes of gendering 
produce differences and inequalities which are most visible in those versions 
of masculinity associated with positions of privilege and power: 
dominant/subordinant, master/slave, father/child, man/woman, heterosexual/ 
homosexual, and so on. 
Interrogation of the categories female and male, and the relations 
between them, necessitates consideration of how hierarchical relations 
between women and men reproduce differences within those categories and 
how those differences, as relations of power, reproduce inequality. Hare-
Mustin & Marecek (1990) observe that hierarchical dualisms are predicated 
on inequality. The representation of gender as dichotomies or opposites 
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implies symmetry to a relationship that is unequal and denial of any 
interrelationship between male and female serves to maintain that inequality 
(Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1990, p.43). In drawing on poststructuralist 
feminist theory and deconstruction I am challenging both the opposition and 
the hierarchy inherent in dualisms, drawing attention to how each term of the 
binary pair contains elements of the other and depends on it for its meaning, 
and recognising that 'both sides of the paradigm are glued together in an 
ultimately complicitous fashion' (Barthes, 1994, p.55). 
I recognise that the male/female dichotomies which stem from the 
morphology of genitalia have been extrapolated to a vast range of other 
categories. I suggest that a range of biological and behavioural norms are 
informed by discursively produced knowledges, myths, metaphors and 
stereotypes that are ideologically and politically motivated. Further, the 
principle of dualism, and the dualistic categorisation, logic and discursive 
practice which follow from it, is situated as central to the maintenance of 
patriarchy. Indeed, Stoltenberg (1990) defines patriarchy as 'the social system 
of rigid dichotomisation by gender' (Stoltenberg, 1990, p.55), a system 
through which men maintain power and privilege in culture, where dominance 
and subordinance are mapped onto the male/female, self/other dualisms and 
where that which is other, or different, is subordinated to that which is same. 
Dualism, difference and power 
Ruthven (1990, p.50) identifies two dominant forms through which 
binary systems are manifest as social reality. One is an hierarchical, vertical 
model which places that which is higher above that which is lower. The other 
is a horizontal model which has a centre occupied by an elite, with others 
banished to the margins. 'What is clear is that in these systems men are both 
top and centre' (Ruthven, 1990, p.50). Similarly, Grosz (1994) observes that 
dichotomous thinking necessarily hierarchises and ranks polarised terms so 
that one becomes the privileged term, the other suppressed, becoming the 
subordinated, negative counterpart. The subordinated term becomes 'merely 
the negation or denial, the absence or privation of the primary term' (Grosz, 
1994, p.3). Within the male/female dualism the male is the ascendant term 
and the woman is defined as not, or other to, man. In this way binary logic is 
homogenising and universalist and 'built on the principle of exclusion and the 
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tyranny of the familiar' (Gunew & Yeatman, 1993, p.xiii). Thus, binary 
oppositions absorb alterity and difference into the hegemonic and the familiar. 
Dualism is central to any ideology or discursive practice that seeks to 
make a distinction between self and other (Shaef, 1992, p.207), and involves 
'the construction of a devalued and sharply demarcated sphere of otherness' 
(Plumwood, 1993, p.41). This sphere of otherness involves a denied 
dependency on a subordinated other and thus, the terms are not autonomous 
or self referential, but other referential. This relationship of denied 
dependency determines 'a certain kind of logical structure in which the denial 
and the relation of domination/subordination shape the identity of both the 
relata' (Plumwood, 1993, p.41). Dualism is then, a structure in which power 
construes and constructs difference in terms of an inferior, alien and 
antithetical other. In its systematised form power is institutionalised and 
naturalised by constructing, co-opting or exaggerating existing forms of 
difference. Dualisms not only ascribe qualities or characteristics to the 
relationship between members of contrasting pairs, they also reflect relations 
of power in the ways these distinctions are treated, the meanings and 
assumptions that are associated with them and the relationships imposed on 
them. Like Plumwood (1993) I argue that dualistic conceptual frameworks 
create difference where none necessarily exists and capitalise on existing 
patterns of difference by rendering them meaningful and significant in ways 
that institutionalise and naturalise hierarchy. 
Dualism constructs difference as oppositional and hierachical. The 
more highly valued side is constructed as alien to, and of a different nature or 
order of being from, the lower inferiorised side. Each side is constructed in 
terms of the exclusion of qualities shared with the other and this makes 
overlap or continuity difficult to conceptualise. The dominant side is taken as 
primary and the subordinated side defined in relation to it. In patriarchy 
where man is treated as the primary model, woman is constructed as other. 
Thus, dualism results in the naturalisation of domination; strong over weak, 
reason over emotion, right over wrong, man over woman, and constructs the 
identities of the dominant and subordinate terms, and the relationship between 
them, as inevitable and natural. What is at issue is not simply the perceived 
differences or distinctions between women and men but rather the dualistic 
basis of their construction. This construction is discursive and an important 
aspect of many hegemonic discourses is their focus on 'an absolute, 
naturalised and typically hierarchised male/female dichotomy whereby men 
and women are defined in terms of the differences between them' (Cornwell 
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& Lindisfarne, 1994, p.18). Difference then, is not simply difference as 
distinction, but difference as distinction in terms of hierarchies of power. 
Thus I am arguing that patriarchal structures and practices constitute 
difference as dominance, 'as unavoidably hierarchical' (Connell, 1995, p.231) 
and that this 'difference/dominance does not mean logical separation but 
intimate supremacy' (Connell, 1995, p.231). 
I recognise that dualisms are integral to the power structures in 
patriarchal society and are discursive constructions and symbols, not 
universals. They form a scheme or pattern for classifying the world, and 
produce the categories and concepts through which subjects make meaning of 
their lived experience. Oppositional, hierarchical dualisms both describe and 
limit the production of meaning, and in prohibiting recognition or articulation 
of 'illuminating connections between things' (Goodison, 1992, p.11) tend to 
fetishise narrowed, closed meanings. 
The possibilities for, and meanings of, lived experience are reflections 
of social structures and practices. In a patriarchal social structure, where 
power is typically associated with male authority figures, hierarchical 
oppositional dualisms privilege those terms associated with men (Goodison, 
1992, p.12). In this way the symbolic order has material effects on the lived 
experience of social subjects. My point here is that the dominant system of 
meanings and values is not simply abstraction, but lived experience and as 
such constitutes our sense of reality 'beyond which it becomes difficult, if not 
impossible, to imagine or enact alternatives' (Goodison, 1992, p.32). Any 
disruption of binary constructions of knowledge and reality thus require 'a 
revolution of the imagination' which recognises possibilities for the 
production of new discourses, discourses freed from the dualistic symbol 
system that is 'continuously reiterated and endorsed' (Goodison, 1992, p.3) by 
patriarchal structures and practices. Like Cixous (1981, 1986) I believe that 
patriarchy is neither destinal nor natural, and argue that once society is freed 
from the tyranny of dualism, where masculinity and male power are 
privileged, ways of relating other than those currently available may come 
into being. I have asserted, in chapter one, that since patriarchy is an historic 
creation formed by women and men, that it may be transformed by them also, 
together, and not as oppositional forces in a dualistic, alienated and separated 
world. Thus I place the transformation of patriarchal relations, of relations 
between women and men, at the centre of my attempt to articulate a politics of 
possibility. 
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Weedon (1991) acknowledges that from a poststructural feminist 
perspective, biological differences do not have inherent natural or social 
meanings. Rather, their multiple meanings are produced within a range of 
conflicting discourses (Weedon, 1991, p.127). Much of this conflict and 
competition between discourses, can be attributed to the tensions and 
irreconcilable differences between hierarchical binary opposites: 
science/society, nature/culture, true/false, objective/subjective, fact/fiction and 
so on. All discourses are subject to these evaluative dichotomous frameworks 
and thus struggle for hegemony and authority. This struggle is always a 
struggle for power and this struggle for power is often rendered invisible by 
the regimes of truth that naturalise, neutralise and depoliticise a situated, 
motivated view as transparent, inevitable, obvious and commonsensical. Such 
commonsense, natural truths inform academic, scientific and lay theories of 
sex/gender/sexuality. These discursively produced theories account for, or 
challenge, perceived differences in physiology, morphology, sexuality, 
emotion, intelligence, desire, and a vast range of capabilities, predispositions 
and preferences in female and male subjects. They also account for the social 
relationships between women and men, and since the male/female dualism is 
at the heart of all conceptions of sex, gender and sexuality, then the 
relationship between the sexes is the paradigm for understanding all 
relationships between dichotomous terms, both abstract and lived. 
As Bordo (1990) suggests, we 'must get beyond the number two ... and 
move toward a dizzying accumulation of narratives ... not to do so is to 
perpetuate a hierarchical binary construction of reality' (Bordo, 1990, p.134). 
This 'dizzying accumulation of narratives' involves the search for, and 
articulation of, ideas which reconfigure the realities we take for granted. 
Social reality is understood in terms of lived social relations, and these social 
realities, relations and lived experiences are ordered around hierarchical 
oppositions that come back to the man/woman opposition. This opposition is 
sustained by means of differences which are constructed as natural through 
various discourses, such as religion, medicine, biology, law and so on. For 
Connell this opposition is 
the most obvious of structural determinations of sexual character because 
of the prominence of heterosexual couple relationships in everyday life. 
It is folklore that opposites attract. 
(1991,p.181) 
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Dualism and deviance 
I have argued that a dichotomy is 'a polarisation which ignores 
overlaps' (Rogers, 1988, p.44). Where differences come to be seen as more 
interesting than similarities, these differences tend to be seen as absolute. 
Once again difference is brought within the field of a reductionist 
understanding of causal chains which promise to locate first causes and 
absolutes which define the terms within which normality and deviance are 
constructed. Thus unequal social relations, institutions and practices are 
maintained through the processes by which individuals come to accept, 
without question, the hegemony of the socio-political discourses through 
which they are constructed, and come to construct themselves, as both natural 
and normal subjects. 
Like Butler (1990) and Connell (1991, 1995) I recognise that the 
institution of compulsory and naturalised heterosexuality regulates gender as a 
binary relation in which the masculine term is differentiated from the 
feminine term. 'The act of differentiating the two oppositional moments of the 
binary results in a consolidation of each term, the respective internal 
coherence of sex, gender, desire'. (Butler, 1990:22) This differentiation is 
founded in the heterosexual couple and accomplished through the practices of 
heterosexual desire. Connell (1991) identifies heterosexual desire, that is 
desire for the other, as one of the structures around which the social 
construction of sexuality is made possible and meaningful. 
Within the dichotomised world of sexual ideology, romanticism 
dominates the representation of normal social life and sexual relations, where 
'true love' is understood as a symbolic reconnection of the dichotomised 
worlds of men and women. This romantic discourse of true love 'both asserts 
the rightness of the dichotomy, and claims a way for each woman as a loved 
individual to escape the narrow and impoverished world the dichotomy 
constructs for women as a group' (Connell, 1991, p.248). Within the romantic 
discourse hegemonic masculinity is naturalised in the form of the hero. This 
focus on exemplary individuals is 'not only a way of justifying privileges 
which happen to be shared by the unheroic majority of men' (Connell 1991, 
p.248), but also a way of dealing symbolically with real problems. 
Like Segal (1990) I recognise that the polarities of male and female, 
heterosexual and homosexual, are 'the pivot of contemporary Western 
thinking on sex' (Segal, 1990, p.101). Sex then, is about sexual difference, the 
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desire for the other, for the opposite sex. Just as dualistic oppositional 
thinking elaborates difference and suppresses similarity, so discourses of sex 
and desire ascribe heterosexuality, desire for the other, as natural and normal, 
whilst homosexuality, desire for the same, is described as unnatural, abnormal 
and immoral. 
I have located the concept of otherness as central to the production and 
reproduction of subject positions in terms of sex, gender and sexuality, where 
the concept of difference defines members of the other group as 'not-like' the 
self, where 'not-like' is understood as different from, less than, or antithetical 
to the self/same (Haste, 1993). 
Where the model of difference implies that the male is the standard, 
woman is defined in terms of her lack of, or antithesis to, male characteristics 
and qualities. In so far as she fails to meet those standards, woman is 
perceived to be other, where otherness implies deficit. Within this 
configuration of difference as otherness, the position not-male is not only a 
deficit, but antagonistic. Otherness defines the self by negation: 'If I lack this 
negative quality, I am therefore positive. But if I lack this positive quality, if I 
am 'other-like' I am no longer self-like' (Haste, 1993, p.85). Thus where the 
other is perceived as threat, self-quality must be sustained in order to avoid the 
dangers of other-quality. The metaphor of pollution is central to this 
conception, particularly for the male, since otherness is both inferior and 
antagonistic (Haste, 1993). 
Gayness, in patriarchal ideology, is the repository of whatever is 
symbolically expelled from hegemonic masculinity ... Hence from the 
point of view of hegemonic masculinity, gayness is easily assimilated to 
femininity. 
(Connell, 1996, p.78) 
Thus patriarchal culture has a simple interpretation of gay men; they 
lack masculinity. They are assigned a feminised subject position and this 
assignment is linked to an axiomatic assumption about sexuality; that 
opposites attract. Therefore 'if someone is attracted to the masculine, then 
that person must be feminine - if not in the body then somehow in the mind' 
(Connell, 1995, p.143). 
Kaplan & Rogers (1990) suggest that once we have constructed our 
world view, and the language through which it is perceived, interpreted and 
expressed, around the male/female dualism, other concepts become 
automatically linked to it. Thus, the normal/abnormal dichotomy hangs on the 
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male/female dichotomy, and if individuals do not fit neatly into either a 
female or male category, they come to be seen as abnormal, deviant, 
disordered or diseased (Kaplan & Rogers, 1990, p.225). Such individuals are 
pathologised, oppressed, or rendered invisible from the hegemonic reality. 
For Butler the heterosexualisation of desire requires, and results in, the 
production of oppositions between feminine and masculine which are 
understood as attributes of male and female (1990, p.17). From appropriate 
sex/gender identification, appropriate sexual orientation follows. This cultural 
matrix of sex, gender and sexuality prescribes which identities can exist, and 
proscribes those which cannot: those in which gender does not follow from 
sex, and those in which the practices of desire do not follow from either sex or 
gender. Those identities which fail to conform to the norms of cultural 
intelligibility appear as developmental aberrations, failures or impossibilities 
from within that domain of intelligibility (Butler, 1990, p.17). Yet, as Butler 
recognises, they do appear, and their continued proliferation provides critical 
opportunities to explore the limits of that domain and 'open up within the very 
terms of that matrix of intelligibility rival and subversive matrices of gender 
disorder' (Butler, 1990, p.17). 
I argue that these rival and subversive matrices may be produced in 
the spaces opened up through deconstruction of the discourses through which 
this matrix of intelligibility is constructed and through which multiple, non-
dualistic differences may be produced. 
Multiple, non-dualistic differences 
For Segal the dismantling of dualistic oppositional gender hierarchies 
necessitates the pursuit of change and this is, in part, 'a process of conscious 
collective action' (1990, p.294). Such action aims to articulate possibilities for 
the creation of new non-oppressive subject positions for both women and 
men. Having argued that social realities are not static, I assume that 
constructions of sex, gender and sexuality and relations between women and 
men remain open to change and that this change 'whether the intended 
outcome of emancipatory activity or the unintended consequence of other 
agencies' (Segal, 1990, p.xiii) is inevitable. 
What I am arguing for is a non-dualistic, non-hierarchical, non-
oppositional concept of difference; a 'non-reductionist basis for recognising 
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continuity and reclaiming the ground of overlap between nature, the body and 
the human' (Plumwood, 1993, p.123). Grosz observes that such a non-
hierarchical, non-oppositional construction of difference will necessitate, and 
result in, the reformulation of the categories female and male, and the 
relationship between them (1994, p.10). 
Cixous (1981) argues that since dualistic modes of thinking and being 
always result in the representation of sexual difference as opposition, then this 
opposition always results in the repression or death of one of the terms. In 
recognising that all the hierarchical binarisms that structure Western thought 
stem from the man/woman opposition, Cixous identifies a need to work on the 
couple, to deconstruct and transform the dualistic language in which the 
male/female dualism is the basic opposition which informs all others. In 
rejecting the male/female, masculine/feminine, same/other oppositions Cixous 
formulates a concept of subjectivity that is not oppositional, not othering and 
begins with 
the location within oneself of the preserve of both sexes, evident and 
insistent in different ways according to the individual, the non-exclusion 
of difference or of a sex, and starting with this 'permission one gives 
oneself, the multiplication of the effects of desires inscription on every 
part of the body and the other body. 
(Cixous & Clement, 1986, p.104) 
Cixous constructs this location in terms of a bisexuality, where any 
acknowledgment of difference does not result in an opposition but rather 
allows for movement in both directions, from one to the other and back again, 
without conflict (1981, 1986). I argue that this movement is possible only 
within a community of interdependent, interrelated subjects and that it cannot 
be undertaken by alienated, opposed subjects who inhabit discrete and 
autonomous realms. I thus conceptualise a movement beyond hierarchically 
constructed patriarchal communities where power and privilege are distributed 
on the basis of a complex set of oppositional binary terms derived from the 
male/female dualism; masculine/feminine, heterosexual/homosexual, 
employed/unemployed, rich/poor, black/white, educated/ignorant, 
strong/weak and so on. 
Yet, in arguing for a non-dualistic concept of difference I am not 
proposing a 'repressive fiction of unity' (Ormer, 1992, p.85). Rather, I am 
arguing for a proliferation of multiple differences where subject positions 
beyond those currently available are made possible, do not necessarily imply 
relations of power and in which subjects are not opposed to each other, but are 
Chapter 5: dualism, consciousness and transformation 	 191 
rather 'linked to each other in some mutual project' (Formaini, 1990, p.171). 
For Stoltenberg (1990) such a project is not possible within the context of 
separation and insularity that results from the dualistic construction of an 
oppositional self/other, subject/object, but rather is only possible between 
subject and subject. He suggests that a non-dualistic concept of subjectivity, 
of subjects in relation, foregrounds both the capacity, and the commitment, to 
• regard another as whole, and not the other half of a binary equation which 
imputes a fake symmetry or complementarity. This implies the coexistence 
and cooperation of equally active subjects who 'understand that others are just 
as real as oneself (Stoltenberg, 1990, p.60). 
Just as Stoltenberg argues for the mutual recognition of subjects as 
equally complete selves, Ormer (1992) argues for the mutual recognition of 
subjects as equally other. She suggests that instead of grounding analysis 
solely on an examination of an oppressed individual or group's status as other, 
that it be grounded instead in the practice of constructing the other in all of us. 
In this way Ormer recognises that we are all someone else's other. In 
juxtaposing these views and creating possibilities beyond an either/or, 
self/other reality, I am arguing for a non-dualistic, non-hierarchical, non-
oppressive concept of difference where subjects are simultaneously self and 
other, same and different. Such subjects are understood to be relational, that 
is subjects-in-relation, subjects who are flexible and value multiplicity, 
mutuality and reciprocity as prerequisites for non-oppressive social relations. 
Dualism and deconstruction 
Dualism takes a very complex universe and breaks it down into this or 
that, feeding an illusion of control and, dualisms being static, keep us 
stuck so we don't have to, or can't, make decisions between two poles, 
neither one of which makes sense and both of which are oversimplified. 
Setting the world up in dualities keeps us static and feeds our illusion of 
control. 
(Shaef, 1992, p.208) 
Given the relationship between dualism, power and male hegemony in 
patriarchal culture I argue that the interrogation and disruption of dualistic 
thinking and categorising is critical to a reconceptualistion of subjectivity, 
subject positions and social relations between subjects. 
It is within poststructuralist feminist theory that I locate possibilities 
for the disruption and deconstruction of the binarisms through which we 
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construct our knowledge of ourselves, of other social subjects and the reality 
we inhabit. 
For Lather (1991) deconstruction involves: identification of the 
binaries or opposites upon which arguments are structured; displacement of 
the dependent term from its negative position to a place that locates it 'as the 
very condition of the positive term' (Lather, 1991, p.13); and the creation of a 
'more fluid and less coercive' (Lather, 1991, p.13) conceptual organisation of 
terms which transcends a binary logic by being 'both and neither of the binary 
terms' (Lather, 1991, p.13). Thus elements of the binary pair are no longer 
understood in terms of opposition, but rather as inseparable elements of the 
same thing. 
Dollimore recognises the uses of deconstruction for revealing both the 
limitations of binary logic in the construction of theoretical discourses and 'its 
often pernicious effects in practice' (Dollimore, 1992, p.64). Deconstruction 
can be used to demonstrate that binarisms are 'unstable constructs whose 
antithetical terms presuppose, and can therefore be used against, each other' 
(Dollimore, 1992, p.64). In recognising that binarisms are fundamental to 
social organisation and discursive practices, determining both culture and 
consciousness, Dollimore acknowledges that their influence is not easily 
erased and that even deconstructed 'they continue to exert an influence' 
(Dollimore, 1992, p.65). 
Thus, what I am arguing for is a move beyond deconstruction and a 
move toward intervention and invention: in/ter/vention. What I am seeking is 
a new inscription, a new interval between the poles of a dichotomised reality. 
Like Heckman (1992) I suggest that new ways of thinking emerge from the 
spaces of freedom located in the old episteme, from discursive practices and 
political action that locate and fill spaces left empty, or not conceptualised, in 
the old structure. 
Like Thorne (1993) I suggest that the contrastive framework of 
dualism has outlived its usefulness, and argue that in place of dualism we need 
to develop concepts that help us grasp diversity, overlap, contradiction and 
ambiguity. Such a view shifts analysis from identifying fixed, abstract binary 
differences to examining the social relations in which multiple differences are, 
or may be, constructed and given meaning. Thorne (1993) suggests that the 
project of opening up possibilities for the construction of multiply sited 
differences requires acts of imagination and transformation, of commitment 
and action. 
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Ultimately, the basis of the human capacity for self-transformation lies in 
the ... act of self overcoming ... Every human act of will has a self-
conscious interpretative element. 
(Patton, 1993, pp.154-5) 
Beyond dualism 
I recognise the production of this text to be a self-conscious 
interpretive act. I am attempting to re/conceptualise my embodied 
subjectivity both within and beyond a range of discursive positions, practices 
and meanings. 
Like Davies (1993) I am engaged in an exploration of the ways in 
which the 'apparent inevitability' (Davies, 1993, p.ix) of the male-female 
dualism might be disrupted. Such disruption aims to 'open up the possibility 
of multiple genders, of fluidity between gender categories, of movement, in 
and out of a range of ways of being which were not limited by the dualistic 
categories of maleness and femaleness' (Davies, 1993, p.ix). Such 
transformation is made possible through the development of an understanding 
of the ways in which we become gendered, and through imagining, and 
'speaking into existence' (Davies, 1993, p.ix) new ways of being. Habermas' 
critical theory of communicative action assumes that 'language is the ground 
of intersubjectivity ... where the 'I' is constituted through acknowledging the 
discourse of the other' (Habermas, 1971, p.57) and emphasises trust, mutual 
recognition and reciprocal understanding as central to this communicative 
action. 
I am attempting to conceptualise ways in which discourses may be 
opened up to 'a free play of signs in which new, more complex and hybrid 
identities can be formed and created' (Patton, 1993, p.33). I am also 
attempting to conceptualise a non-oppositional notion of difference which 
both necessitates, and results in, the reformulation of conceptions of male and 
female, masculinity and femininity, and of social and sexual relations between 
variously inscribed subjects. This requires a model of subjectivity that is non-
mechanistic, non-dualistic and anti-essentialist. In recognising that 
subjectivities are historically, politically and socially constructed, both the 
physical body and the social body are re/situated as 'a series of processes of 
becoming, rather than a fixed state of being' (Grosz, 1994, p.12). The 
embodied social subject is thus open to multiple, changing inscriptions. 
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Butler exposes the inner truth of gender as a fabrication, a 'fantasy 
instituted and inscribed on the surface of bodies', a fabrication that is 'neither 
true nor false but are only produced as the true effects of a discourse of 
primary and stable identity' (1990, p.337). In place of an original 
identification or true, essential self as a determining cause, Butler reconceives 
gender identity as 
a personal/cultural history of received meanings subject to a set of 
imitative practices which refer to ... other limitations which jointly 
construct the illusion of a primary and interior gendered self or which 
parody the mechanism of that construction. 
(Butler, 1990, p.338) 
These received meanings, limitations, illusions and constructed selves 
and realities acquire meaning, power and embodiment through the binarisms 
to which all thought and meaning-making are subject. Thus, until dualistic 
practices are challenged and changed we are forced to think and exist within a 
dichotomised framework. 
Challenging the male-female dualism involves contesting the ideas of 
femaleness and maleness that the dualism implies. Like Davies I recognise 
that 'the extent to which the dualism is taken to be true, it is true' (1989, 
p.109). Our subjectivities are both organised in terms of, and held in place 
by, social structures and discourses, which are themselves informed by 
dualisms. Thus any discursive challenge is inevitably complex, difficult and 
contentious and disrupts our sense of who we are, of our naturalness and 
individuality, of our social relations and our commonsense understanding of 
the social world. 
Hierarchical dualistic structures and discourses emphasise simplicity, 
linearity and either/or thinking. They necessitate the ranking of one thing 
above another and reduce the value placed on multiplicity, diversity and 
complexity. In so doing, multifaceted and complex qualities are reduced to 
unitary things that can be measured and compared. 
Whereas these hierarchical oppositional dualisms are reductive and 
contrastive I seek a multiplicity that is inclusive and expansive, and allows 
for different, diverse and divergent ways of seeing, feeling, thinking and 
valuing. I seek discourses through which positions that are both/and, rather 
than either/or, may be articulated. 'Both/and thinking requires a complex 
mind capable of embracing all the possibilities' (Shepherd, 1993, p.135). 
Such thinking contests hierarchical laws imposed on static structures and 
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describes more complex and interactive systems. Like Wiltshire (1990) I am 
seeking discourses that do not continue the 'dualistic either/or PATTERN so 
.... I am suggesting a non-dualistic both/and PATTERN' (Wiltshire, 1990, 
p.95). 
Like Porter (1991) I am arguing for a redefinition of binarisms as 
related parts and not as oppositional dualisms where the apparent opposition 
between the terms of the dualism is questioned and their interrelation 
emphasised. This proposition does not discount ideas of difference, 
distinction, or tension within the pairs, but rather, discounts the idea of 
opposition and antagonism. Neither does this proposition imply 
complementarity between the sexes, for complementarity is constructed 
within a dualistic framework in which individuals are posed with either/or 
choices. Either/or choices result in restrictive boundaries which restrict 
choices and the range of available, and culturally endorsed, subject positions. 
Spaces of freedom 
What I am searching for is a middle ground, an in between space, a 
space of freedom, which emphasises the spillage across binary classifications 
and questions the presumed inevitability of dualism. This search to locate the 
territory between polarised dualistic opposites aims to avoid a restless 
hovering, a naive taking of both sides, or a limiting either/or mentality (Porter, 
1991, p.49). This search also aims to locate the terms on which dualistic 
subjectivities and realities may be transformed into dialectical ones which 
recognise, and emphasise, the centrality of interrelationship. Possible tensions 
within contrasts are acknowledged, but the necessity of antagonism or 
contradiction is rejected. This move beyond binary logic attempts to locate 
and explore 'the excluded middle' (Shepherd, 1993, p.130) which opens 
discursive spaces for an articulation of what is left out or unaccounted for. 
In questioning the implicit value and domination of the binary structure, 
feminists will attempt to occupy the impossible, paradoxical position of 
the middle ground, the ground left uncovered by the oppositional 
structure, being both subject and object, self and other, reason and 
passion, mind and body, rather than one or the other. 
(Grosz, 1988, p.101) 
In this middle ground, this new territory or space, many questions, 
dilemmas or conceptions collapse and cease to have meaning beyond the 
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binary system in which they are framed. In this new space, new questions, 
answers and solutions may be created alongside new realities. 
So this chapter will have to struggle with long-established and comforting 
habits of thinking in opposites ... The introduction of "something else" 
disturbs minds that mistake comfortable thinking with clarity of thought. 
(Hilman, 1996, p.129) 
I argue that this something else, this middle ground, this excluded 
territory, this space of freedom, is simultaneously conceptual and corporeal; 
simultaneously symbolic, imaginary and real. In attempting to locate, move 
into, inhabit and map this territory I recognise the creative, intellectual, 
theoretical and practical dimensions and challenges of such a project. I argue 
that social subjects, as agents capable of self-reflexive, motivated, 
transformative action, can make a difference to the lived experience of a 
community of relational subjects. I situate such transformative action as self-
aware, intentional activity and locate it within the discursive arena of a 
politicised consciousness. I recognise that both this text, as an account of 
possibilities for transformation, and its arguments and meanings are 
discursively produced within the territory made available to me by 
poststructuralist feminist theory. 
Theory and possibility 
Poststructuralist feminist theory emphasises contradiction, 
indeterminancy and multiplicity. In this view the self/other dualism, like the 
mind/body, subject/object and same/different dualisms, cease to be 
meaningful. Static concepts and categories give way to fluidity and 
changeability and contextualised, dialectical relationships replace absolute, 
hierarchical relationships. 
Patriarchalist possessive individualism and its dualistic mode of 
ordering/mastering reality must go. Instead ... we have to conceive an 
individuality which locates its freedom in processes and relations which 
integrate all these dichotomous terms. 
(Yeatman, 1993, p.290) 
This process of integration, or in/ter/vention, is here understood as a 
'politics of possibility' (Connell, 1995, p.233) which recognises the subject as 
an embodied, conscious, wilful agent in this process of personal/social 
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transformation. As proposed by Connell this politics of possibility requires 
're-embodiment, a search for different ways of using, feeling and showing 
bodies' (Connell, 1995, p.233). 
Given the possibilities of recombination, much of a degendered and 
regendered world will be familiar. But we should not underestimate the 
difference between the configuration of that world and our own ... what 
we are moving towards is indeed 'something rich & strange'; and 
therefore, necessarily, a source of fear as well as of desire. 
(Connell, 1995, p.234) 
The re-embodiment to which Connell refers, this search for different 
ways of using, feeling and showing bodies, I take to be possible within 
discourses and practices which reconfigure the meanings associated with 
embodied subject positions. These reconfigured meanings I take to be made 
possible in the territory created by the dialectical relationship between 
discourse and practice, and between mind and body, or more specifically 
between consciousness and body, where consciousness and body are no 
longer separated and opposed to each other. Thus I am attempting to 
reconfigure subjectivity in terms of embodied consciousness, and propose a 
view of subjectivity which foregrounds the materiality of the subject, where 
all capacity for thought, feeling and action is located in the spatial frame of 
the body. This desire to include the body, to incorporate the corporeal, is 
motivated and informed by the experience of my own body as a knowing 
body, as a source of knowledge previously lost to consciousness. It was 
through my body that my familiar was disrupted, that my sexual abuse was 
both experienced, re-experienced and re/presented to consciousness. 
Consciousness 
In my discussion of consciousness I seek to avoid a binary construct 
that opposes that which is understood to be conscious with that which is 
understood to be unconscious. I recognise that within different discourses, 
especially psychoanalysis and psychology, these terms have quite specific 
meanings and recognise also that the terms are differently privileged within 
different discourses. My purpose in foregrounding consciousness is quite 
particular, and though I attempt to locate the terms of discussion I do not wish 
to close it to the possibility of ambiguity, partiality and speculation. I take 
consciousness to refer to the relationship between the subject and their sense 
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of self/other/world as expressed in terms of self-awareness, critical reflection, 
self-reflexivity and intentionality. This understanding is axiomatic to my 
positioning of subjectivity and the subject in terms of 'self-conscious agency' 
(Rose, 1995, p.334) where transformative practice is understood as 'resistance 
to regulatory regimes and a performative statement of self-conscious othering' 
(Bell & Valentine, 1995, p.1490). 
Whereas the subject of humanist discourses is ascribed a unique 
essence which is both fixed and coherent, poststructuralist feminist theory 
proposes a subjectivity which is 'precarious, contradictory and in process, 
constantly being reconstituted in discourse each time we speak' (Weedon, 
1991, p.33). Such a view frees discourses of both subjectivity and 
consciousness from belief in a fixed nature or essence and a true monolithic, 
monodimensional reality, and opens them instead to the possibility of critique, 
deconstruction and change. Such a view also shifts the emphasis from natural 
and absolute causes to the social realm of ideology, discourse and language. 
Giroux (1984) identifies three aspects of the relationship between 
ideology, discourse and the lived experience of the subject: the sphere of the 
unconscious; the realm of common sense; and the sphere of critical 
consciousness. Giroux (1984) emphasises that historical and social forces are 
implicated in each of these aspects, and argues that when subjectivity is 
acknowledged as having been historically and socially constructed, critique 
of the hegemony of the dominant society is made possible. This critique 
occurs through analysis and contestation of everyday, commonsense, taken 
for granted practices which are historically and socially constructed. Such 
critique is made possible through the sphere of critical consciousness which 
exposes the historical and social forces which shape the construction of 
knowledge, social relations and material practices. Such critique is thus 
critical to the process of both personal and social transformation. 
Consciousness and social context 
Here I am foregrounding the extent to which individual subjects and 
social practices and structures are mutually informing. The individual 
subject is understood to be constituted through socially produced discursive 
practices. These practices produce a highly specified and limited set of 
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subject positions within which a particularised body/consciousness is 
inscribed. Thus 
in the sense that the interpretations that make up my consciousness are 
drawn from a public realm of the interpretive possibilities in my culture, 
the self that I am is not even 'my' self. Although my interpretations may 
be my own, they are constrained by the possibilities that my culture 
makes available to me. 
(Lorraine, 1990, p.16) 
Ornstein (1986) recognises that these discursive practices and 
interpretive possibilities form the boundaries of what it is possible for us to 
understand. We tend, he says, 'to set mental limits on the possible boundaries 
of our world and work within these limits' (Ornstein, 1986, p.99). The 
processes and activities of consciousness and consciousness-raising are 
therefore involved when something needs deliberate, rather than automatic 
control or intervention. Personal and social transformation thus require 
alterations to the concepts and consciousness that form the boundaries of 
reality and the construction of subjectivity within culture. 
Capra (1992) recognises that self awareness and reflective 
consciousness are social phenomena that arise through language and operate 
in a social system and thus 'cannot be understood by disciplines such as 
physics, chemistry, psychology or biology unless contextualised in the social 
domain' (Capra, 1992, p.127). 
When we become conscious of the meaning of a word and understand it, 
our understanding of the word, our subjective sense of it, is of the 
relations that constitute its meaning ... Changes in subjectivity, changes in 
the frame of reference, alter meanings and knowledge in general. 
(Rosenfield, 1993, pp.99-100) 
In recognising the role of the self/subject in the construction of 
meaning, meaning and understanding are understood to be self-referential; 
they emerge from self-reference and are structured in terms of it. If, as 
Rosenfield asserts, all mental acts and all language are self-referential, then 
the means by which self-reference is created may, when altered, 'alter our 
knowledge of our bodies and objects in our environment as well as our use of 
language' (Rosenfield, 1993, p.103). Given the plasticity of the relationship 
between observer and observed, subject and object, the corporeal and the 
incorporeal proposed in chapter three, then changes in consciousness may be 
manifest as changes in reality. The political activities of the women's 
liberation and gay liberation movements have not only raised consciousness 
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about sex, gender and sexuality in terms of a range of juridical, medical, 
social, political and economic issues, but have resulted in changes to laws, 
institutions, practices and structures. Thus changes in consciousness have had 
material consequences which have impacted on the lived experience of social 
subjects. 
Critical reflection and consciousness-raising 
By becoming more self-conscious about our strategic choices - about 
when to deny, celebrate, or dislodge difference - we may come closer to 
minimising the inequalities it has traditionally entailed. 
(Rhode, 1990, p.7) 
In becoming more self-conscious about our strategic choices we need 
to become more conscious of the contexts and structures that inform those 
choices and render some of them more obvious or acceptable than others. 
Friere (1990) foregrounds the ways in which social forces shape 
subjectivity and the means by which these processes may be challenged and 
transformed. He contends that empowerment through consciensisation - 
critical reflection on the circumstances of lived experience together with 
action - is the means through which individual subjectivity and social 
institutions and practices may be contested and transformed. Thus for Friere, 
reflection leads to action, and conversely, when a situation calls for action, 
that action will only constitute an effective praxis if its consequences become 
the object of critical reflection (Friere, 1990, p.41). 
Such a process demands ideological critique and analysis of everyday 
taken-for-granted commonsense practices which instead of being treated as 
given, must be viewed within the historical, political and social contexts and 
relations within which they are constructed (Giroux, 1984, p.322). Thus for 
Giroux, critical consciousness makes visible the historically and socially 
constructed values which operate in the construction of knowledge and social 
relations. New or different knowledge emerges only through intention and 
reinvention, and through 'restless, impatient, continuing, hopeful inquiry' 
(Friere, 1990, p.46). 
For Friere (1990) only active inquiry, participation and reflection can 
result in transformative consciousness and such consciousness is motivated 
towards critical intervention in reality. Subjects are therefore encouraged to 
critically perceive, and reflect on, the ways they exist in the world in which 
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they find themselves. Through such reflection they come to see the world not 
as a static reality 'but as a reality in process, in transformation' (Friere, 1990, 
p.56). Within this conception of a mobile reality, consciousness and world 
are understood as simultaneous, and simultaneous reflection on self, world 
and reality is understood to increase the scope of perception and allow for the 
observation of 'previously inconspicuous phenomena' (Friere, 1990, p.55). 
Thus, that which had been invisible is made visible. Critical perception and 
reflection is thus embodied in action directed at negating and overcoming 
given limits or boundaries. 
Friere (1990) asserts that it is as transforming and creative subjects 
that we produce, in our ongoing relations with reality, both material goods 
and social institutions, both ideas and concepts. These institutions, ideas and 
concepts constitute historical epochs and these epochs are characterised by a 
complex set of ideas, concepts, hopes, beliefs, values, and desires which in 
turn shape both our reality and our consciousness. In proposing a dialectical 
relationship between consciousness and reality Ornstein and Ehrlich (1991), 
argue that thoughts and perceptions, and by implication ideas, beliefs, 
assumptions, realities, desires and knowledges, can be consciously changed 
or transformed. 
Critical consciousness, as proposed by Friere (1990) and Giroux 
(1984), recognises the possibilities for active participation in the 
transformation of reality. Kenway & Modra (1992) suggest that if 
consciencisation is a process of critical reflection and action, then reflection 
without action 'is simply wishful thinking' (Kenway & Modra, 1992, p.156). 
They understand feminist theory as 'a discourse of hope and possibility that 
makes our dreams practical and possible' (Kenway & Modra, 1992, p.138) 
and argue that critical consciousness facilitates analysis of the context of 
problem situations, especially relations of power. Such analysis aims to 
enable 'people together to transform their reality, rather than merely 
understand it or adapt to it with less discomfort' (Kenway & Modra, 1992, 
p.156). Conscious awareness of a need for change also necessitates a change 
in the ways we construct reality, knowledge, truth and subjectivity. This in 
turn results in a change in consciousness. 
For Seidler (1989) consciousness-raising is concerned with theorising, 
reflecting and acting upon an understanding of the relationship between 
consciousness, experience and power. Raising consciousness involves 
'heightening one's awareness, becoming attuned to those things which 
previously were unremarked or ignored' (Eisenstein, 1990, p.35). This 
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process involves becoming aware of new insights, knowledges, meanings and 
possibilities, as well as the idea of raising into consciousness that which was 
formerly invisible or known and understood only at the unconsciousness level. 
This transformation of consciousness may result in a redefinition of 
subjectivity on the basis of these new insights, which in turn support the 
construction of new knowledges and realities. 
Embodied consciousness 
The human subject is an embodied agent, acting and judging in a context 
that can never be wholly objectified, with orientations and motivations 
that can never be fully grasped or controlled. The knowing subject is 
never disengaged from the body or from the world, which form the 
background and condition of every cognitive act. 
(Tarnas, 1991, p.396) 
Conscious awareness is always from a particular point of view and this 
point of view is only possible 'when the brain creates a body image, a self, a 
frame of reference' (Rosenfield, 1993, p.8). The complexity and diversity of 
each subjective world is thus 'a consequence of the dynamic qualities of the 
person's body image, which the brain uses as a frame of reference' 
(Rosenfield, 1993, p.49). In this way the body image becomes conscious by 
reference to itself; it is its own frame of reference. Rosenfield contends that 
any act of re/cognition requires a frame of reference, and that the only 
constant image to which the brain has ready access, is that of the body. Given 
this dialectical relationship between body and mind, Rosenfield foregrounds 
the importance of 'our conscious and unconscious attempts to maintain and 
create the body image' (Rosenfield, 1993, p.50). The body, as currently 
constituted in culture, is a sexed, gendered, sexualised body and constructed in 
terms of the binary oppositions male/female, masculine/feminine, 
heterosexual/homosexual. If these sexed, gendered and sexualised bodies are 
the self-reference of consciousness, then I argue that consciousness too is 
sexed, gendered and sexualised. It is this gendered consciousness that informs 
our sense, and our stories, of who we are, what we know, what is real, what is 
true and what is possible. My gendered consciousness informs both the limits 
and possibilities of the subject positions I take up. My sense that I am male 
implies one set of choices, whereas my sense that I am not masculine informs 
another. I do not need to constantly refer to external markers and signals to 
achieve this. I have successfully internalised that which I have seen and 
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learned to be possible within my culture and embedded these positions in both 
my consciousness and my body. Each informs the other; my consciousness is 
structured with reference to, and in the spatial frame of, my body and my body 
is understood and inhabited with reference to my consciousness of what this 
body might be, or mean, or be capable of doing. 
What I am arguing here is that subjectivity, knowledge, reality and 
consciousness are embodied; located in the body of the subject. This body is 
self-referential and relational. Where socially constructed categories form the 
fictive boundaries of the real, then the bodies constructed by/within those 
categories will reflect, describe and determine the boundaries of those 
categories, the boundaries of knowledge, the boundaries of reality and the 
boundaries of consciousness. Disrupted or redrawn boundaries admit 
possibilities and create spaces for new bodies, new knowledges, new realities 
and new consciousness. 
Consciousness and gender 
Millett (1971) locates personal and social transformation in the arena 
of sexual politics and understands that 
the arena of sexual revolution is within human consciousness even more 
pre-eminently than it is within human institutions. So deeply embedded 
is patriarchy that the character structure it creates in both sexes is perhaps 
even more a habit of mind and a way of life than a political system. 
(Millett, 1971, p.3) 
Connell (1991) suggests that there are likely to be historical moments 
where the possibilities for a general change in consciousness and culture 
depend 'more critically on the dynamic of gender relations than on any other 
social force' (Connell, 1991, p.253) and argues that we are presently located in 
such a moment. Yet the present moment is not understood to be simply an 
inevitable culmination of events, but is rather understood as a point of choice. 
For Connell, the purpose of analysis is to better understand 'the structure of 
the choice and the collective projects that are feasible responses to it' 
(Connell, 1991, p.279). 
Taylor (1989) argues that any attempts to transform gender relations 
need to focus on both socio-political structures and consciousness, for 'both 
are equally important in change' (Taylor, 1989, p.448). Rinehart (1992), in 
Chapter 5: dualism, consciousness and transformation 	 204 
theorising the relationship between gender and consciousness, understands 
that 
Gender consciousness is the recognition that one's relation to the ... world 
is shaped in important ways by the physical fact of one's sex and by the 
associated characteristics of being defined either female or male. 
(Rinehart, 1992, p.14) 
Rinehart (1992) describes gender consciousness as a cognitive 
structure which enables critical reflection on gender identification and role 
ideology. She recognises that social practices, structures and situations 
reinforce one another in a perpetual interactive cycle and proposes that gender 
consciousness offers an opportunity to break this habitual cycle (Rinehart, 
1992, p.116). 
For Rinehart, gender consciousness is critical to personal, social and 
political change. Gender consciousness provides 'internal psychological 
resources and external spurs to action' (Rinehart, 1992, p.132). This process 
involves internal recognition, identification and engagement with sympathetic 
others, and mobilisation: the motivation to act. This process, suggests 
Rinehart, is 'a powerful antidote to gendered political socialisation and 
structural constraints' (Rinehart, 1992, p.132) which constantly interact with 
each other. Given the understanding that consciousness represents 'the living 
intellectual and affective framework used in order to make sense of the world' 
(Rinehart 1992, p.167) then consciousness knits thought and action. In a 
social context of subjects-in-relation group, consciousness arises from the 
recognition of one's membership of a group, identification with it, and action 
in, and on, its behalf (Rinehart, 1992). 
Drawing on the theories of Connell (1995), Davies (1989, Giroux 
(1984), Lather (1991, Pile & Thrift (1995) and Rinehart (1992) I argue that if 
we retell, reinvent, reconceptualise and reinscribe our embodied subjectivities 
and realities, then it is possible to act to alter the structures, boundaries and 
forms of both our experience of being embodied and our experience within 
the social body. I argue, too, that critical to such transformation is a 
transformation of consciousness. I have attempted, in the autobiographical 
stories, to reveal my struggle with these ideas, these possibilities. In 
reflecting on the ways in which my sexuality has been discursively produced I 
have tried to liberate myself from the pejorative meanings and associations I 
have taken up as real. This has empowered me to think and feel differently 
about myself, to take up alternative subject positions, especially in relation to 
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men, and map a new view of the social/political terrain in which I reside and 
into which I am venturing. 
Consciousness and transformation 
All the evidence suggests that a tradition is made, not given: it is created 
retrospectively for self-validating purposes out of the present needs of a 
particular group of people, and is not handed down to everybody 
indiscriminately as a natural inheritance. 
(Ruthven, 1990, p.128) 
Critical awareness, and critical reflection embodied in personal, 
political and social action are essential to the process of conscious 
transformation. Further, conscious transformation is contingent on a 
transformation of consciousness. For Ornstein and Ehrlich (1991) the goal of 
such transformation is a change in mental contents and structures. This 
implies a need for critical reflection focussed on change, transformation, 
emancipation and liberation from those limitations imposed on perception, 
cognition and action that impede the recognition of multiple possible 
subjectivities, truths, knowledges and realities. Thus an alteration or shift in 
consciousness is fundamental to any change in prevailing cultural values, 
beliefs, systems and practices. 
I have argued earlier in this chapter that the tradition that determines 
and limits thought, value, imagination, knowledge, language, subjectivity, 
truth and reality in patriarchal culture is one of hierarchical binary 
oppositions. 
I have also argued that personal and social transformation will be 
possible only once we are freed from the impoverished, limiting construction 
of subjectivity in terms of dualistic polar opposites. Segal (1990) 
acknowledges that though we may continue to live our lives as women and 
men, with distinctive sexual/reproductive capacities and differences, these 
differences do not need to result in the sexual contrasts that have come to 
shape our commonsense, consensual reality. 'Social reality, group awareness 
or collective consciousness can be changed by new ideas only when they are 
brought into consciousness' (Starhawk, 1990, p.316). What is required then, 
for both personal and social transformation is an awareness, or consciousness, 
of the constructed nature of sex/gender/sexuality and sexual differences and 
the difference that these differences make. 
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For Hooks (1990) a politics of transformation involves 'working to 
identify both individually and collectively the specific character of our social 
identity' (Hooks, 1990, p.189). Advocacy of a transformative critical 
consciousness assumes a politicisation of the self that focuses on creating an 
understanding of the ways in which discursive categories such as sex, gender 
and sexuality determine both individual and collective experiences. 
Engagement in ongoing critical self-examination and reflection, coupled with 
engagement in collective discussion, is critical to the project of personal and 
social transformation, for 
without committed vigorous dialectical engagement we cannot hope to 
change the world. Coming to critical consciousness requires that we give 
up set ways of thinking and being, shift our paradigms and open ourselves 
to the unknown and unfamiliar. If we do not change our consciousness 
we cannot change our actions or demand change from others. 
(Hooks, 1990, p.190) 
If we invent ourselves by virtue of the choices that we make, then we 
can reinvent/reconstruct ourselves by choosing differently: imagining 
different possibilities which translate into different realities. Giroux (1983) 
recognises the role of imagination in the formulation of a vision of a possible 
future, of a transformed society. He foregrounds the importance of human 
agency and struggle in 'revealing the gap between the society as it presently 
exists and society as it might be' (Giroux, 1983, p.30). Thus the conscious 
exercise of imagination, choice and action translates possibility into actuality. 
The possibilities for new and different inscriptions open possibilities for new 
and different subject positions, consciousness, bodies and realities. This is a 
politics of possibility. 
Possibility 
Men and women are caught up in a web of age old cultural 
determinations that are almost unanalysable in their complexity. One can 
no more speak of 'woman' than of 'man without being trapped in an 
ideological theatre, where the proliferation of representations, images, 
reflections, myths, identifications, transform, deform, constantly, change 
everyone's imaginary and invalidate in advance any conceptualisation. 
(Cixous & Clement, 1986, p.83) 
Like Pile & Thrift (1995) I am arguing for a politics of transformation 
which is grounded on an ethics of difference which 'can express and 
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encourage an openness of outlook based upon a freedom to move across the 
border and the boundaries in pursuit of new senses of self and other' (Pile & 
Thrift, 1995, p.21). This crossing of boundaries is understood in terms of a 
struggle to traverse the difference between the familiar and the strange, where 
new meanings may be produced alongside 'liberated spaces that can be 
occupied' (de Certeau, 1984, p.105). 
Yet, like Moore (1994) I recognise that 'we can't just think our way 
out of our present dilemmas, because thinking itself is part of the problem' 
(Moore, 1994, p.xiii). What is required are new discursive possibilities which 
provide alternatives to dualistic ways of thinking and being. Thus our 
thinking and being need to be radically reimagined. 'A new idea, a new 
language, and new traditions must be developed on which to base our theory 
and practice' (Moore, 1994, p.xv). 
Poststructuralist feminist theory opens spaces within discourse for 
in/ter/vention. For Giroux (1991) this language of possibility needs to 'be 
capable of thinking risky thoughts', engage in 'a project of hope' and 'point to 
the horizon of the not yet' (Giroux, 1991, p.52). This language of possibility 
articulates opportunities for the construction of knowledges in which 
multiple narratives and social practices are constructed around a politics of 
difference. This politics opens subjects to the possibility of reading the world 
differently, resisting the abuse of power and privilege, and constructing 
alternative relationships and communities (Giroux, 1991, p.49). 
Gramsci (1971) recognises that hegemonised subjects have the 
potential to contest their ideological positioning. Although hegemonic control 
is powerful and complex it is not in Gramsci's view, seamless. Thus a 
politics of possibility can locate and explore 'small and potentially powerful 
spaces' (Luke, 1992, p.27) within institutions and practices of social and 
ideological control. It is within these spaces that counter hegemonic 
discourses and practices can be organised. 
Transforming patriarchal discourses of sex/gender/sexuality and 
expanding the range of possible subject positions necessitates unmasking, 
contesting and replacing the dualisms at the heart of all conceptualisations of, 
and discourse about, identity and reality; male/female, same/different, 
biology/culture, agency/determinism among them. Yet I recognise that our 
subjectivities are organised in terms of, and held in place by social structures 
that are informed by these dualisms. I recognise too that any challenge is 
inevitably complex, difficult, confusing, painful, threatening and always a site 
of contest. Yet, I argue that transformation of the performative structures and 
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practices through which subject positions are constructed and taken up, is 
possible. 
Like Heckman (1992) I understand that this involves the invention of 
'a new structure of multiple truths, multiple voices of sexuality which aim to 
undo, and open-up the closure of logocentric oppositions' (Heckman, 1992, 
p.165). What would be lost in this undoing and restructuring is 
the necessary connection of the elements of gender relations to 
institutionalised inequality on one side and biological difference on the 
other. The depth of this change should not be underestimated. It would 
be a fundamental departure from a key condition of our present culture, 
which might be summarised as the sense that gender is fatality. 
(Connell, 1991, p.290) 
Possible subjects 
We are in the midst of a period of social change in which gender issues 
have been profoundly politicised around the world - or perhaps a better 
word here would be contested - and we are plunged into an arena in 
which we ourselves, our identities our self-definitions, are part of the 
struggle. 
(Eisenstein, 1991, p.101) 
This struggle engages me in the project of speculating about the 
possibilities for a radical transformation of behaviour, bodies, thoughts, 
consciousness, relationships and politics beyond the boundaries of the 
familiar. Such a project aims to contest and transform the processes and 
practices through which meaning, myth and representation are socially 
produced and reproduced. It also proposes a liberation of the subject aimed at 
transforming each subject's relationship to their body, where they are enabled 
to become subjects who are mobile, complex and open and for whom political 
transformations of social institutions and structures are possible. Thus 
male/female, masculine/feminine and heterosexual/homosexual subject 
positions as currently understood, would cease to exist. 
For Heckman (1992) the aim is not to erase difference but reinscribe it 
in non-oppositional terms and in so doing dislodge the polarity by revealing a 
multiplicity of differences. Such re-inscription requires a 'non-polarised way 
of thinking about sexuality that rests on multiplicity rather than opposition' 
(Heckman, 1992, p.172). Thus masculine and feminine, male and female, 
heterosexual and homosexual cease to be understood as opposites and are 
instead, understood as elements that 'represent multiple differences, pluralities 
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of characteristics that cross and recross the alleged boundary between the two' 
(Heckman, 1992, p.174). 
What I am arguing for here is a contextual, relational politics of 
possibility which simultaneously works on the personal and social body in the 
production of multiple possibilities for inscription. Davies suggests that the 
freedom to position ourselves in multiple ways, some of which bear no 
relation to current discursive practices, will require 'access to imaginary 
worlds in which new metaphors, new forms of social relations, and new 
patterns of power and desire are explored' (Davies, 1989, p.14.1). 
I recognise that in a world based on dualistic hierarchical oppositions, 
where power and privilege accrue unequally according to ones relation to the 
ascendant binary, the illusion of freedom is made necessary by the lived 
experience of inequity, powerlessness and restriction. I recognise the freedom 
to which Davies refers to be contingent on counter-hegemonic political/social 
action and that this action is contingent on the disruption of 'the pervasive and 
powerful assumptions ... that certain past 'givens' are inevitable, 
unchangeable, natural' (Morgan, 1994, p.36). 
For Davies this disruption begins with the recognition of multiple 
possible subject positions which 'bear little or no relation to the genitals of the 
people who take them up' (1989, p.110). 
Eventually we may come to see these terms 'masculine' and 'feminine' as 
archaic and wonder how the social world could ever have been reduced to 
two types of people, these types being related to relatively minor pieces 
of anatomy whose sole relevance lies in biological reproduction. In such 
a Utopia those masculine and feminine qualities that are worthy of 
celebration would still be able to be celebrated, but without the 
destructive marginalisation of the feminine and without the restrictions 
currently placed on people to be exclusively or primarily one or the other. 
(Davies, 1989, p.141) 
Transforming subject relations 
It is in the terrain of the relationship between the binary pair, the 
couple, that I locate both the current limits to, and the possibilities for, 
transformation. I argue that dualistic, hierarchical, oppositional discourses 
create dualistic, hierarchical, oppositional social subjects. Everyone and 
everything conceptualised within patriarchal culture is derived from, and 
reduced to, the male/female couple. This couple embodies patriarchal 
ideologies and discourses and is located in relations of power and privilege 
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where one half of the couple attains hegemony over the other. Discourses 
about the couple, especially those located in biology, normalise and legitimise 
these relations of power and come to be solidified in other discourses, such as 
law, religion, economics, labour and so on. Ideologies, social structures, 
discourses and discursive practices are taken up and performed by embodied 
social subjects. What I am struggling to articulate are possibilities for 
conscious re-embodiment of transformed subjectivities, subjects and subject 
positions. I am locating this struggle in the project of deconstructing and 
transforming the couple. Thus, the couple, as terrain, must be remapped. 
To be aware of the couple, that is the couple that makes it all work, is also 
to point to the fact that it is on the couple that we have to work if we are 
to deconstruct and transform culture. The couple as terrain, as space 
demanding, insisting on, a complete transformation of one to the other. 
And so work still has to be done on the couple .... on the question.... of 
what a completely different couple might be like. 
(Cixous 1981, p.44) 
Hollway (1992) argues that in analysing the production of sex/gender 
and sexual relations, the interpersonal dynamic must be theorised (Hollway, 
1992, p.265). This dynamic includes sex, intimacy, attraction, desire and 
emotion. Hollway recognises that 'because traditional discourses concerning 
sexuality are gender differentiated, taking up subject or object positions is not 
equally available to men and women' (Hollway, 1992, p.248). Therefore men 
and women are positioned differently, and unequally, in relation to the 
interpersonal dynamic and are differently inscribed in different discourse of 
sex, intimacy, desire, attraction and love. Hollway, in identifying discourses 
about intimate relationships to be gendered, recognises that they are 
characterised by dichotomised distinctions between the physical and the 
emotional, between sex and love. 
For Taylor (1989) romantic ideology operates as a regulatory 
mechanism which is shaped by social and economic forces. As an ideal, it 
acts as a force in the regulation of behaviour between the sexes, working to 
construct male and female subjectivity in particular ways, especially within 
traditional versions of heterosexual coupling and marriage. 
In reflecting on intimate relationships between women and men, 
Firestone foregrounds the phenomenon of love as 'the pivot of women's 
oppression' (1970, p.126). She argues that the concept of love is an 
ideological disguise which renders invisible the relations of power that prevail 
in heterosexual relationships. Millett (1970) theorises that sexual 
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relationships between women and men embody a political dimension and that 
this dimension involves, among other things, the unequal allocation of power. 
Among these beliefs is 'the most cherished of ideas, namely that of physical 
and emotional love between men and women' (Eisenstein, 1990, p.14). In this 
analysis, sex/love is revealed as a crucial part of the ideological structure that 
perpetuates 'male power over women, with their full participation' (Eisenstein, 
1990, p.14). Love and sex, are thus critical to the continued reproduction of 
an ideology that reinforces a separation between male and female subject 
positions and then creates a set of beliefs about those positions. 
In avoiding essentialist conceptions and definitions of sex, gender and 
sexuality, Cixous (1986) stresses that we must avoid assuming a natural 
anatomical determination in terms of opposites, and acknowledges that it is 
impossible, at this point in time, to predict what will become of sexual 
difference in the future. What is possible, however, is the apprehension of 
some discernible outlines of the future of difference, outlines that enable us to 
imagine a change in the oppositional structures that currently circumscribe the 
current discussions of sex/gender, man/woman, male/female, 
masculine/feminine. This leads to a different way of inscribing difference, 
where 'difference would be a bunch of new differences' (Cixous & Clement, 
1986, p.81). Cixous' discourse of difference does not rest on oppositions, but 
rather, defines difference as plural and fluid. 
In transforming the couple, Cixous disrupts the ,heterosexual binary 
pair with a proposed bisexuality. Cixous (1981) defines bisexuality not as the 
incorporation of two types of being, defined by phallocentric dualisms, but 
rather as the multiplication and inclusion of possibilities in oneself. 
Bisexuality on an unconscious level is the possibility of extending into 
the other, of being in such a relation with the other that I move into the 
other without destroying the other: That I will look for the other where 
s/he is without trying to bring everything back to myself. 
(Cixous 1981, p.55) 
This bisexuality implies a relationship of mutuality and reciprocity 
between equal subjects. Reciprocity and mutuality imply relationships where 
authority and decision making are shared in ways that preclude domination 
(Flax, 1992, p.205). The outcome of mutual and reciprocal relations is not 
the legitimation of power 'but the enabling of empowerment' (Benhabib, 
1990, p.109). The issue of empowerment is critical to my articulation of the 
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possibilities for transformation of both the subject and of social relations 
among subjects, a transformation that elides relations of domination. 
For Gatens (1991) the struggle for a different social organisation 
requires relations of mutuality and reciprocity and not ones which exist 
between subject and object, self and other, or one and its complement. As 
described by Flax, (1992) relationships based on mutuality and reciprocity 
require subjects who need connection with others; who are able and willing 
to see how their own acts affect others; and who are 'able to tolerate the 
prospect of engaging in an open process without a guaranteed end result or 
privileged position within it' (Flax, 1991, p.207). Such subjects will also 
seek out, and be responsive to, differences and 'worry when discourse 
becomes too mono-vocal, stable or unitary' (Flax, 1991, p.207). 
Flax (1992) suggests that in order to create and sustain these 
relationships there must be 'a self that desires reciprocity, which can also 
honour and do justice to our separateness, to the distinctiveness and integrity 
of each other person' (Flax, 1992, p.207). For Friere such a project aims for, 
and results in, 'the creation of a world in which it will be easier to love' 
(Friere, 1990, p.19), a world where relationships are characterised by 'mutual 
trust between the participants' (Friere, 1990, p.64). 
In contemplating possibilities for mutual, reciprocal relationships, 
Berman (1990) questions the ideology of individualism that dominates 
patriarchal society. She suggests that such ideology situates subjects as 
'separate, independent corpuscular bodies, each individually responsible only 
for our own fate' (Berman, 1990, p.246), and recognises that this perpetuates 
and justifies an elitist hegemony. Like Finzi 
I do not believe ... that there is a natural law which will guarantee justice. 
I do think, however, that ethics must embrace a larger sphere than 
historically constituted by the polis and the citizen. A new gendered 
ethics must also concern private relationships ... The goal is to achieve an 
equilibrium of mutual recognition where difference does not imply 
hierarchy and where exchange does not imply the logic of domination. 
(Finzi, 1992, p.142) 
A discourse of love 
Here I recognise the centrality of the discourse of love in gaining the 
complicity of desiring subjects in the maintenance of unequal power relations 
which gather to them the dichotomised elements of the male/female dualism. 
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This discourse of love is the ideological glue through which oppositions are 
joined in a parody of complementarity, unity and harmonious completion. 
Yet, having located the discourse of love at the centre of patriarchal 
relationships, I intend to leave it there. What I am arguing for is a 
reinscription of love in terms of mutuality and reciprocity, and for an 
understanding of such inscription as counter-hegemonic practice and as an 
alternative, and antidote, to patriarchal relations of power. Like Hollway 
(1992) I recognise that transformative practice does not automatically, or 
necessarily, eradicate what went before, either in structure or in the ways in 
which practices, powers and meanings have been 
historically/politically/socially produced. Consciousness-changing is not 
simply accomplished by replacing old discourses with new ones. Rather, 
It is accomplished as a result of the contradictions in our positionings, 
desires and practices - and thus in our subjectivities - which result from 
the coexistence of the old and the new. Every relation and every practice 
to some extent articulates such contradictions and therefore is a site of 
potential change as much as it is a site of reproduction. 
(Hollway, 1992, p.71) 
Like Hooks I am arguing that in reconceptualising, reformulating and 
reimagining strategies for our future 'we need to concentrate on the 
politicisation of love' (1990, p.192). I do not conceptualise love within the 
context of a mythology of romance and intimate relationships but rather in the 
context of 
a critical discussion where love can be understood as a powerful force 
that challenges and resists domination. As we work to be loving to create 
a culture that celebrates life, that makes love possible, we must move 
against dehumanisation, against domination. When women and men 
understand that working to eradicate patriarchal domination is a struggle 
rooted in the longing to make a world where everyone can live fully and 
freely, then we know our work to be a gesture of love. 
(Hooks, 1990, p.192) 
Convergence 
I am attempting, in this chapter, to bring the themes of my text to some 
point of convergence. In the process of exploring possibilities for 
transformation I am foregrounding the centrality of relationship to the 
conceptualisation of the various subjects of this ,text. It is my desire to 
construct a relational context within which my discursive subjects, and 
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subjectivities, may be articulated, contested and transformed. Such 
transformation seeks out spaces of freedom in which social relationships are 
freed from the hegemony and tyranny of patriarchal relations of power, spaces 
in which subjects are empowered to transform their subject positions, their 
lived experiences, their everyday places and their social realities. 
The central assumption underpinning this text is that change is both 
desirable and possible, and that this change necessitates the disruption of that 
which has become habitual and familiar. I recognise that this disruption might 
be painful and may be met with resistance, both personal and collective. I 
recognise too that those with power may find it hard to imagine being without 
it, and be reluctant to relinquish it, and that those with limited or little power 
may find it hard to imagine the terms of their own empowerment. 
I locate my politics of possibility in the discursive arena of 
imagination, speculation, invention and action, and emphasise the need for a 
praxis created within the dialectical relationship between theory and practice. 
I place at the centre of this practice a politicised, conscious, self-reflexive 
social subject with agency and a will to transformative action. Such action is 
understood as being simultaneously personal and social, individual and 
collective, and motivated toward the realisation of communities that are not 
premised on relations of power. In so doing I am attempting to argue for more 
than a politics of possibility. I am arguing for a politics of love, where love is 
understood as the possibility of relationships characterised by the absence of 
power and expressed in terms of mutuality and reciprocity. 
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LACUNA: a closing statement 
HER STORY 
Islands are metaphors for the heart, no matter what poet says otherwise. 
My own heart, like this wild place, has never been visited, and I do not 
know whether it could sustain life. 
In an effort to find out I am searching for a dancer who may or may not 
exist, though I was never conscious of beginning this journey. Only in the 
course of it have I realised its true aim. When I left England I thought I 
was running away. Running away from uncertainty and confusion but 
most of all running away from myself. I thought I might become someone 
else in time, grafted on to something better and stronger. And then I saw 
that the running away was a running towards. An effort to catch up with 
my fleetfooted self, living another life in a different way. 
Time has no meaning, space and place have no meaning, on this journey. 
All times can be inhabited, all places visited ... The journey is not linear, it 
is always back and forth, denying the calendar, the wrinkles and lines of 
the body. The self is not contained in any moment of any place, but it is 
only In the intersection of moment and place that the self might, for a 
moment, be seen vanishing through a door, which disappears at once ... 
I don't know if other worlds exist in space or time. Perhaps this is the 
only one and the rest is rich imaginings. Either way it doesn't matter. 
We have to protect both possibilities. They seem to be interdependent. 
Winterson, 1990, pp.80, 128 
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MY STORY 
JANUARY 1994 
I have been thinking, struggling, reading and writing for some considerable 
time now. I had considered this journey conceptually closed and nearing 
completion, yet feel the end to be unattainable, that I cannot complete it, that 
it cannot be completed. 
I am aware that the journey is not linear, has no beginning, no end. Yet a text 
requires closure. Or does it? I struggle with the text because I seek openness 
and avoid closure. I'm frightened. What of me closes when the text closes? 
Do I lose something? Surrender the illusion of the me who wrote it? Does the 
text, on closing, become incomplete, partial, not at all what I want it to be? 
Not me? 
How do I reconcile these things? Live with contradiction? Uncertainty? 
Confusion? 
DECEMBER 1996 
I'm still nervous, anxious, edgy. Any mention of Repressed Memory 
Syndrome and I'm nauseous. Confused. Did anything really happen? There 
is no final proof, and never can be. A private moment. A repressed 
re/constructed memory. A dead father. I am what is left. Me. But I'm not 
sure who I am or where it is that I am left. What I do know is that I am deeply 
suspicious of facts. Of truths. Of realities. Of knowledges. I take little for 
granted. I search for ambiguity, contradiction, possibility. I know that 
differences are made, and I want to make them. I have after all made this text, 
this story, this fabrication. This legacy of something that may never have 
happened. 
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MARCH 1994 
I am a fiction constructed in my own image. This image is historically, 
politically and socially constructed through the equally fictitious discourses of 
others. This constructed fictitious self is the subject of my story. More 
precisely, these constructed fictitious selves are the subjects of my stories. 
These stories are dreams, memories, ideas and experiences brought into 
language through the discourses of psychology, sociology, biology, 
psychiatry, physics, philosophy, pedagogy, metaphysics, theology, feminism, 
poststructuralism and a desperate need to know something yearning to be 
known. 
These stories tell of journeys beyond dualistic conceptions of mind and body. 
My academic journey in thought has been paralleled by a journey in embodied 
consciousness. I have chartered the territory of a mis/remembered childhood 
re/remembered it, and in so doing re/claimed and re/constructed it.--,I/have 
transformed myself, my reality, in a paradigm where my experience ) is 
mediated more by my growing sense of personal power than by the power of 
those who have chosen, may still choose, to use their power against me. This 
is my act of self-preservation. 
JUNE 1994 
I have been on a journey and drawn a map, a rudimentary outline of the 
territory I have explored. You may recognise the territory and comfortably 
trace its outline. But then again this territory might be foreign, inaccessible. 
You may even find it badly drawn. So be it. This is after all my map and you 
are free to draw your own. 
NOVEMBER 1996 
journeying is, after all, so fundamental to the way we humans 
think about ourselves and assign our lives a meaning. Every 
second book you read is about some kind of journey, really, 
isn't it? And we constantly talk about paths in life - ways, 
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roads, progress, stages and so on - all travel metaphors when 
you think about it ... 
The sentimental traveller travels simply in order to observe 
the motion of his own sensibilities. (People are awfully snooty 
about the word 'sensibilities' these days. Do you mean 
'feelings'? they ask querulously. If so, say 'feelings'. But I 
think it's quite a useful word, I think it indicates, as the 
simple word 'feelings' doesn't, a self-awareness and even 
appreciation of what you feel, as well as a kind of pleasure, 
which may indeed be unwholesomely effete, in the way the 
different currents of feeling you experience work together to 
produce a whole - an emotional self, if you like .. . ) 
Dessaix, 1996: 241, 243 
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I want to tell you more about the journey that this sentimental traveller 
has taken, about the territory I have negotiated between the there and here, 
between the then and now, between the familiar and the strange. 'Behind this 
story lie the ghosts of other stories - and these relate to power' (Pile & Thrift, 
1995, p.13). 
DECEMBER 1996 
My sharpest memory is of a single instant surrounded by 
dark. I was seven ... It took three decades for that instant to 
unfreeze ... It took a long time for me to ... drive that memory 
from that single place in time out toward the rest of my life ... 
it took so long for me to paste together what happened ... It 
went long unformed for me ... When the truth would be 
unbearable the mind often just blanks it out. But some ghost 
of an event may stay in your head. Then, like the smudge of a 
bad word quickly wiped off a school blackboard, this ghost 
can call undue attention to itself by its very vagueness. You 
keep studying the dim shape of it, as if the original form will 
magically emerge. This blank spot in my past, then, spoke 
most loudly to me by being blank. It was a hole in my life 
that I feared and kept coming back to because I couldn't 
quite fill it in. 
Karr, 1995:3, 5 & 9 
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This is not my story. I did not write it. It is not mine. Yet, 
paradoxically it is mine. My story. There was a dark instant. A frozen 
moment. I was seven. Three decades later that moment, that ghost of an 
event , unfroze and came haunting. So you see the story is mine and not mine 
after all; both and at the same time. Though details may differ, the narrativity, 
our always fictionalised lived experience, is constituted in much the same 
ways, through much the same discourses. Here the I and you dissolve into us, 
the we, the simultaneously same and different, self and other. Personal and 
collective. Individual and social. Paradox and contradiction. 
DECEMBER 1996 
In producing this text I have employed the worn, but not exhausted, metaphors 
of journey, map and territory. Yet the journey, map and territory of which I 
speak/write have not always been metaphoric. Having completed the first 
draft of this text in 1994 I spent the following year travelling overseas with 
my companion. All text annotated '1995' is taken from the journal I kept 
during that time. Those entries map the inner territory I traversed and are 
informed by, and intimately related to, the theoretical reflections prompted by 
the writing of this text. This text is also a map of the intellectual territory in 
which I have travelled. 
This text then represents a coalescence of three journeys: the outward 
bound and geographical; the intellectual and theoretical; the inward bound and 
personal. The direction of these journeys has been signalled by a sense of 
possible, unknown, yet to be imagined destinations. The going has provoked 
anxiety, confusion, doubt, fear and pain. Along the way I haVe been variously 
lost and found, known paths have been disrupted and arrival at familiar or 
anticipated destinations deferred. Yet always I have been seduced to 
continue, not by the promise of arrival, but by my desire to move inexorably 
toward the possible. 
JULY 1996 
auto-ethnography ... the results of a writer's attempts to use 
reflexivity to interrogate the self/other relationship come 
perilously close to narcissism and solipsism. Every childhood 
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slip, every parental flaw ... becomes grist to a 'falsely radical' mill 
... We end up with something like the confessional, romantic hero 
of yore that the writer has just spent blocks of print criticising, 
but now reconsecrated by the act of self-criticism. 
Pile & Thrift, 1995, p.16 
MAY 1995 
I am a boulder. Held at the edge of a precipice by a rubber band. Stretched, 
taut, precarious. About to give way, stretch and catapult over the edge. I am 
awkward. Tense. Distracted. Gently nauseous. I want to lie down and never 
get up. I want to run away. Escape. Retreat. Like a monk. In a monastery. 
But I am not a monk. I am not in a monastery. I am here in this body. 
Flushed. One foot nailed. Spinning. Covering the same territory. Again. 
And again. And again. I've said all this before. And before that. What has 
changed? Nothing? Everything? A little? I'm so wearied by it all. The in-
here journey has halted in an unknown and unrecognisable place whilst the 
out-there journey shambles along in a disinterested way. I feign interest. 
Perhaps in a moment, now and then, it is real. The interest that is, not 
necessarily the moment. This obfuscation, this confusion, is numbing and 
exhausting. The weariness again. To claim me. Body and mind. 
JUNE 1995 
Where do I begin and end? At what point do I freeze the field of possibility to 
say this is me? How do I recognise, and seize, a new moment in which to say, 
this is me also? 
JULY 1995 
I find myself at the edge of my limits, at the boundary, and see no place to go. 
The view beyond is blank, without sign. No path. No door. No light to guide 
me. All I can do is wait in this dark emptiness at the edge. Wait for the 
courage to step into the space beyond my imagination. 
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AUGUST 1995 
I am here at the edge again. Still. I see no way beyond. No way to step. No 
stone, no path, no door, no gate. Blind, mute and lame from lack of courage 
and want of imagination. Perhaps this is my life. To stand constantly at the 
edge, squinting blankly at nothing, searching for a way, a place, to cross. But 
no. I will cross. I don't know where, or when, or even how. and once across I 
don't know what awaits me. I don't know what to expect. I am lost. My 
familiar is disrupted. I don't like it. I want the old comfortable baggy kneed 
life to fold back into. 
SEPTEMBER 1995 
I sit here at the water's edge looking out on the horizon. Shadows of distant 
lands lie beyond the shimmering water, small dark shapes suggest boats. 
Tonight I will sail on these waters, away from where I am and where I have 
been, toward a place I have not yet been but only imagined. I know that this 
place of my imagination may, or may not, correspond to any real place, or at 
least any place believed to be real. The I that sits and writes feels already 
adrift on the waters that lap against the rocks beneath. Adrift, my familiar is 
gone, willingly surrendered, eagerly abandoned. Yet still, a woolly nostalgia 
makes a soft place for memories not wholly forgotten. A moment between. 
Not gone. Not arrived. A moment of stillness at the edge of perpetual waving 
motion. A paradoxical moment of seeing but not knowing; knowing but not 
seeing. What is to become of me? I weep at this beautiful mystery that so 
confounds me, but in weeping am neither self piteous nor sorrowful. Rather I 
am moved to feel both my limits and my possibilities. I trust that beyond the 
limits of this body, this mind, this imagination, lies a realm of possibility more 
subtle than this clumsy instrument can yet discern. 
OCTOBER 1995 
I feel so in need of courage and imagination. I have been so content with 
small things, and artfully enlarged them to seem a little plumper, a little 
rounder, a little more substantial. But they were, are, beneath all this artifice, 
still small. Still tentative. Still safe. I want to be bolder, to stretch the space 
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around myself in different directions, to enlarge myself my sense of who lam, 
of what I can do. But the habit of smallness is not easily disregarded, 
discarded. It has become a comfortable and faithful protective garment, and 
it is really hard now to unravel this self I've been so long knitting. What 
began as something warm and comfortable has become, imperceptibly, a 
straight-jacket whose chosen colours and soft fabrics mask its darker function 
of binding me to a way of life now passed. What is required then is a different 
fabric, texture and hue with which to clothe my newness. But I am no knitter. 
I cannot read a pattern nor wield any needles. Right now I have only a pen 
with which to craft a life. It is blue and I am writing. Words tumble from 
silent lips as I struggle to animate this awkward mouth, this swollen tongue, to 
say I am here. This is me. 
NOVEMBER 1995 
So the end is in sight, but where am I? Where I began? Not quite. But how 
far past? I am frightened. Frightened that I have wasted time or lost a 
moment of possibility. I don't want to go back to where I was. What I was. 
Who I was. But what and who and where was I anyway? To begin with? 
What will alert me to the degree to which I might have changed? Have 
changed? How will I know? What do I want? This troubles me. I am so often 
unclear as to what it is that makes this journey purposeful, bearable. 
Satisfying even. I have my suspicions though. I've come to realise, in these 
last few days, that what I yearn for, what confounds me, is re-inscription. 
Repatterning. Possibility. 
DECEMBER 1995 
My unfurling hand releases the captive beauty of the butterfly. She flies now, 
freely, the incandescence of her wings blindingly lovely as she shimmers into 
possibility. 
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DECEMBER 1996 
we imagine ourselves to be whole, to be complete, to have a full 
identity and certainly not to be open or fragmented; we imagine 
ourselves to be the author, rather than the object, of the narratives 
that constitute our lives. It is this imaginary closure that permits 
us to Act. Still, I would suggest, we are now beginning to learn 
to act in the subjunctive mode, as if we had a full identity, while 
recognising that such a fullness is a fiction, an inevitable failure. 
It is this recognition that permits us to acknowledge the limits of 
our selves and with it the possibility of dialoguing across the 
subsequent differences - the boundary, or horizon from which, as 
Heidegger points out, things unfold; both towards and away from 
US. 
(Chambers, 1994, pp.25-26) 
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Self/text 
In exploring the textual staging of knowledge through culturally 
produced, ideologically situated discourses I have positioned author and text 
as co-constructions, fabrications, fictions. Thus text and author are 
inseparable, one and the same, each a reading of the other. 
In creating this self-reflexive text I have explored some of the 
discursive structures and practices through which the subjects of this text, 
including its author, have been fabricated. This exploration has been located 
in the historical/political/social context of patriarchy and patriarchal relations, 
especially relations of power. 
This self/text has been spoken/written in the space created by the 
painful disruption of my familiar, an experience of betrayal by both the father 
and my own mind/body/memory. It has also been created through critical 
reflection on other, previously invisible, betrayals which serve to maintain 
patriarchal hegemony, power and hierarchical, dualistic, oppositional 
relationships between social subjects and various subjects of knowledge. 
In critically reflecting on the terms of my own fabrication I have 
attempted to articulate possibilities for both personal and social transformation 
and am heartened by Connell's assertion that 
Life histories give rich documentation of personal experience, ideology 
and subjectivity ... But life histories also, paradoxically, document social 
structures, social movements and institutions. That is to say, they give 
rich evidence about impersonal and collective processes as well as about 
subjectivity ... A life history is a project, a unification of practice through 
time. The project that is documented in a life-history is itself the relation 
between the social conditions that determine practice and the future social 
world that practice brings in to being. That is to say, life-history method 
always concerns the making of social life through time. It is literally 
history. 
(Connell, 1995, p.89) 
In the project of re/defining myself and my reality I also hope to 
articulate the possibilities for re/defining our collective selves and realities, 
our relationships and communities. Like Finzi (1992, p.142), I emphasise the 
desire to become, and not a specific model for that becoming. Like Birch 
(1993) I understand that any political, social or personal transformation is 
contingent upon a 'change of consciousness in the way we see our world and 
ourselves in relation to the world' (Birch, 1993, p.19). 
My project is simultaneously personal, social, political and spiritual. It 
is political in that it advocates the need for 'collective activity designed to 
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improve outer world social, economic and environmental conditions' 
(Andrews, 1994, p.10). It is spiritual in that it is motivated by 'a desire to find 
meaning' (Andrews, 1994, p.176). 
This self/text, motivated by a desire for change and a politics of 
possibility, anticipates a future in which the social distinctions currently 
drawn between women and men, female and male, feminine and masculine, 
homosexual and heterosexual are rejected and cease to be meaningful. This 
possible future is one in which both subjectivity and subject relations are 
informed by multiplicity, reciprocity and mutuality. In anticipation of this 
possible future this self/text seeks to critique, contest and locate alternatives to 
those patriarchal structures and practices which form the boundaries of current 
conceptions of subjectivity and subject relations. 
In so doing I aim to contest, critique and disrupt taken-for-granted 
assumptions and meanings as well as commonsense, consensual realities and 
knowledges. Such action is motivated by a search for new definitions of, and 
possibilities for, subject positions and relations which challenge the received 
wisdom, symbols and metaphors which explain and justify that which has 
become familiar, true and real. Such challenge arises from 'a new 
consciousness, a consciousness that (makes) it possible to explore - and 
eventually to construct - new frameworks for analysing and interpreting and 
ultimately changing the social construction of gender' (Haste, 1993, p.129). 
This exploration of self, of social relations, of self-in-relations, 
becomes possible when subjectivity is viewed as the product of 'a lifetime's 
relationship to a diverse spread of social practices and power relations within 
a variety of institutions' (Jackson, 1990, p.264). Thus socially constructed 
identities may be apprehended and understood through critical reflection on 
lived experiences and interrogation of the historical, political and social forces 
through which these subjectivities have been constructed. This requires a 
dialectical understanding of the relationship between ideology, discourse, 
social structures, practices and institutions and lived experience in terms of 
subjectivity and agency. 
My reconstructed fictive narratives of lived experience provide the 
context for my reflections on theory and I have argued that these theories are 
themselves similarly fictive. Having positioned these reflections on academic 
theory as similarly fictitious, I now claim them to be similarly 
autobiographical; they are constructed in terms of my experience in order that 
I may construct and articulate my understanding of, and meanings about, that 
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experience. This proposed reflexivity between experience and theory 
recognises that 
if autobiographies are to question rather than endorse dominant 
ideologies, then personal histories cannot be unanalytically confessional 
but they have to be integrated into a critical frame that excites and 
provokes an engaged questioning in the reader. 
(Jackson, 1990, p.4) 
The critical frame through which I have attempted to construct and 
articulate this self/text is informed by poststructuralist feminist theory. Thus 
informed, my self/text desires an articulation of its many subjects that 
suggests heterogeneity, complexity, plurality, fragmentation, discontinuity, 
contradiction, multiplicity and ambiguity. Yet, in contesting, disrupting and 
hoping to transform any of the discourses represented in this text I remain 
conscious that 'we're always inside the concepts we at the same time wish to 
critique' (Jackson, 1991, p.135). 
Like Lather (1991) I recognise that 'efforts toward a world in which we 
can all flourish' (Lather, 1991, p.158) must be both within and without, within 
and against, the discourses and practices currently available, and that it is from 
this inside/out location that ex-centric, counter-hegemonic discourses and 
practices may be produced. I thus seek discourses that allow the subject to be 
thought of in terms of both interior and exterior, agency and structure, inside 
and out. 
Outside and inside are both intimate - they are always ready to be 
reversed, to change their hostility. If there exists a borderline between 
such an inside and outside, this surface is painful on both sides. 
(Bachelard, 1964, p.217-8) 
Disruption, transgression and attempts to traverse this borderline, and 
the discursive boundaries of subjectivity, thus involve pain; a painful 
disruption of the familiar. 
Disrupting the familiar 
In wanting to disrupt the familiar I want also to avoid replacing it with yet 
another fossilised familiar with its own boundaries, tactics and strategies, 
structures and practices. I thus propose a succession of multiple, always 
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disrupted familiars. Like Pile and Thrift I understand that 'theories are not 
'objects' but living territories of contemplation, constantly on the move' (Pile 
& Thrift, 1995, p.24). 
A final strand is my desire to write my way to some understanding of the 
deeply unsettling discourses of postmodernism, in a way that doesn't 
totalise, that doesn't present emergent, multiply-sited, contradictory 
movements as fixed and monolithic. To write 'postmodern' is to 
simultaneously use and call into question a discourse, to both challenge 
and describe dominant meaning systems in ways that construct our own 
categories and frameworks as contingent, positional, partial. 
(Lather, 1991, p.1) 
As much as I have tried to avoid a final synthesis or reductionist 
totalising statements and positions, I have also attempted to avoid non-
contextualised, a-historical, a-political and a-social statements and positions. 
Still, I recognise the partiality of my text, its incompleteness, its gaps, 
omissions and failures. In attempting to make connections across a variety of 
discourses I have constructed a necessarily partial view of the subjects of my 
inquiry, an inquiry which represents my attempt to shift myself, and any 
willing reader, 'into ways of thinking that can take us beyond ourselves' 
(Lather, 1991, p.164). 
Like Grosz (1989) and Lather (1991) I am attempting to exploit the 
contradiction and ambiguity to be found in a range of available discourses in 
order to create a space in which it is possible to think, feel and act differently. 
Yet, the question remains 
What difference to the world does our theory make? A text that might 
help enable movement beyond received habits of thought and practice is a 
form of political intervention, even given the (largely unknowable) limits 
of discursive challenges. 
(Lather, 1991, p.154) 
Discursive challenge 
I argue that discourses always limit thought and action and are in 
constant need of contestation, critique and in/ter/vention. Such a view 
recognises the power/knowledge nexus through which certain discourses 
attain hegemony over others. 
Discursive challenge simultaneously recognises and contests the limits 
of available discourses and calls for in/ter/vention in creating discursive 
spaces beyond those limits. 
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I position this discursive challenge as a political activity and an act of 
creation; disrupting and transforming the familiar and making something other 
than what went before. Like Grosz (1989) I recognise that in undertaking 
creative, political action of this sort we must 'become familiar with the 
patriarchal discourses, knowledges and social practices which define and 
constrain them: these provide the only sources and tools against patriarchy' 
(Grosz, 1989, p.133). Thus discursive challenge is located simultaneously 
inside and outside, within and against, the discourses it seeks to contest. 
Like Finzi (1992) I recognise that in contesting and transforming 
patriarchal structures and practices it is necessary to recognise and reconstruct 
'the external and internal history which has made us what we are' (Finzi, 1992, 
p.141). In the course of this transformation other possibilities, other ways of 
being and relating, will become visible and available. 
Poststructuralist feminist theory provides a context in which I am able 
to ask questions about what I had previously 'not thought to think, about what 
has been muted, repressed, unheard' (Lather, 1991, p.156) from both inside 
and outside myself, from that which is both within and against me. Like 
Walkerdine I recognise the need to 'create some other stories, which face the 
present and confront it' (1995, p.330). My emphasis on fiction, narrative and 
performance locates this self/text in a theoretical context which anticipates the 
possibilities for creative in/ter/vention, for the production of new narratives 
and performances. 
My understanding of poststructuralist feminist theory recognises that it 
does not invent a new structure to replace the old, but rather, 'provides insights 
into the discursive mechanisms which hold existing structures in place' 
(Davies, 1993, p.198). These insights allow the formation of different 
relationships to the existing structures which, no longer understood as 
absolute, are instead understood to be open to change through both individual 
and collective action. Whilst the constitutive powers of these structures must 
be acknowledged, Davies suggests they can also be 'laughed out of existence, 
played with, disrupted, or used to manufacture new possibilities' (1993, 
p.198). These openings 'occur in language, individual psyches and in the 
material and symbolic structures in which we are all embedded' (Davies, 
1993, p.200). 
It is obvious then, that we need to imaginatively move beyond existing 
discursive, interactional and structural constraints and to construct new 
storylines and new ways of relating to our bodies, if we are to escape the 
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relentless imposition of binary definitions dividing male from female, 
heterosexual from homosexual, limiting ourselves and our sexuality. 
(Davies, 1993, p.148) 
I recognise that the exploration of subject positions beyond dualistic 
conceptions of subjectivities will require, and result in, 'beings who are 
complex, mobile, open' (Cixous, 1986, p.102). In accepting the other as a 
component of oneself, subjects are made 'much richer, more various, stronger 
and - to the extent that they are mobile - very fragile' (Cixous, 1986, p.102). It 
is only in this condition of fragility that we are able to invent and this 
invention is not possible 'without there being in the inventing subject an 
abundance of the others of variety ... whole populations issuing from the 
unconscious, and in each suddenly animated desert, the springing up of selves 
one didn't know' (Cixous, 1986, pp.202-3). 
The role of invention and imagination is thus critical to the 
re/envisioning of a possible, future society. For Giroux (1983) this vision is 
located in 'the gap between the society as it presently exists and society as it 
might be' (Giroux, 1983, p.30). It is in this gap, this space of freedom, this 
elsewhere, that new meanings, knowledges, realities and subjectivites may be 
produced and performed. 
Changes in behaviour go hand in hand with changes in consciousness: to 
become a feminist is to develop a radically altered consciousness of 
oneself, of others, and of what, for lack of a better term, I shall call 'social 
reality'. 
(Bartky, 1990, p.12) 
Self/knowledge/reality 
The epistemology which results from this process of in/ter/vention 
emphasises, and is constructed upon, the continuous interaction between who 
we imagine ourselves to be and how we understand the world, between our 
constructed subjectivity and our constructed reality. This interactive 
epistemology emphasises the need for theory to be self reflexive, focussing 
not only on the outer world but also on ourselves and our relation to that 
world. Self reflexive theory building involves critical examination of our 
historical, political and social location, our actions, motives, values, desires, 
perceptions, thoughts and emotions. 'Our efforts to reinterpret and refine our 
emotions, thoughts and actions are necessary to our theoretical investigation' 
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(Jaggar, 1990, p.164). Thus our responses to, and actions in, the world change 
as we conceptualize it differently. Further, these changing responses and 
actions stimulate new insights, new connections, new knowledges, new 
subjectivities and new realities. Thus the reconstruction of ourselves is 
inseparable from the reconstruction of our knowledge and our social reality. 
In order to develop an effective politics of everyday life we need to 
understand better than we do now not only the process of personality 
development, but the micropolitics of our most ordinary transactions, the 
ways in which we inscribe and reinscribe our subjection in the ordinary. 
(Bartky, 1990, p.119) 
What I am searching out then, in this self-reflexive constructed text, is 
a radically altered understanding of self, society and reality. I search too, for a 
radically altered sense of subjectivity, as the embodiment of an altered 
consciousness, understanding, knowledge and way of seeing. This is a 
political project of transformation, a politics of possibility in which previously 
axiomatic realities are interrogated, disrupted and transformed, where we 
come to understand 'what we are and where we are in the light of what we are 
not yet' (Bartky, 1990, p.15). Like Bartky I recognise that we come to 
understand who/what/where we are in the light of what we are in the process 
of becoming. In coming to see things differently we are able to imagine, 
invent and enact possibilities for empowering, liberating personal change and 
social action. 
Transformative practice thus explores the limits of choice and 
constraint in the construction of subjectivity, knowledge and reality, and 
understands that these limits are determined by the regimes of power and truth 
that operate in a given historical/political/social moment. The validity and 
hegemony of those truths accorded authority in such moments is thus opened 
to question and disruption. The naturalness, rightness and obviousness of 
social arrangements, taken-for-granted knowledges and meanings and 
conceptions of reality are challenged so that social subjects may see both the 
constraints and the potential for change in their situations: 'The subject is not 
only a signified but can disrupt or transform the pre-given chain' (Flax, 1992, 
p.204). 
This disruption begins with the problematisation of an apparent, 
naturalised reality, of taken for granted, commonsense knowledges and of 
habitual, repetitive performances that come to be accepted as evidence of a 
true, natural self. Poststructuralist feminist theory makes visible the ways in 
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which these realities, knowledges and subjectivities are 'created and sustained 
through text and talk so that we can begin the awesome task of finding other 
ways of speaking/writing ourselves into existence' (Davies, 1994, p.35). 
In the production of this self/text I am attempting to explore and 
transcend the limits of an illusory rational unitary subject and imagine both 
myself and other social subjects to be populated by multiple selves. Through 
my self/text I am attempting to speak/write of possibilities for disrupting the 
familiar, for generating multiple positions and coming to know in multiple 
ways, so that the familiar oversimplified and impoverished division of all 
phenomena, including human subjects, in terms of oppositional dualisms 
ceases to be meaningful, ceases to constitute commonsense, and ceases to 
determine the limits of a socially constructed consensual reality. With the 
meaningful distinctions and differences between male and female disrupted, 
space is created for the construction of a vision of the possible, a vision 
beyond what is currently taken as the limit of the real. In so doing multiple 
realities disrupt the hegemony of the static hardened patriarchal reality which 
assumes its claim to singular and uncontestable truth; that being the 
fundamental dichotomised distinction between man and woman, self and 
other, where the other can only exist as opposition. 
The intention then, in creating a picture of an alternative society, is to 
'actually change the current reality by means of creating a model, or pieces of 
model, of a society organised along different lines' (Eisenstein, 1990, p.xiii). 
Thus, what is at issue is the ways in which notions of sex, gender and 
sexuality are bounded by clusters of attributes assigned to women and men on 
the basis of genital sex. These clusters establish boundaries for both 
acceptable and unacceptable, normal and deviant behaviours, and their 
common sense, taken-for-granted, and fixed meanings render them natural, 
and hence invisible as discursive constructions. 
The formulation of possibilities for an alternative society, and altered 
social relations, requires critical reflection on the ways in which 'we are all 
caught up in ideological processes in our everyday lives' (Gilbert & Taylor, 
1991, p.33). Critical reflection on the ways in which gender is constructed in 
the intersection between culture, social structure, power and subjectivity not 
only illuminates the process of that construction but the possibility of its 
transformation. Conscious, intentional action that is historically, politically 
and socially situated can lead to the transformation of seemingly rigid 
structures and practices. 
Lacuna: a closing statement 	 233 
As Davies (1993) makes clear any attempts to disrupt old cultural 
patterns and invent new ones must simultaneously deal with individual 
psyches, social structures and patterns, and the discursive practices through 
which they are constituted. 
Poststructuralist feminist theory provides the discursive means through 
which we might recognise, articulate and transform the ways in which we are 
constituted in patterns of being and desire, and of relations between subjects. 
Since the subject is constructed within the context of social relations it is 
understood as a self-in-relations, and 'the search for a life lived well, where 
humans flourish, necessitates the search for new modes of relationship' 
(Porter, 1991, p.22). 
I imagine these new modes of relationship to be characterised not by 
domination, oppression, suppression, denial or destruction of the other, but 
rather, by differentiation, identification, tolerance, acceptance and connection 
between subjects. Such relationships create a reality comprised of 'groups of 
relations that intersect, interact, and change in the process but are not in 
essential opposition' (Porter, 1991, p.22). Such a view envisions the 
possibility of mutual, reciprocal, non-exploitative human relationships. This 
concept of relational subjects, of self-in-relations, forms the basis of a 
'narrative sense of self which confirms individuality and the social basis of our 
selfhood through the intermeshing of personal histories' (Porter, 1991, p.196). 
I am attempting, in this self-reflexive text, to produce a narrative sense 
of myself, a self that is simultaneously symbolic, imaginary and real, a self 
discursively produced in the relationship between an embodied subject 
position and social structure. In so doing I am searching for spaces of 
freedom from within which I may 'speak in order to change things' (Pile & 
Thrift, 1995, p.285). 
In constructing this self/text I am attempting to articulate a subject 
which is 'in some ways detachable, reversible and changeable; in other ways 
fixed, solid and dependable; located in, with and by power, knowledge and 
social relationships' (Pile & Thrift, 1995, p.12). 
In so doing I am also seeking 'new paths, new performances and new 
politics' (Pile & Thrift, 1995, p.12). I am arguing for a politics of possibility 
actualised through a politics of love and understand these to be founded on 'an 
ethics of difference, which can express and encourage an openness of outlook 
based upon a freedom to move across border and boundaries in pursuit of new 
senses of self and other' (Pile & Thrift, 1995, p.21). I understand this move 
across borders and boundaries to involve traversing the difference between the 
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familiar and the strange, where this difference is understood in terms of 'a 
non- hierarchical, qualitative multiplicity, which can realise continuity without 
assimilation' (Pile & Thrift, 1995, p.20). I understand too that this is 'a 
determinedly partial activity ... an ethics of wanting to know, not knowing and 
not wanting to know ... a Necessary, Passionate fiction' (Pile & Thrift, 1995, 
p.50). 
Closure 
I recognise here at the end of my text, as throughout it, that I am in 
danger of passing superficially over what I find to be difficult theoretical 
material. It is not my intention to debate the relative merits of competing 
discourses. Rather I am foraging among these various discourses and theories 
in search of insights into the ways in which I might have negotiated, and of 
how I might renegotiate, my sense of myself as occupying a particular set of 
subject positions. 
I recognise that this project of personal, political and social change is 
made possible through the willing struggle to contest and transform the 
discursive practices through which subjectivity, knowledge and reality are 
constructed: 'Making something new is to imagine different grids on reality, 
other views on the world' (Gilbert & Taylor, 1991, p.138). 
The future must no longer be determined by the past. I do not deny that 
the effects of the past are still with us. But I refuse to strengthen them by 
repeating them, to confer upon them an irremovability the equivalent of 
destiny ... Anticipation is imperative. 
(Grosz, 1994, p.xiii) 
The reality that I seek, that I imagine and anticipate, is one that 
refuses, disrupts and traverses the boundaries between male and female, 
masculine and feminine, heterosexual and homosexual, mind and body, 
conscious and unconscious, fiction and reality. In assuming that I will, in my 
search, encounter other subjects, I also assume that together we may confront 
and negotiate our own/shared subjectivities and understand 'ourselves as the 
fictional subjects of our own histories, with all the intensity and passion that is 
entailed in being and becoming the specific subject that one is' (Davies, 1994, 
p.42). 
Lacuna: a closing statement 	 235 
There is 'destiny' no more than there is 'nature' or 'essence' as such. 
Rather, there are living structures that are caught and sometimes rigidly 
set within historico-cultural limits so mixed up with the scene of history 
that for a long time it has been impossible (and it is still very difficult) to 
think or ever imagine an 'elsewhere'. 
(Cixous & Clement, 1986, p.83) 
This self/text is my attempt to imagine, to begin to imagine, an 
elsewhere. 
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